成唯識論了義燈 3.43

3.43

《論》：緣用必依實有體故者。問：若無體法，雖無緣義，得有所緣者，何故？前第一云：非諸極微共和合位，可與五識各作所緣？答：五識不能緣細境，故說非所緣，不障第六緣，無變相成所緣義。若爾何故觀所緣？云極微於五識，設緣非所緣？答：意破所緣，設縱緣義，無實體法望於六識，皆不成緣。問：假法及無，皆不成緣，大乘第六，緣兔角等，此相分假，得成緣不？若許成緣，何故破他？若不成緣，豈無親所緣緣耶？答：小乘等執識外之法，假實皆無，非所緣緣，故前破之。大乘所緣，是不離識，簡遍計故，皆得名實，成所緣緣。

[Regarding] the Treatise stating: "Because the function of an object-condition must rely on a real substantial entity": Question: If a phenomenon without substance, though lacking the meaning of a condition, can serve as an intentional object, why did the earlier first fascicle state: "It is not the case that atoms in their state of mutual aggregation can each serve as an intentional object for the five consciousnesses"? Answer: The five consciousnesses cannot cognize subtle objects; therefore it is said they are not intentional objects. It does not prevent the sixth [consciousness] from cognizing them; there is no transformation of an image that accomplishes the meaning of an object-condition. If so, why does the Ālambanaparīkṣā say: "Atoms, with respect to the five consciousnesses, even if conditions, are not intentional objects"? Answer: The intent is to refute the intentional object; even granting the meaning of a condition, a phenomenon without real substance, with respect to the six consciousnesses, in all cases does not constitute a condition. Question: Nominal phenomena and non-existents both fail to constitute conditions; when the sixth [consciousness] of the Mahāyāna cognizes a hare's horn and the like, does this nominal form-aspect succeed in constituting a condition or not? If it is admitted to constitute a condition, why refute others? If it does not constitute a condition, would there be no immediate object-condition (pratyayālambana)? Answer: What the Hīnayāna and others grasp are phenomena external to consciousness; whether nominal or real, all are non-existent and not object-conditions; hence they were refuted earlier. The intentional objects of the Mahāyāna are not separate from consciousness; setting aside the imagined (parikalpita), all can be called real and constitute object-conditions.