成唯識論了義燈 2.62

2.62

破古薩婆多云：非諸極微共和合位，可與五識各作所緣，此識上無極，彼相故者，《要集》云：本末二計《婆沙》、《俱舍》及《正理論》自有識證，第二麁相曾未見教，有說一一各發麁相不異和集，此難准知。今謂不爾，何者准此論文？新薩婆多既云：展轉相資有麁相生，故知古師七極微聚，雖不相資有麁相起。然由七聚有似麁相，不爾寧許為五識緣，等極微故。又新翻古，既說相資有麁相起，明知古師雖有麁相，不由相資，故本末異。彼云：第二麁相曾未見教，即此論說可非教耶？故慈恩、西明所說不謬。又云：有說一一各發麁相，不異和集，此亦難知。今謂極顯，前文古師共和合位，可與五識各作所緣，即有麁相但不相資。新薩婆多後更正解，展轉相資，有麁相生，為五識境。在文極顯何謂難知？問破薩婆多云：瓶甌等物極微等者，緣彼相識應無差別者，為五識緣為不緣耶？若非五識緣，云何破五根境中說？若五識緣，彼宗不許五識緣假，若瓶等非假，云何前破能成極微？取以為喻破非實有耶？西明云：瓶等是假，是意識緣，若爾彼救，瓶、甌極微，體雖無異，而妄意識生覺解故，如大乘師意亂生解。此亦不爾，大乘亂意，所緣境無，如空花等，彼有體故。又問：若見意境，何故五境中破？意境應是法處收故。答：如大乘宗長短等色，亦色處故。今又助解，瓶、甌等假，五雖不緣，彼計長等，依瓶等有，體實有故是五識境。故《觀所緣》云：非形別故別，故知正難長等形色，舉長等色所依瓶、甌，以因瓶、甌顯長、短等，非正為喻。如舉空、瓶為常、無常二喻依等。然不障依亂不亂識緣境虛實故。有引瞿波論師云：五識及根亂不亂故，引三種意生，既言識、根俱亂不亂，明五亦緣第二月也。有人改三為二，意緣於假及實二境故。西明云：三種意識緣三境別，故云三意：謂一緣假；二緣實；三緣二，故云三意。此非薩婆多義，不可為證。今更解云：彼許五識緣瓶等假，以有體故，不爾何故在五境破。

Regarding the refutation of the ancient Sarvāstivādins: "The state where atoms are gathered together cannot each serve as an object for the five consciousnesses, because this consciousness lacks that atom's appearance." The Yaoji states: "Regarding the two theories of the root and branch [Sarvāstivāda], the Vibhāṣā, the Kośa, and the Nyāyānusāra have their own textual attestations; as for the second coarse appearance, no authoritative text has ever been seen. There are those who say that each [atom] individually produces a coarse appearance, not different from the assembled state; this objection should be understood accordingly." Now I say this is not so. Why? Following this treatise's text, since the new Sarvāstivāda says that they mutually assist one another so that a coarse appearance arises, we know that although the ancient masters held that an aggregation of seven atoms did not mutually assist each other to produce a coarse appearance, nevertheless due to the aggregation of seven there was a resemblance of a coarse appearance; otherwise, why would they allow it to be an object of the five consciousnesses, since it would be equivalent to atoms? Moreover, since the new translation overturns the ancient, stating that they mutually assist each other so that a coarse appearance arises, it is clear that although the ancient masters had a coarse appearance, it was not due to mutual assistance; hence the root and branch theories differ. As for its claim that "as for the second coarse appearance, no authoritative text has ever been seen"—could this very treatise's statement not be an authoritative text? Therefore, what Ci'en and Ximing have said is not erroneous.
Again, it says: "There are those who say that each individually produces a coarse appearance, not different from the assembled state; this too is difficult to understand." Now I say it is extremely clear. In the earlier passage, the ancient masters held that in the gathered state they could each serve as an object for the five consciousnesses, which means there was a coarse appearance, but they did not mutually assist each other. Later, the new Sarvāstivādins corrected this explanation, holding that they mutually assist each other so that a coarse appearance arises to serve as the object of the five consciousnesses. This is extremely clear in the text; why say it is difficult to understand?
Question: In refuting the Sarvāstivāda, it is said: "If the atoms of objects like jars and bowls are equal, the consciousness that perceives their appearance should have no difference." Is this an object of the five consciousnesses or not? If it is not an object of the five consciousnesses, why is it stated within the refutation of the objects of the five faculties? If it is an object of the five consciousnesses, their school does not allow that the five consciousnesses perceive what is nominal; if jars and the like are not nominal, why were they taken as an example in the previous refutation of the constituent atoms to refute their real existence? Ximing says: jars and the like are nominal and are objects of the mental consciousness. If so, they might defend themselves by saying that although the substance of the atoms in jars and bowls does not differ, erroneous mental consciousness produces cognitive understanding, just as in the Mahāyāna master's view a distracted mind produces understanding. This too is not so: for the distracted mind in Mahāyāna, the object perceived does not exist, like sky-flowers, whereas their objects possess substance. Furthermore, it is asked: If it is an object of the mental consciousness, why is it refuted among the five objects? An object of the mind should be included in the sphere of phenomena (dharmāyatana). Answer: Just as in the Mahāyāna school, forms such as long and short are also within the sphere of visible forms (rūpāyatana). Now I offer an additional explanation: although the five consciousnesses do not perceive the nominality of jars, bowls, and the like, they hold that shape-forms like length exist based on jars and the like, and their substances are real existents, and therefore are objects of the five consciousnesses. Hence the Ālambanaparīkṣā says: "Because shapes are not distinct, they are not distinct." Thus we know that the direct objection is against shape-forms like length, and it adduces jars and bowls as the bases of forms like length in order to make long, short, and so forth manifest by way of jars and bowls, not as the primary example—just as one adduces space and a jar as the two supports for the examples of permanence and impermanence. Yet this does not obstruct the unreality or reality of the objects perceived depending on whether consciousness is confused or non-confused.
Some cite Master Gopa as saying: "Because the five consciousnesses and faculties are confused or non-confused, they induce three kinds of mental consciousness to arise." Since he says that both consciousness and faculty are confused or non-confused, it is clear that the five consciousnesses also perceive a second moon. Someone altered "three" to "two", on the grounds that the mind perceives both nominal and real objects. Ximing says: three kinds of mental consciousness perceive three different objects, hence called "three minds"—namely, the first perceives the nominal; the second perceives the real; the third perceives both, hence called three minds. This is not the doctrine of the Sarvāstivāda and cannot serve as proof. Now I explain further: they allow that the five consciousnesses perceive nominal entities such as jars because they have substance; otherwise, why would they be refuted within the five objects?