成唯識論了義燈 3.49

3.49

《論》：似謂增益。本云，自相之上，增益共相。西明云：且如眼識，得青自相，名實有相。後尋求心，重緣青等，非自相青將為自相，故云似，謂增益非實有相。《集》云：有釋尋求心等，於非自相將為自相，故名增益，此非共相，尋求非量故。今謂不爾。若尋求心所緣非共，離自共相，應有第三相。第三相無，非共何攝？又尋求心是假智不？若是假智者，前言假智及詮，唯依諸法，共相而轉。若非共相，違彼唯言。又復定中，亦許尋求，豈是非量？問：假智及詮，俱非自相，依似事轉，似事非實，即假法如無，如何得有表義名言之所熏種？答：若彼本質是可生法，相分似彼，由此名言意解之力，令此相分熏成彼種。相分非假，故亦無過。

Regarding the treatise saying, "'Resemblance' means superimposition." The original text says: upon the individual characteristic, the common characteristic is superimposed. Master Ximing says: take, for instance, the visual consciousness: grasping the individual characteristic of blue is called having an actual aspect. The subsequent seeking mind (paryeṣaka-citta) re-cognizes blue and so forth; mistaking what is not the individual characteristic of blue as the individual characteristic, it is therefore called "resemblance," meaning superimposing an aspect that is not an actual existence. The *Ji* states: "There is an interpretation that the seeking mind and so forth, taking what is not the individual characteristic as the individual characteristic, is therefore called superimposition; this is not the common characteristic, because the seeking mind is non-valid cognition." I now say this is not so. If the object cognized by the seeking mind were not common, apart from the individual and common characteristics, there ought to be a third characteristic. Since a third characteristic does not exist, under what is the non-common subsumed? Furthermore, is the seeking mind metaphorical cognition or not? If it is metaphorical cognition, it was previously said that metaphorical cognition and verbal expression operate solely reliant on the common characteristic of dharmas; if it were not the common characteristic, it would contradict the word "solely." Moreover, in meditative concentration, seeking is also permitted; how could it be non-valid cognition? Question: Metaphorical cognition and verbal expression are both not individual characteristics; they operate reliant on resembling affairs, and resembling affairs are not real, meaning conceptual dharmas are like non-existence; how can there be seeds perfumed by meaningful nominal designations? Answer: If that archetype is a dharma capable of arising, the objective aspect resembles it; by the force of the conceptual understanding of this nominal designation, it causes this objective aspect to perfume and form that seed. The objective aspect is not conceptual, and therefore there is also no fault.