成唯識論了義燈 3.35

3.35

《論》：名詮自性，句詮差別者。辨自性差別，如因明斷。本疏成立他方，有佛云：除此三千界外他方，亦應時有佛出，教化眾生，有人天眾生故，猶如此土。不言定有、恒有，以有劫中，無佛出故，復除成、壞，非時有故，簡不定過。有解改因云：彼有所化人天故，意避成、壞，雖有人天，而非所化。根性未成故。《要集》云：前量有不定過，為如成，壞，劫有人天，故無佛出世。今謂不爾。於無過中，妄生過想，前量不言，恒定有故，自許不定故。今為不定，云有人天眾生，故佛定不出，如成壞等劫。此意餘方定無佛出，以有人天眾生故，如此成、壞劫。此量不定，破前定量，亦令不定。即似《理門》，似共不定。故《理門》云：由用不定，同法等因。成立自宗，方便說他，亦有此法，由是便成似共不定。今所立量，雖非即彼，然似於彼，又無共同喻，以成壞劫。大乘亦許有佛出故。前云時有不簡報化，如《法華經》，眾生見劫盡大火所燒時，我此土安穩等。又彼自立量云：他方世界人天有根性成器者；以住劫減時人天有情故；如此土住劫減時。令謂此量是真不定，為如此有佛住劫減時，人天有根性成器，為如此無佛住劫減時，人天無根性成器，故成不定。　《要集》又於本第二量，作決定相違量云：光明等上，定無名等；以非聲故；如虛空等。此亦不爾，無共同喻。大乘亦許名等依空，雖不依如，依識變故，無文障故。問：言便繕那，此云扇，相好、根形。味此即是鹽，能顯物中味故。味即是文。准此解意，文即能顯。云何前言而體不能顯耶？答：顯有二義：一、顯名、句；二、能顯義。文能顯名、句，名句由文有故。名、句能顯義，文從名、句能顯體，非顯義故。前後義亦不相違。問：字體非能顯？從彼名、句說為顯。聲性非能詮，從名說能顯。答：名、句依文近，字從名說顯，句等望聲疎，聲不從名顯。問：文體非能詮，為因從果顯，字體非能表，為果從因表？答：名、句必帶文，文從名等顯，聲不必有字，字不從聲表。問：名、句為攬字成，為別有體，若別有體，豈可離聲？一剎那聲必有字故，若即攬成，名、句與文，體性何別？答：有二解：一、云各別，一剎那聲多屈曲故；二、云攬成，總別有異故。三體別，後釋為正。如前第一卷已辨。

[Regarding] the text of the Śāstra: “Names express essential nature, phrases express differentiation,” distinguishing essential nature and differentiation is as determined in Hetuvidyā. The original Commentary, in establishing that there are Buddhas in other directions, states: “Outside this trichiliocosm, in other directions there should also at times be Buddhas appearing to teach and transform sentient beings; because there are human and heavenly sentient beings; just like this land.” It does not say “definitely exist” or “constantly exist,” because during some eons no Buddha appears; furthermore, excluding the eons of formation and destruction, because they do not appear at those times, thus averting the fallacy of inconclusiveness (anaikāntika). Another explanation alters the reason to: “Because there are humans and gods who are to be transformed,” meaning to avoid [the eons of] formation and destruction, where although there are humans and gods, they are not to be transformed because their faculties have not yet matured. The Yaoji states: “The previous syllogism commits the fallacy of inconclusiveness: Is it like the eons of formation and destruction, where there are humans and gods, and therefore no Buddha appears in the world?” Now I say this is not so. In what is without fault, one falsely conceives the thought of a fault; because the previous syllogism did not say “constantly and definitely exist,” admitting an occasional nature itself. Now making it inconclusive, saying “because there are human and heavenly sentient beings, therefore Buddhas definitely do not appear, like the eons of formation and destruction, etc.”—this intention holds that in other directions definitely no Buddha appears, because there are human and heavenly sentient beings, like the eons of formation and destruction here. This syllogism's inconclusiveness refutes the previous determinate syllogism, making it also inconclusive. This resembles the pseudo-common inconclusive (asādhāraṇa-anaikāntika) in the Nyāyamukha. Thus the Nyāyamukha says: “Through using an inconclusive, similar-attribute reason to establish one’s own thesis, one expediently states that the other also has this property, whereby it turns into a pseudo-common inconclusive.” Although the syllogism established now is not literally that, it resembles it. Furthermore, there is no common similar example, because during the eons of formation and destruction the Mahāyāna also accepts that Buddhas appear. As said earlier, “at times existing” does not differentiate reward and transformation [bodies], as in the Lotus Sūtra: “When sentient beings see the eon ending and being consumed by a great fire, this land of mine remains tranquil,” etc. Again, he himself constructs the syllogism: “In other world realms there are humans and gods whose faculties have matured into vessels; because they are human and heavenly sentient beings during the period of decline in the eon of duration; like the period of decline in the eon of duration in this land.” Now I say that this syllogism is truly inconclusive: Is it like the period of decline in the eon of duration in this land where there is a Buddha, in which humans and gods have faculties matured into vessels; or is it like the period of decline in the eon of duration in this land where there is no Buddha, in which humans and gods do not have faculties matured into vessels? Hence it becomes inconclusive. The Yaoji again, against the second syllogism of the root text, formulates an opposing conclusive syllogism (viruddha-avyabhicārin): “Upon illumination and the like, there are definitely no names and so forth; because they are not sound; like empty space, etc.” This too is not so, for there is no common similar example. The Mahāyāna also accepts that names and so forth are based on space; though not based on suchness, because they are based on the transformations of consciousness, there is no hindrance of phonemes. Question: It is said vyañjana is translated here as fan, bodily marks and signs, sense-organ shapes, or flavor—this is salt, because it can manifest flavor in things. Flavor is precisely phoneme (vyañjana). In accordance with this explanation, phonemes are indeed capable of manifesting. Why did you say before that their essence cannot manifest? Answer: “Manifesting” has two senses: first, manifesting names and phrases; second, manifesting meaning. Phonemes can manifest names and phrases, because names and phrases exist through phonemes. Names and phrases can manifest meaning; phonemes take the capacity to manifest essence from names and phrases, not manifesting meaning. The earlier and later senses are not contradictory. Question: If the essence of a syllable cannot manifest, yet from those names and phrases it is said to manifest; and the nature of sound cannot express, yet from names it is said to manifest? Answer: Names and phrases rely closely on phonemes, so syllables are called manifesting through names; phrases, etc., are distant with respect to sound, so sound is not called manifesting through names. Question: If the essence of phonemes cannot express, being the cause, is it manifested through the effect; and if the essence of syllables cannot signify, being the effect, is it signified through the cause? Answer: Names and phrases must entail phonemes, so phonemes are manifested from names, etc.; sound does not necessarily have syllables, so syllables are not signified from sound. Question: Are names and phrases formed by gathering syllables, or do they have distinct essences? If they have distinct essences, how could they be detached from sound, since a single moment of sound must have syllables? If they are formed by gathering them, what difference in essence is there between names, phrases, and phonemes? Answer: There are two explanations: First, they are each distinct, because a single moment of sound has many inflections. Second, they are formed by gathering, because there is a difference between the whole and the parts. The three essences being distinct is the correct interpretation among the later explanations, as already distinguished in the first fascicle above.