成唯識論了義燈 2.61

2.61

論云：勿第二月等，能生五識故，准瞿波師二十唯識釋，一云唯意識得，此中為五識喻，非緣義等，故無有過。以五識是有法收，同喻無有無所立過。此意若以和合為有法，於五識設所緣、非緣為法，即喻中有所立不成過。以經部師亦不許五緣第二月故，今既和合於五識名有法，設所緣、非緣為法，五識既在有法，第二月是第六所緣，以無體故不是緣義，故得為喻，無所立不成過，具解如疏。有釋云：瞿波二解，一許五識緣第二月。護法不許，評二說中，瞿波順文違理，以緣月故順文。而現量識緣非量境，故違於義。今謂理難，若現量識緣非量境，即違理者，遍計所執聖者達無，得說遍計，為凡聖境。五緣非量境違何正理？設許非理亦非順文。觀所緣云：設所緣、非緣，明非實許。故護法勝。破經部宗中所緣緣義者。有云：如聚實微以成假色，即以實微為緣，假相為所緣，別起行相攝屬見分，即當大乘相分所攝，他攝此相為行相，故說為見分，十九部同。今者，經部取彼假相，故離識取。若爾，假相非五識緣，實微是緣。云何破彼云和合相，應非五緣？彼已自許假相非緣，今者破他相符之失。今解云：汎說所緣緣即如彼解，據實和合能生識故，即為緣也，所以破之。問：如經部說，積微為麁攬多法故，是假非實。依大乘宗，且如眼識及同時心所所帶相分，皆各熏成本質之種，後生現行，為從一起，為多共成。若從一起，熏習同時勢力復等，有生、不生不應道理。若許皆生即各各別，心王、心所不同一所緣。若多共生如何非假？答：不同彼許不以種體和合成一，以別別種共生一現。以本同緣於一質故，種在一識所生之色，一體密合，故不是假。又復彼許離實無別和合相故，故相是假。大乘種、現不定一故，所以是實。又，設許假非無體假，故五識緣，彼無體假故非五緣。

The treatise says: "[Otherwise,] a second moon and so forth would be able to generate the five consciousnesses." Following Master Gopa's commentary on the Viṃśikā, one explanation states that it is perceived by the mental consciousness alone; here it serves as an example for the five consciousnesses, not in the sense of being an object-condition (ālambanapratyaya), and therefore there is no fault. Since the five consciousnesses are included within the subject (dharmin), the positive example does not have the fault of lacking what is to be proved (sādhyavikala). The meaning is that if the aggregated state (saṃghāta) were taken as the subject, and "being assumed as an object-condition yet not being a condition" were the property to be proved (dharma) regarding the five consciousnesses, then there would be the fault of lacking what is to be proved in the example. For the Sautrāntikas also do not accept that the five consciousnesses perceive a second moon. Now, since the aggregated state in relation to the five consciousnesses is named the subject, and "being assumed as an object-condition yet not being a condition" is the property to be proved—the five consciousnesses already being within the subject, and the second moon being an object of the sixth consciousness, which, having no real substance, is not a condition in meaning—it can therefore serve as an example, free from the fault of lacking what is to be proved. The complete explanation is as given in the Commentary (Shu).
There is another explanation that says: Gopa has two explanations; one accepts that the five consciousnesses perceive the second moon, whereas Dharmapāla does not accept it. In evaluating the two explanations, Gopa accords with the literal text but contradicts reason, because perceiving the moon accords with the literal text, yet for a direct-perception consciousness (pratyakṣa) to perceive a non-valid cognitive object (apramāṇa) contradicts the doctrinal principle. Now I say that this objection based on reason is difficult to maintain. If a direct-perception consciousness perceiving a non-valid object contradicts reason, then when the noble ones comprehend the non-existence of the imagined nature (parikalpita), one would not be able to say that the imagined nature is an object for both ordinary beings and noble ones. When the five consciousnesses perceive a non-valid object, what correct principle does it contradict? Even if granted as contrary to reason, it also does not accord with the literal text. The Ālambanaparīkṣā says: "hypothetically an object, but not a condition," which clearly indicates it is not truly accepted. Therefore Dharmapāla is superior.
Regarding the refutation of the meaning of object-condition in the Sautrāntika school: Some say that just as gathering real subtle atoms forms a nominal form, one takes the real atoms as the condition and the nominal appearance as the object (ālambana), separately giving rise to an cognitive representation (ākāra) that is subsumed under the perceiving part (darśanabhāga). This corresponds to what is subsumed under the object-part (nimittabhāga) in the Mahāyāna; other schools subsume this appearance under the cognitive representation, and hence call it the perceiving part, which is shared by nineteen schools. Now, the Sautrāntikas grasp that nominal appearance, and thus grasp it apart from consciousness. If so, the nominal appearance is not the condition of the five consciousnesses, whereas the real atoms are the condition. Why does the refutation against them say: "The aggregated appearance should not be an object of the five"? They themselves have already accepted that the nominal appearance is not a condition; now to refute them would commit the error of proving what is already accepted (siddhasādhana). Now I explain: Generally speaking, the object-condition is as they explain it; yet in actuality, because the aggregated state can generate consciousness, it serves as a condition, which is why it is refuted.
Question: According to the Sautrāntika, accumulating atoms into a coarse object brings together multiple phenomena, and hence it is nominal, not real. According to the Mahāyāna school, take for instance the visual consciousness and the object-parts borne by its concurrent mental factors: each perfumes and forms seeds of the fundamental substance (vastu); when these later produce actual manifestations, do they arise from one seed or are they jointly formed from many? If they arise from one, since their perfuming is simultaneous and their power is equal, it would be unreasonable for some to produce and others not to produce. If you allow that all produce, then each would be distinct, and the primary mind and mental factors would not have the same single object. If many jointly produce it, how could it not be nominal?
Answer: It is not like what they accept. It is not that the substances of the seeds aggregate to become one, but that distinct seeds jointly produce a single actual manifestation. Because originally they jointly take the single substance as an object, the form produced by the seeds in a single consciousness is seamlessly united as one substance; therefore it is not nominal. Furthermore, they accept that apart from the real there is no separate aggregated appearance, and hence the appearance is nominal. In the Mahāyāna, seeds and actual manifestations are not necessarily identical, and therefore it is real. Moreover, even if conceded to be nominal, it is not a nominality without substance, and thus is an object of the five consciousnesses; their nominality lacks substance, and thus is not an object of the five.