成唯識論了義燈 4.13

4.13

問：《疏》云：依識變曾、當假立三世，為道理三世，為唯識三世。若道理三世，與唯識三世有何差別？答：不尋因果，相酬引邊。但說過去事，及記未來，諸可怖事。而心變作過、未之相，對彼二相，說名現在，即是唯識。故與此別。復更有解：然立三世諸宗不同，如一說部，三世但言，都無實體；若出世部，依法立世。世間是假，世亦假。出世實，世亦實；大眾、經部等，過、未是假，現在是實；若薩婆多三世俱實，《俱舍》二十引教及理，立三世實。然就彼宗有四師別。故彼頌云：「此中有四種。類、相、位、待異。第三約作用，立世最為善。」一、法救說：由三類不同，三世有異，非體不同。如破金器作餘物時，形色雖有殊，而顯色無異。行於三世，唯捨類得類，非捨體得體；二、妙音說：由相不同，三世有異。相不同者：一云，不相應中，別有一類，世相不同，三世有異，隨一世相合，餘二世相隱，非謂體無。二云，世相有用時名合。相雖無用，而隨於法其體非無；三、世友說：由位不同，三世有異，非體有異。如運一籌，置在一位名一，在千位名千，位雖別體不別；四、覺天說：由觀待有別，故三世異。觀待後故名過去，觀待前故名未來，俱觀待名現在。《俱舍論》破法救所說，執法轉變，置數論朋中，妙音所立，世相雜亂，三世皆有三世相故。覺天所說前後相待，一世法中應有三世，謂過去世前後剎那，應名去、來，中名為現，唯許第三依作用立，世無雜亂。《婆沙》同《俱舍》，正理許類異，俱破妙音及覺天說。大乘所立，或二、或三，如本疏辨，所指之文，恐煩略引。《瑜伽》第三：「云何建立，謂諸種子不離法故，如法建立。若諸果法，若已滅相是過去；有因未生相是未來；已生未滅相是現在。」《瑜伽》五十一云：「過去行云何？謂相已滅沒，自性已捨；現在行云何？謂相未滅沒，自性未捨；未來行云何？謂因現在有自相未生，未得自性。」《瑜伽》五十二云：「過去諸行與果故有；未來諸行攝因故有。所以者何？現在諸行，三相所顯：一是過去果性故。二是未來因性故。三自相相續不斷故。」又云：「已與果種子相續，名過去界。若未與果當來種子相續，名未來界。若未與果現在種子相續，名現在界。」《辨中邊》第二云：「因果已未用，是世義應知。」釋云：「謂於因果俱已受用，是過去義；俱未受用，是未來義；若已受用因未已受用果，是現在義。」此等但約因果種子顯世差別，皆是道理三世所攝。諸說神通、三明等者，皆神通三世。今此論文，即唯識三世。《論》云：「假謂現識似彼相現。」又宗明唯識。然准西明似約道理，釋此因果。《要集》亦同，智者簡擇。問：法有三性，假立三世依何性耶？答：據實道理，唯依依他。若據隨緣假施設者，通依三性。《要集》說云：圓成常住，遍計性無，俱不依立三世差別。今謂剋性雖爾，然諸經論亦依假立，且圓成實，依詮以顯得說三世，何者如十二行眼智明覺，各於四諦觀去、來、今。於圓成實，若不依詮假立三世，不成四行，故依圓成亦得假立。即通唯識、道理二種，依遍計性亦得假立。何者如般若經云：無我人等。天親論釋：約妄執我三世總別，立此四種。即依遍計，立三世也。此但唯識，三世非餘。依依他起，所立三世，如前所引。所引之文，但全依觀緣起正理。圓成非緣起，遍計無自性，故略不說。

Question: The Commentary says: 'Relying on consciousness transforming into past and future, one nominally designates the three time periods.' Is this the rational three time periods, or the vijñapti-mātra three time periods? If it is the rational three time periods, what difference is there with the vijñapti-mātra three time periods? Answer: When one does not investigate the aspect of cause and effect repaying and leading forth, but merely speaks of past events and remembers future terrifying things, the mind transforms into the forms of the past and future, and relative to those two forms speaks of the present—this is vijñapti-mātra; hence it is distinct from this. There is further another explanation: however, the establishment of the three time periods differs among the various traditions. For instance, according to the Ekavyāvahārika school, the three time periods are mere words and completely lack real substance. According to the Lokottaravāda school, time periods are established on the basis of phenomena: the mundane is nominal, so its time periods are also nominal; the supramundane is real, so its time periods are also real. According to the Mahāsāṃghika, Sautrāntika, and others, past and future are nominal, and the present is real. According to the Sarvāstivāda, the three time periods are all real; the twentieth fascicle of the *Kośa* cites scripture and reason to establish that the three time periods are real. Yet within that tradition there are distinctions among four masters. Thus their verse says: 'Herein there are four types: / differences in kind, character, state, and relativity. / The third, based on function, / is the best in establishing the time periods.' First, Dharmatrāta says: due to the differences of the three kinds, the three time periods have differences, but not differences in substance. Just as when breaking a gold vessel to make other items, although the shape-color differs, the顯-color is without difference; when traversing the three time periods, there is only relinquishing a kind and acquiring a kind, not relinquishing substance and acquiring substance. Second, Ghoṣaka says: due to the differences in characters, the three time periods have differences. 'Differences in characters' means: one says that within the non-concurrent formations there is a distinct kind, and because the characters of the time periods differ, the three time periods differ; when conforming to the character of one time period, the characters of the other two time periods are concealed, not that their substance does not exist. A second says: when the character of a time period has function, it is called conforming; although the character is without function, following the phenomenon its substance is not non-existent. Third, Vasumitra says: due to differences in state, the three time periods have differences, not that there are differences in substance. Just as moving a single counting-rod: placed in the single unit position it is called 'one', in the thousand position it is called 'a thousand'; although the positions differ, the substance does not differ. Fourth, Buddhadeva says: due to differences in relativity, the three time periods differ. Relative to the subsequent, it is called past; relative to the prior, it is called future; relative to both, it is called present. The *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* refutes what Dharmatrāta taught as holding to the transformation of phenomena, placing him in the camp of the Sāṃkhya; what Ghoṣaka established confuses the characters of the time periods, because the three time periods would all have the characters of the three time periods; what Buddhadeva taught regarding reciprocal relativity would mean that within the phenomena of a single time period there should be the three time periods, meaning the preceding and succeeding moments of the past time period should be called past and future, and the middle called present. It accepts only the third, established on the basis of function, as keeping the time periods unconfused. The *Vibhāṣā* agrees with the *Kośa*, while the *Nyāyānusāra* allows difference in kind, both refuting the assertions of Ghoṣaka and Buddhadeva. What the Mahāyāna establishes is either two or three, as distinguished in the root commentary; fearing prolixity, I cite the referenced texts in brief. *Yogācārabhūmi*, fascicle three: 'How is it established? It is established like phenomena because all seeds are not separate from phenomena. As for all result phenomena: if they have the character of having already perished, they are past; if they have a cause but have the character of being as yet unborn, they are future; if they are already born and have the character of not yet perishing, they are present.' *Yogācārabhūmi*, fascicle fifty-one, says: 'What are past saṃskāras? That is, their characters have already perished and their self-nature has already been relinquished. What are present saṃskāras? That is, their characters have not yet perished and their self-nature has not been relinquished. What are future saṃskāras? That is, their cause is present, their specific character is as yet unborn, and they have not attained self-nature.' *Yogācārabhūmi*, fascicle fifty-two, says: 'Past saṃskāras exist because they have given results; future saṃskāras exist because they encompass causes. Why is this? Present saṃskāras are manifested by three characteristics: first, because of being of the nature of past results; second, because of being of the nature of future causes; third, because their specific character continues unbroken.' It also says: 'The continuum of seeds that have already given results is called the past realm. The continuum of future seeds that have not yet given results is called the future realm. The continuum of present seeds that have not yet given results is called the present realm.' The second fascicle of the *Madhyāntavibhāga* says: 'The already and not-yet functioned of causes and effects / is what should be understood as the meaning of time periods.' The explanation says: 'Having already functioned in both causes and effects is the meaning of the past; having not yet functioned in both is the meaning of the future; having already functioned in causes but not yet having functioned in effects is the meaning of the present.' These only explain the distinction of the time periods in terms of cause and effect and seeds, all being subsumed under the rational three time periods. Those which speak of supernormal powers, the three knowledges, and so forth are all the supernormal three time periods. Now this treatise text refers to the vijñapti-mātra three time periods. The Treatise says: 'Nominal means that the present consciousness appears resembling that form.' Furthermore, the fundamental tenet clarifies vijñapti-mātra. However, according to Ximing, it seems to interpret this cause and effect in terms of principle. The Yaoji agrees with this; let the wise discern. Question: Phenomena have three natures; upon which nature are the three time periods nominally established? Answer: In terms of real principle, they are established solely on the dependent nature. In terms of nominal designation according with conditions, they extend to all three natures. The Yaoji states: the consummate is permanent and abiding, and the imagined nature is non-existent, so neither is relied upon to establish the distinction of the three time periods. Now I say that while this is so in terms of distinct natures, the various sūtras and treatises also nominally establish them based on [these natures]. First, the consummate can be spoken of in terms of the three time periods through being revealed on the basis of verbal expression. How so? As in the twelvefold mental practices of the eye, knowledge, clarity, and awakening, which each contemplate past, future, and present with respect to the four noble truths. With respect to the consummate, if one did not nominally establish the three time periods relying on verbal expression, the fourfold mental practice would not be accomplished; therefore, relying on the consummate, they can also be nominally established. Thus it extends to both types, vijñapti-mātra and principle. Relying on the imagined nature, they can also be nominally established. How so? As the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra* says: there is no self, person, and so forth. Vasubandhu's commentary explains: in terms of erroneously grasping the self in the three time periods generally and specifically, these four kinds are established. That is establishing the three time periods relying on the imagined nature. This is solely vijñapti-mātra, the three time periods and nothing else. The three time periods established relying on the dependent nature are as cited above. The cited passages are entirely based on contemplating the correct principle of dependent origination. The consummate is not dependent origination, and the imagined lacks intrinsic nature, so they were omitted and not spoken of.