成唯識論了義燈 4.13

4.13

Question: The Commentary says: 'Relying on consciousness transforming into past and future, one nominally designates the three time periods.' Is this the rational three time periods, or the vijñapti-mātra three time periods? If it is the rational three time periods, what difference is there with the vijñapti-mātra three time periods? Answer: When one does not investigate the aspect of cause and effect repaying and leading forth, but merely speaks of past events and remembers future terrifying things, the mind transforms into the forms of the past and future, and relative to those two forms speaks of the present—this is vijñapti-mātra; hence it is distinct from this. There is further another explanation: however, the establishment of the three time periods differs among the various traditions. For instance, according to the Ekavyāvahārika school, the three time periods are mere words and completely lack real substance. According to the Lokottaravāda school, time periods are established on the basis of phenomena: the mundane is nominal, so its time periods are also nominal; the supramundane is real, so its time periods are also real. According to the Mahāsāṃghika, Sautrāntika, and others, past and future are nominal, and the present is real. According to the Sarvāstivāda, the three time periods are all real; the twentieth fascicle of the *Kośa* cites scripture and reason to establish that the three time periods are real. Yet within that tradition there are distinctions among four masters. Thus their verse says: 'Herein there are four types: / differences in kind, character, state, and relativity. / The third, based on function, / is the best in establishing the time periods.' First, Dharmatrāta says: due to the differences of the three kinds, the three time periods have differences, but not differences in substance. Just as when breaking a gold vessel to make other items, although the shape-color differs, the顯-color is without difference; when traversing the three time periods, there is only relinquishing a kind and acquiring a kind, not relinquishing substance and acquiring substance. Second, Ghoṣaka says: due to the differences in characters, the three time periods have differences. 'Differences in characters' means: one says that within the non-concurrent formations there is a distinct kind, and because the characters of the time periods differ, the three time periods differ; when conforming to the character of one time period, the characters of the other two time periods are concealed, not that their substance does not exist. A second says: when the character of a time period has function, it is called conforming; although the character is without function, following the phenomenon its substance is not non-existent. Third, Vasumitra says: due to differences in state, the three time periods have differences, not that there are differences in substance. Just as moving a single counting-rod: placed in the single unit position it is called 'one', in the thousand position it is called 'a thousand'; although the positions differ, the substance does not differ. Fourth, Buddhadeva says: due to differences in relativity, the three time periods differ. Relative to the subsequent, it is called past; relative to the prior, it is called future; relative to both, it is called present. The *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* refutes what Dharmatrāta taught as holding to the transformation of phenomena, placing him in the camp of the Sāṃkhya; what Ghoṣaka established confuses the characters of the time periods, because the three time periods would all have the characters of the three time periods; what Buddhadeva taught regarding reciprocal relativity would mean that within the phenomena of a single time period there should be the three time periods, meaning the preceding and succeeding moments of the past time period should be called past and future, and the middle called present. It accepts only the third, established on the basis of function, as keeping the time periods unconfused. The *Vibhāṣā* agrees with the *Kośa*, while the *Nyāyānusāra* allows difference in kind, both refuting the assertions of Ghoṣaka and Buddhadeva. What the Mahāyāna establishes is either two or three, as distinguished in the root commentary; fearing prolixity, I cite the referenced texts in brief. *Yogācārabhūmi*, fascicle three: 'How is it established? It is established like phenomena because all seeds are not separate from phenomena. As for all result phenomena: if they have the character of having already perished, they are past; if they have a cause but have the character of being as yet unborn, they are future; if they are already born and have the character of not yet perishing, they are present.' *Yogācārabhūmi*, fascicle fifty-one, says: 'What are past saṃskāras? That is, their characters have already perished and their self-nature has already been relinquished. What are present saṃskāras? That is, their characters have not yet perished and their self-nature has not been relinquished. What are future saṃskāras? That is, their cause is present, their specific character is as yet unborn, and they have not attained self-nature.' *Yogācārabhūmi*, fascicle fifty-two, says: 'Past saṃskāras exist because they have given results; future saṃskāras exist because they encompass causes. Why is this? Present saṃskāras are manifested by three characteristics: first, because of being of the nature of past results; second, because of being of the nature of future causes; third, because their specific character continues unbroken.' It also says: 'The continuum of seeds that have already given results is called the past realm. The continuum of future seeds that have not yet given results is called the future realm. The continuum of present seeds that have not yet given results is called the present realm.' The second fascicle of the *Madhyāntavibhāga* says: 'The already and not-yet functioned of causes and effects / is what should be understood as the meaning of time periods.' The explanation says: 'Having already functioned in both causes and effects is the meaning of the past; having not yet functioned in both is the meaning of the future; having already functioned in causes but not yet having functioned in effects is the meaning of the present.' These only explain the distinction of the time periods in terms of cause and effect and seeds, all being subsumed under the rational three time periods. Those which speak of supernormal powers, the three knowledges, and so forth are all the supernormal three time periods. Now this treatise text refers to the vijñapti-mātra three time periods. The Treatise says: 'Nominal means that the present consciousness appears resembling that form.' Furthermore, the fundamental tenet clarifies vijñapti-mātra. However, according to Ximing, it seems to interpret this cause and effect in terms of principle. The Yaoji agrees with this; let the wise discern. Question: Phenomena have three natures; upon which nature are the three time periods nominally established? Answer: In terms of real principle, they are established solely on the dependent nature. In terms of nominal designation according with conditions, they extend to all three natures. The Yaoji states: the consummate is permanent and abiding, and the imagined nature is non-existent, so neither is relied upon to establish the distinction of the three time periods. Now I say that while this is so in terms of distinct natures, the various sūtras and treatises also nominally establish them based on [these natures]. First, the consummate can be spoken of in terms of the three time periods through being revealed on the basis of verbal expression. How so? As in the twelvefold mental practices of the eye, knowledge, clarity, and awakening, which each contemplate past, future, and present with respect to the four noble truths. With respect to the consummate, if one did not nominally establish the three time periods relying on verbal expression, the fourfold mental practice would not be accomplished; therefore, relying on the consummate, they can also be nominally established. Thus it extends to both types, vijñapti-mātra and principle. Relying on the imagined nature, they can also be nominally established. How so? As the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra* says: there is no self, person, and so forth. Vasubandhu's commentary explains: in terms of erroneously grasping the self in the three time periods generally and specifically, these four kinds are established. That is establishing the three time periods relying on the imagined nature. This is solely vijñapti-mātra, the three time periods and nothing else. The three time periods established relying on the dependent nature are as cited above. The cited passages are entirely based on contemplating the correct principle of dependent origination. The consummate is not dependent origination, and the imagined lacks intrinsic nature, so they were omitted and not spoken of.