成唯識論了義燈 4.2

4.2

《論》：觸謂三和，分別變異等，辨其體業。問：何故心王但辨自性、行相，不說作業；心所即辨作業、自性，不說行相耶？答：互相影顯，或已略明，故今不說。前第二云：識、受、想等，了別領納等行相各異故。受等所依說是觸業，亦影顯識，為餘所依，即識作業。問：心、心所法，微隱難知，或以作用，或以行相，而顯自體，作用與行相，復有何別？答：行相顯自取境功能；作用顯他依止功能。然心王多己行相顯自體，心所不定。作意警心，思令造作，非緣境用，受領順違，想取境像，此即緣用故。解識行相，即是了別，了別即是見分所攝。第一卷云：識謂了別，即以行相顯於自體。第三卷引無始時來界等，即顯與他為因緣用，即是作用顯於自體。《論》云：故以作用而顯示之。問：若以了別即是顯自，何故觸等亦稱為了？下第五云：作意了此所未了相等。答：同一了言，各各顯自，此有何妨？不爾，違前第二所說。彼云：了別領納等行相各異故。答：了有二義。一緣境名了，通心及所；二行相了別，非所但王，而作意等，亦言了者，說緣境了，非行相了。或有單、複：單言了者即通王、所，言了別者，非所唯王，前識但云了者，以頌文窄略去別字，後釋方言，了謂了別。或汎明緣王、所俱了。辨別行相，了非心所。問：何故王、所或取了境，或餘作用，而顯自性？答：造論者意隨舉一種，或就顯明了，不可一准。問：同舉作用，以顯性、業，二用何別？答：有云：親用顯性，疎用顯業，近遠、內外、自他亦爾。《要集》云：作用有二。一、唯自用；二、通他用。唯自顯性，通他顯業，今謂不定。如觸順生心所功能，以顯自識，亦能似根境順生，即是通他。雖總是觸自性，且舉和合，令同觸境，為觸自性。非謂三和，分別變異，非觸自性，正以此等，明自性故。作意引心，令趣於境，此即唯自舉一例餘。若云：據心所說，如何不簡？又通他顯業，過亦未離，從多可爾。西明云：了者通行相，王、所俱有，如第五說。今謂不爾，若同了別，何故次下難第三師，云：勿觸等五，亦能了別，故知了別，非通行相，應如前解。問：觸似三順生，似彼是觸性，亦應似因之果，皆觸自性，若不爾，如何難他？似因之果，應皆受性。答：不唯領似名觸自性，更有餘用。彼唯似因名，受自性故作是難。問：觸謂三和，即從因果為名。分別變異，即能領似之稱。此即辨名。觸境為性，應始顯體。今為但顯體，為雙辨名、體？答：雖似釋名，正只顯性。或兼辨名，尋名取體，所以雙辨。然依論意正為辨體，以理俱取義，亦不違。問：六、八境、根別，可說三和生。第七根、境同，應從二和起。一云，可爾；二云，根、境義殊，亦三和起。又據極成說三和起，依大不共，亦二和生。問：觸依三和起，從彼名三和。識、受二、四生，應名二四和。答：二解。一云，觸亦和彼，餘不和彼故不得名；二云，亦得。問：識二和起，得名二和。識作意生，應名警覺。答：識從彼起體亦和，故得從彼名二和。從作意生，非警覺，不從於彼，名警覺。問：作意警心，種位能警。三和起觸，種位三和。答：根、識種位，劣無用，未三和。作意性能警，故種位起用。

The treatise says: "Contact means the harmony of the three, discriminating transformation, and so forth," differentiating its essence and its activity. Question: Why is it that for the principal mind, only its nature and mode of activity (ākāra) are distinguished without stating its activity, whereas for the mental factors, their activity and nature are distinguished without stating their mode of activity? Answer: They mutually reflect each other, or it has already been briefly explained, hence it is not stated now. The earlier second fascicle says: "Consciousness, sensation, conceptualization, and so forth, because their modes of activity such as discerning and apprehending are each distinct." That which sensation and the rest rely upon is stated as the activity of contact, which also reflects that consciousness, as the basis for the rest, is precisely the activity of consciousness. Question: Mental dharmas and mental factors are subtle, hidden, and difficult to know; their own entity is revealed either through their function or through their mode of activity. What distinction is there between function and mode of activity? Answer: The mode of activity reveals its function of taking an object for itself; the function reveals its function of serving as a basis for others. However, the principal mind mostly reveals its own entity through its own mode of activity, whereas the mental factors are not uniform. Attention alerts the mind, and volition causes it to act—these are not functions of cognizing objects; sensation apprehends what is agreeable or disagreeable, and conceptualization grasps the image of the object—these are functions of cognizing. Explaining the mode of activity of consciousness: it is discernment, and discernment is subsumed under the seeing aspect (darśanabhāga). The first fascicle says: "Consciousness means discernment," which reveals its own entity through its mode of activity. The third fascicle cites "the realm from beginningless time," and so forth, which reveals its function as a causal condition for others, that is, revealing its own entity through function. The treatise says: "Therefore it is displayed through function." Question: If discernment reveals the self, why are contact and the rest also called discernment? Below, the fifth fascicle says: "Attention discerns marks of this that have not yet been discerned," and so forth. Answer: The single word "discernment" each reveals its own [aspect]; what contradiction is there in this? If not, it would contradict what was said earlier in the second fascicle. That says: "Because their modes of activity such as discerning and apprehending are each distinct." Answer: "Discernment" has two senses. First, cognizing an object is called discernment, which is common to both mind and mental factors. Second, the mode of activity of discernment belongs not to the mental factors, but only to the principal mind; and as for attention and the rest being called "discerning," this refers to cognizing an object as discernment, not discernment as the mode of activity. Or, there are simple and compound terms: the simple word "discern" is common to both the principal mind and mental factors, whereas the compound word "discernment" is not for the mental factors, but only for the principal mind. When consciousness was previously spoken of merely as "discern," it was because the verse was condensed and omitted the second character; only later when explaining it does it say that to discern means discernment. Or, speaking generally of cognizing, both mind and mental factors discern; when differentiating the mode of activity, discernment is not a mental factor. Question: Why do mind and mental factors take either the discernment of objects or other functions to reveal their own natures? Answer: The treatise author's intent simply takes up one kind, or does so to clarify it; it cannot be uniformly standardized. Question: Both take up function to reveal nature and activity; what is the difference between the two functions? Answer: Some say: Direct function reveals nature, indirect function reveals activity; near and far, internal and external, self and other are also like this. The Yaoji says: "Functions are of two kinds: first, exclusively for oneself; second, common to others. Exclusively for oneself reveals nature, and common to others reveals activity." We now hold that this is not fixed. Just as the function of contact favorably engenders mental factors to reveal one's own consciousness, it can also resemble sense faculties and objects in favorably engendering, which is common to others. Although this is entirely the nature of contact, it tentatively takes up harmony to make them contact objects together, as the nature of contact. It does not mean that the harmony of the three and discriminating transformation are not the nature of contact, for it is precisely through these that the nature is clarified. Attention directs the mind, causing it to proceed toward the object; this is exclusively for oneself, taking up one to illustrate the rest. If it is said to be spoken based on mental factors, how could there be no qualification? Furthermore, as for revealing activity through what is common to others, the fault has not yet been avoided; following the majority, it may be permissible. Ximing says: "Discernment extends across the mode of activity and is present in both mind and mental factors, as stated in the fifth fascicle." We now hold that this is not so. If it were identical with discernment, why would it subsequently refute the third master by saying: "Lest the five such as contact should also be able to discern"? Therefore, we know that discernment is not a common mode of activity, and it should be interpreted as explained before. Question: Contact resembles the three in favorably engendering, and resembling them is the nature of contact; then also, any fruit resembling its cause should all be the nature of contact. If not, how could one refute the other by saying: The fruit resembling its cause should all be the nature of sensation? Answer: It is not merely apprehending resemblance that is called the nature of contact; it has other functions besides. That [other master] claims that merely resembling the cause is the nature of sensation, which is why this refutation was made. Question: "Contact means the harmony of the three"—this takes its name from cause and fruit. "Discriminating transformation" is the designation for being able to apprehend resemblance. This differentiates the name. "Contacting the object as its nature" should be the beginning of revealing its entity. Is it now solely revealing the entity, or is it distinguishing both name and entity? Answer: Although it seems like an explanation of the name, it properly only reveals the nature. Or it concurrently distinguishes the name, taking the entity by investigating the name, which is why both are distinguished. However, according to the treatise's intent, it properly distinguishes the entity; taking both through reasoning also does not conflict. Question: For the sixth and eighth consciousnesses, the object and faculty are distinct, so they can be said to arise from the harmony of the three. For the seventh, faculty and object are identical, so it should arise from the harmony of two. One says: It may be so. A second says: The meanings of faculty and object are different, so it also arises from the harmony of three. Furthermore, speaking in terms of what is universally established, it arises from the harmony of three; based on its great non-shared nature, it also arises from the harmony of two. Question: Contact arises dependent on the harmony of three, and from that is named "the harmony of three." Consciousness and sensation arise from two and four; should they be named "the harmony of two" and "the harmony of four"? Answer: There are two explanations. One says: Contact also harmonizes them, whereas the others do not harmonize them, hence they do not receive the name. A second says: They could also receive it. Question: Consciousness arises from the harmony of two and can be named the harmony of two. Consciousness arises from attention; should it be named alerting? Answer: Consciousness arises from them and its entity is also harmonized, so from that it can be named the harmony of two. Arising from attention, it is not alerting, so it is not named alerting from that. Question: Attention alerts the mind, and it is capable of alerting in the state of seeds. The harmony of three gives rise to contact; does the harmony of three occur in the state of seeds? Answer: The seeds of faculties and consciousness are inferior and without function; they are not yet the harmony of the three. The nature of attention is capable of alerting, hence its function arises in the state of seeds.