成唯識論了義燈 3.35

3.35

[Regarding] the text of the Śāstra: “Names express essential nature, phrases express differentiation,” distinguishing essential nature and differentiation is as determined in Hetuvidyā. The original Commentary, in establishing that there are Buddhas in other directions, states: “Outside this trichiliocosm, in other directions there should also at times be Buddhas appearing to teach and transform sentient beings; because there are human and heavenly sentient beings; just like this land.” It does not say “definitely exist” or “constantly exist,” because during some eons no Buddha appears; furthermore, excluding the eons of formation and destruction, because they do not appear at those times, thus averting the fallacy of inconclusiveness (anaikāntika). Another explanation alters the reason to: “Because there are humans and gods who are to be transformed,” meaning to avoid [the eons of] formation and destruction, where although there are humans and gods, they are not to be transformed because their faculties have not yet matured. The Yaoji states: “The previous syllogism commits the fallacy of inconclusiveness: Is it like the eons of formation and destruction, where there are humans and gods, and therefore no Buddha appears in the world?” Now I say this is not so. In what is without fault, one falsely conceives the thought of a fault; because the previous syllogism did not say “constantly and definitely exist,” admitting an occasional nature itself. Now making it inconclusive, saying “because there are human and heavenly sentient beings, therefore Buddhas definitely do not appear, like the eons of formation and destruction, etc.”—this intention holds that in other directions definitely no Buddha appears, because there are human and heavenly sentient beings, like the eons of formation and destruction here. This syllogism's inconclusiveness refutes the previous determinate syllogism, making it also inconclusive. This resembles the pseudo-common inconclusive (asādhāraṇa-anaikāntika) in the Nyāyamukha. Thus the Nyāyamukha says: “Through using an inconclusive, similar-attribute reason to establish one’s own thesis, one expediently states that the other also has this property, whereby it turns into a pseudo-common inconclusive.” Although the syllogism established now is not literally that, it resembles it. Furthermore, there is no common similar example, because during the eons of formation and destruction the Mahāyāna also accepts that Buddhas appear. As said earlier, “at times existing” does not differentiate reward and transformation [bodies], as in the Lotus Sūtra: “When sentient beings see the eon ending and being consumed by a great fire, this land of mine remains tranquil,” etc. Again, he himself constructs the syllogism: “In other world realms there are humans and gods whose faculties have matured into vessels; because they are human and heavenly sentient beings during the period of decline in the eon of duration; like the period of decline in the eon of duration in this land.” Now I say that this syllogism is truly inconclusive: Is it like the period of decline in the eon of duration in this land where there is a Buddha, in which humans and gods have faculties matured into vessels; or is it like the period of decline in the eon of duration in this land where there is no Buddha, in which humans and gods do not have faculties matured into vessels? Hence it becomes inconclusive. The Yaoji again, against the second syllogism of the root text, formulates an opposing conclusive syllogism (viruddha-avyabhicārin): “Upon illumination and the like, there are definitely no names and so forth; because they are not sound; like empty space, etc.” This too is not so, for there is no common similar example. The Mahāyāna also accepts that names and so forth are based on space; though not based on suchness, because they are based on the transformations of consciousness, there is no hindrance of phonemes. Question: It is said vyañjana is translated here as fan, bodily marks and signs, sense-organ shapes, or flavor—this is salt, because it can manifest flavor in things. Flavor is precisely phoneme (vyañjana). In accordance with this explanation, phonemes are indeed capable of manifesting. Why did you say before that their essence cannot manifest? Answer: “Manifesting” has two senses: first, manifesting names and phrases; second, manifesting meaning. Phonemes can manifest names and phrases, because names and phrases exist through phonemes. Names and phrases can manifest meaning; phonemes take the capacity to manifest essence from names and phrases, not manifesting meaning. The earlier and later senses are not contradictory. Question: If the essence of a syllable cannot manifest, yet from those names and phrases it is said to manifest; and the nature of sound cannot express, yet from names it is said to manifest? Answer: Names and phrases rely closely on phonemes, so syllables are called manifesting through names; phrases, etc., are distant with respect to sound, so sound is not called manifesting through names. Question: If the essence of phonemes cannot express, being the cause, is it manifested through the effect; and if the essence of syllables cannot signify, being the effect, is it signified through the cause? Answer: Names and phrases must entail phonemes, so phonemes are manifested from names, etc.; sound does not necessarily have syllables, so syllables are not signified from sound. Question: Are names and phrases formed by gathering syllables, or do they have distinct essences? If they have distinct essences, how could they be detached from sound, since a single moment of sound must have syllables? If they are formed by gathering them, what difference in essence is there between names, phrases, and phonemes? Answer: There are two explanations: First, they are each distinct, because a single moment of sound has many inflections. Second, they are formed by gathering, because there is a difference between the whole and the parts. The three essences being distinct is the correct interpretation among the later explanations, as already distinguished in the first fascicle above.