成唯識論了義燈 4.2

4.2

The treatise says: "Contact means the harmony of the three, discriminating transformation, and so forth," differentiating its essence and its activity. Question: Why is it that for the principal mind, only its nature and mode of activity (ākāra) are distinguished without stating its activity, whereas for the mental factors, their activity and nature are distinguished without stating their mode of activity? Answer: They mutually reflect each other, or it has already been briefly explained, hence it is not stated now. The earlier second fascicle says: "Consciousness, sensation, conceptualization, and so forth, because their modes of activity such as discerning and apprehending are each distinct." That which sensation and the rest rely upon is stated as the activity of contact, which also reflects that consciousness, as the basis for the rest, is precisely the activity of consciousness. Question: Mental dharmas and mental factors are subtle, hidden, and difficult to know; their own entity is revealed either through their function or through their mode of activity. What distinction is there between function and mode of activity? Answer: The mode of activity reveals its function of taking an object for itself; the function reveals its function of serving as a basis for others. However, the principal mind mostly reveals its own entity through its own mode of activity, whereas the mental factors are not uniform. Attention alerts the mind, and volition causes it to act—these are not functions of cognizing objects; sensation apprehends what is agreeable or disagreeable, and conceptualization grasps the image of the object—these are functions of cognizing. Explaining the mode of activity of consciousness: it is discernment, and discernment is subsumed under the seeing aspect (darśanabhāga). The first fascicle says: "Consciousness means discernment," which reveals its own entity through its mode of activity. The third fascicle cites "the realm from beginningless time," and so forth, which reveals its function as a causal condition for others, that is, revealing its own entity through function. The treatise says: "Therefore it is displayed through function." Question: If discernment reveals the self, why are contact and the rest also called discernment? Below, the fifth fascicle says: "Attention discerns marks of this that have not yet been discerned," and so forth. Answer: The single word "discernment" each reveals its own [aspect]; what contradiction is there in this? If not, it would contradict what was said earlier in the second fascicle. That says: "Because their modes of activity such as discerning and apprehending are each distinct." Answer: "Discernment" has two senses. First, cognizing an object is called discernment, which is common to both mind and mental factors. Second, the mode of activity of discernment belongs not to the mental factors, but only to the principal mind; and as for attention and the rest being called "discerning," this refers to cognizing an object as discernment, not discernment as the mode of activity. Or, there are simple and compound terms: the simple word "discern" is common to both the principal mind and mental factors, whereas the compound word "discernment" is not for the mental factors, but only for the principal mind. When consciousness was previously spoken of merely as "discern," it was because the verse was condensed and omitted the second character; only later when explaining it does it say that to discern means discernment. Or, speaking generally of cognizing, both mind and mental factors discern; when differentiating the mode of activity, discernment is not a mental factor. Question: Why do mind and mental factors take either the discernment of objects or other functions to reveal their own natures? Answer: The treatise author's intent simply takes up one kind, or does so to clarify it; it cannot be uniformly standardized. Question: Both take up function to reveal nature and activity; what is the difference between the two functions? Answer: Some say: Direct function reveals nature, indirect function reveals activity; near and far, internal and external, self and other are also like this. The Yaoji says: "Functions are of two kinds: first, exclusively for oneself; second, common to others. Exclusively for oneself reveals nature, and common to others reveals activity." We now hold that this is not fixed. Just as the function of contact favorably engenders mental factors to reveal one's own consciousness, it can also resemble sense faculties and objects in favorably engendering, which is common to others. Although this is entirely the nature of contact, it tentatively takes up harmony to make them contact objects together, as the nature of contact. It does not mean that the harmony of the three and discriminating transformation are not the nature of contact, for it is precisely through these that the nature is clarified. Attention directs the mind, causing it to proceed toward the object; this is exclusively for oneself, taking up one to illustrate the rest. If it is said to be spoken based on mental factors, how could there be no qualification? Furthermore, as for revealing activity through what is common to others, the fault has not yet been avoided; following the majority, it may be permissible. Ximing says: "Discernment extends across the mode of activity and is present in both mind and mental factors, as stated in the fifth fascicle." We now hold that this is not so. If it were identical with discernment, why would it subsequently refute the third master by saying: "Lest the five such as contact should also be able to discern"? Therefore, we know that discernment is not a common mode of activity, and it should be interpreted as explained before. Question: Contact resembles the three in favorably engendering, and resembling them is the nature of contact; then also, any fruit resembling its cause should all be the nature of contact. If not, how could one refute the other by saying: The fruit resembling its cause should all be the nature of sensation? Answer: It is not merely apprehending resemblance that is called the nature of contact; it has other functions besides. That [other master] claims that merely resembling the cause is the nature of sensation, which is why this refutation was made. Question: "Contact means the harmony of the three"—this takes its name from cause and fruit. "Discriminating transformation" is the designation for being able to apprehend resemblance. This differentiates the name. "Contacting the object as its nature" should be the beginning of revealing its entity. Is it now solely revealing the entity, or is it distinguishing both name and entity? Answer: Although it seems like an explanation of the name, it properly only reveals the nature. Or it concurrently distinguishes the name, taking the entity by investigating the name, which is why both are distinguished. However, according to the treatise's intent, it properly distinguishes the entity; taking both through reasoning also does not conflict. Question: For the sixth and eighth consciousnesses, the object and faculty are distinct, so they can be said to arise from the harmony of the three. For the seventh, faculty and object are identical, so it should arise from the harmony of two. One says: It may be so. A second says: The meanings of faculty and object are different, so it also arises from the harmony of three. Furthermore, speaking in terms of what is universally established, it arises from the harmony of three; based on its great non-shared nature, it also arises from the harmony of two. Question: Contact arises dependent on the harmony of three, and from that is named "the harmony of three." Consciousness and sensation arise from two and four; should they be named "the harmony of two" and "the harmony of four"? Answer: There are two explanations. One says: Contact also harmonizes them, whereas the others do not harmonize them, hence they do not receive the name. A second says: They could also receive it. Question: Consciousness arises from the harmony of two and can be named the harmony of two. Consciousness arises from attention; should it be named alerting? Answer: Consciousness arises from them and its entity is also harmonized, so from that it can be named the harmony of two. Arising from attention, it is not alerting, so it is not named alerting from that. Question: Attention alerts the mind, and it is capable of alerting in the state of seeds. The harmony of three gives rise to contact; does the harmony of three occur in the state of seeds? Answer: The seeds of faculties and consciousness are inferior and without function; they are not yet the harmony of the three. The nature of attention is capable of alerting, hence its function arises in the state of seeds.