成唯識論了義燈 4.106

4.106

思量為性相。問：既恒思量，所執我相，與我見何別？俱作我解故，復何不名我見？答：我見推求，並作我解。此作我解，而不推求，故不名我見。　問：何以得知心作我解？答：准心所知，既云：我愛、我慢等，當爾彼愛等，若不作我解，貪愛於何？又亦不應名我愛等。由此准知，心王亦作我解。若爾，心王應取別相。答：不爾。即此我境，是總相故。領納屬於順益己相，而貪愛等方為別相，論說唯言故。問：我、無我等是其差別，何名總相？答：准諸法自性差別，名非總相可爾，今心王所取總相，心所所取別相，與彼有別，於彼自性差別之上，各有總相、別相故。不爾，王、所境應差別，故知我者，即是境之總相，於我之上可意、不可意等，方是別相。又有解云：心王亦取別相。《辨中邊論》云：心王亦能取總、別相。今撿彼論第一云：唯能了境，總相名心。亦了差別，名為受等，准此心王不取別相。此論第五，亦識能了別事之總相，不言了別事之別相。問：心王既作我解，即是我執，云何第八卷護法正義，云執我法者，必是惠故，不說所餘。答：心雖作我相，而不執之，執者是惠故。又釋云：彼據勝說，及根本說，此據相從，必由於惠方能起執，非於此聚而無有惠，可起執者故，言必是惠故，不障相應，亦有二執。問：貪等皆有執者，疑有執不？答：執必見俱，疑非見並，又執必決，疑不決故，疑不是執。問：如思相應業之眷屬，亦立業名。與見、相應見之眷屬，何不名見？答：業是造作義。俱能造作未來果，及所造事業，故俱名業。見者推求，相應非推求故不名見。又釋剋性即非，相從亦見，如似智惠相從俱名智惠故。問：執我是惠能，同聚俱執我，推求是惠用，相應亦推求。答：推求是見，餘法不推求，執者堅取義，同聚俱執我。問：既恒審思量與思何別？答：通、別有異，此但思我，彼思一切。問：未轉可爾，已轉如何？已轉通緣一切法故。答：亦總、別緣，勝劣有異。王取總相勝，所取別相勝。不爾，果位王、所二種，俱能遍緣，如何取別？然第五云：心王取總相，心所通總、別。且據因說，若在果位。王、所俱能緣一切法，取總、別相，但勝劣異。西明云：何故釋《名門》但解末那，三性門中，即解心所。解云：理實於諸門中，皆有二義，影略互顯。今謂有餘，若言諸門皆有二義，釋王有覆性，所亦性同，於餘門中，若皆如是者，心王四惑俱，豈我見等，亦四惑俱耶？故思為性相者，但解於王，心所不爾，設心所思。箇思量，所餘心所非恒思量，又思雖有思量之義，不以思量釋思性相。然辨三性門中，解心所者，以彼心所有貪、慢等，不知不善為有覆性，王由相應得成三性，所由所依是有覆故雙問答。至下更釋，此問本意自釋第二變，不解心所，不可門門皆相影顯。

Thinking is its nature and characteristic. Question: Since it is constantly thinking, what is the difference between the characteristic of the grasped self and the view of self (ātmadṛṣṭi)? As both form an understanding of self, why is it not also called the view of self? Answer: The view of self investigates and simultaneously forms an understanding of self. This [mind] forms an understanding of self but does not investigate; hence it is not called the view of self. Question: How is it known that the mind[-king] forms an understanding of self? Answer: It is known by analogy with the mental factors (caitasikas). Since it is said that self-love (ātmasneha), self-pride (ātmamāna), and so forth [are present], if that love and so forth at that moment did not form an understanding of self, what would they greedily love? Furthermore, they should not be called self-love and so on. Therefore, by analogy, it is known that the mind-king also forms an understanding of self. If so, the mind-king ought to apprehend specific characteristics. Answer: It is not so. This object of self is itself a general characteristic. Grasping it as conducive and beneficial to oneself, where greed and love then [arise], constitutes the specific characteristic, because the treatise uses the word "only". Question: Self, non-self, and so forth are distinctions; why are they called a general characteristic? Answer: Judging by the intrinsic nature and distinctions of all dharmas, it is acceptable that it not be called a general characteristic; however, the general characteristic apprehended here by the mind-king and the specific characteristic apprehended by the mental factors are distinct from that, because above that intrinsic nature and distinction there are respectively a general characteristic and a specific characteristic. Were it not so, the objects of the [mind-]king and mental factors would be undifferentiated. Thus we know that the self is the general characteristic of the object, whereas agreeable, disagreeable, and so forth in relation to the self are only the specific characteristics. Furthermore, there is an explanation stating: The mind-king also apprehends specific characteristics. The Madhyāntavibhāga-śāstra states: "The mind-king is also capable of apprehending both general and specific characteristics." Examining the first fascicle of that treatise now, it says: "Only being able to discern the general characteristic of an object is called mind; discerning distinctions as well is called sensation and so forth." According to this, the mind-king does not apprehend specific characteristics. The fifth fascicle of this treatise also states that consciousness can discern the general characteristic of a thing, and does not say that it discerns the specific characteristic of a thing. Question: Since the mind-king forms an understanding of self, that is grasping a self; why does the orthodox position of Dharmapāla in the eighth fascicle say that grasping a self and dharmas must be [a function of] discernment (prajñā), not mentioning the rest? Answer: Although the mind forms the characteristic of a self, it does not grasp it; that which grasps is discernment. Another explanation states: That is said on the basis of the predominant and the fundamental; this is said in terms of association, for one can give rise to grasping only on the basis of discernment, and it is not that in this mental group there is no discernment that could give rise to grasping; therefore, stating that it must be discernment does not prevent the associated [mental factors] from also having the two graspings. Question: Since greed and the like all involve grasping, does doubt involve grasping or not? Answer: Grasping must accompany view; doubt does not accompany view. Moreover, grasping must be decisive, whereas doubt is indecisive; therefore doubt is not grasping. Question: Just as the retinue of karma associated with volition (cetanā) is also given the name of karma, why is the retinue of view associated with view not called view? Answer: Karma has the sense of activity. Both can produce future fruition and the deeds performed; hence both are called karma. View means investigation; the associated [factors] do not investigate, and so are not called view. Another explanation states: Strictly speaking by its nature, it is not; by association, it is also view, just as wisdom (prajñā) and its associates are collectively called wisdom. Question: Grasping a self is the capacity of discernment, yet the entire group collectively grasps a self; investigation is the function of discernment, so the associated factors should also investigate. Answer: Investigation is [the function of] view; the remaining dharmas do not investigate. Grasping has the sense of firm seizing; the entire group collectively grasps a self. Question: Since it constantly deliberates and thinks, what is the difference between it and volition (cetanā)? Answer: There is a difference between the general and the specific: this [manas] only thinks of a self, while that [volition] thinks of everything. Question: This may be so before transformation; how is it after transformation? For after transformation it universally takes all dharmas as objects. Answer: They also take objects generally and specifically, differing in superiority and inferiority: the [mind-]king is superior in taking general characteristics, and the mental factors are superior in taking specific characteristics. Were it not so, in the stage of fruition the two kinds, king and mental factors, would both be capable of universally taking objects, so how could their apprehension be distinguished? However, the fifth fascicle says: "The mind-king takes general characteristics, whereas the mental factors encompass both general and specific." This is spoken provisionally regarding the causal stage. In the stage of fruition, both king and mental factors can take all dharmas as objects, apprehending general and specific characteristics, differing only in superiority and inferiority. Ximing asks: Why does the chapter explaining names only explain manas, while in the section on the three natures it explains the mental factors? The explanation says: In truth, within all the sections, both meanings exist, implicitly indicating each other. I now say that this is incomplete. If it were said that all sections have both meanings, then when explaining the obscured nature of the king, the mental factors would also have the same nature; if it were thus in all other sections, then when the mind-king is accompanied by the four afflictions, could it be that the view of self and so forth are also accompanied by the four afflictions? Therefore, "having thinking as its nature and characteristic" only explains the [mind-]king, not the mental factors. Even if a mental factor were volition, that single factor thinks, but the remaining mental factors do not constantly think. Furthermore, although volition has the sense of thinking, volition's nature and characteristic are not explained by "thinking". However, in the section distinguishing the three natures, the mental factors are explained because those mental factors possess greed, pride, and so forth, and not knowing whether they are unwholesome or of an obscured nature, the king achieves the three natures through association, and because the basis of the mental factors is obscured, both are questioned and answered together. This will be further explained below. The original intent of this question was simply to explain the second transformation, not to explain the mental factors; it is not admissible that every single section implicitly indicates the other.