成唯識論了義燈 4.36

4.36

《論》：依似比量撥無此識者，本疏及《樞要》皆辨過失。如彼諸說，宗中無有法不極成過，以其真性不是有法，舉此真性意，取有為以為有法故。今謂是過，彼舉真性，真性皆空，無有為法。本意不取真性為有法，於真性中，復不可言說，說何以為有為有法，故有法過。若取護法勝義有為，有為非空不空，彼一分違自宗過。取薩婆多勝義有為，俱違宗過。復有說彼因亦無過，緣生法空符宗無故。此亦不爾，若緣生法空，是護法許宗有相符。緣生不空，清辨言空隨一不成過，又勝義空，何有緣生？亦彼自隨一不成過，又依世俗緣生，許有幻事為喻，世俗有體，因於彼轉，是法自相相違因。若以實幻為喻，彼非緣生闕因後二相，以似幻喻有為，異法喻緣生因轉，亦是法自相相違因。喻過准知。西明云：依清辨造《中觀心論．入真甘露品》中說：阿賴耶識無別有性，眼等六識所不攝故，猶若空華。護法今破，然彼比量有三過失，故言似比。宗依勝義勝義說無第八，有相符過，亦有立已成過。若約世俗有違教過，因有共不定，為如空華六識不攝故非有，為如色等是有。若宗言無別識性，即有他不定，為如第七、六識所不攝故，第八是有。今謂不爾，《要集》雖云三藏所說，然恐傳錯。何者諸大乘經清辨同信，勝義諸法空，世俗諸法有，何獨偏破中宗第八？設依勝義，即無違教失。教依俗說，何得相違云違前經？又護法勝義，非空不空，彼說皆空何得相符？又四勝義及四世俗，皆《瑜伽》、《顯揚》等立。未必清辨亦許各四，何須云勝義勝義，撥無一切量。西明即取掌珍比量然出過云：若依勝義宗相符，若依世俗違聖教。今謂不爾，非相符過，義如前說，不違聖教比量標依真性說故。故本《疏》述正契深旨。

The treatise says: "Relying on a fallacious inference to repudiate the existence of this consciousness..." The basic commentary and the Shunyao both distinguish the faults. According to those various explanations, there is no fault of an unestablished subject (dharmin) in the thesis, because the ultimate reality is not the subject: in mentioning this ultimate reality, the intention was to take conditioned phenomena as the subject. Now I say that it is a fault: they mention ultimate reality, and ultimate reality is completely empty, devoid of conditioned phenomena. If the original intention was not to take ultimate reality as the subject, then within ultimate reality it is also ineffable—what could be stated as conditioned phenomena to serve as the subject? Hence there is a fault of the subject. If one takes Dharmapāla's conditioned phenomena of the ultimate truth, conditioned phenomena are neither empty nor non-empty, which incurs the fault of partly contradicting his own tenet. If one takes the Sarvāstivādin's conditioned phenomena of the ultimate truth, it incurs the fault of contradicting both tenets. Furthermore, some say their reason also has no fault, because the emptiness of dependently arisen phenomena accords with their thesis that they do not exist. This is also not so: if dependently arisen phenomena are empty, this is accepted by Dharmapāla, so there is the fault of proving what is already accepted. If dependently arisen phenomena are not empty, Bhāviveka saying they are empty incurs the fault of being unestablished for one party. Moreover, in ultimate emptiness, how could there be dependent origination? That also incurs the fault of being unestablished for his own party. Furthermore, relying on conventional dependent origination, they accept illusory creations as the example; conventional things have real substance, and the reason applies to them, so it is a reason that contradicts the essential nature of the predicate (dharmasvarūpaviparītasādhana). If one takes actual illusion as the example, it is not dependently arisen and lacks the latter two characteristics of the reason. If one uses illusory appearance as an example for conditioned phenomena, taking it as a dissimilar example where the reason 'dependently arisen' applies, it is also a reason contradicting the essential nature of the predicate. Faults of the example may be understood accordingly. Ximing says: According to Bhāviveka's Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā, in the chapter 'Entering the Nectar of Reality' (Tattvāmṛtāvatāra), it is said: 'The ālayavijñāna has no separate nature, because it is not subsumed by the six consciousnesses such as the eye [consciousness], like a sky-flower.' Dharmapāla now refutes this. However, that inference has three faults, hence it is called a fallacious inference. If the thesis relies on the ultimate truth of the ultimate truth to say the eighth [consciousness] does not exist, there is the fault of proving what is already accepted, as well as the fault of establishing what is already established. If taken conventionally, it contradicts the sacred teachings. The reason has the fault of being inconclusive by being too common (sādhāraṇa-anaikāntika): is it like a sky-flower, non-existent because not subsumed by the six consciousnesses, or is it like form and the rest, which exist? If the thesis says there is no separate nature of consciousness, then there is the fault of being inconclusive for the other party (asādhāraṇa-anaikāntika): is it like the seventh [consciousness], which, though not subsumed by the six consciousnesses, exists as the eighth? Now I say this is not so. Although the Yaoji says this was stated by the Tripiṭaka Master, I fear it was transmitted erroneously. For Bhāviveka shares faith in all the Mahāyāna sūtras: in the ultimate truth all phenomena are empty, and in conventional truth all phenomena exist—why would he exclusively refute the eighth [consciousness] of the central school? Even if relying on the ultimate truth, there is no fault of contradicting teaching. Teaching is spoken based on conventional truth; how could it be contradicted so as to say it contradicts the earlier sūtra? Moreover, Dharmapāla's ultimate truth is neither empty nor non-empty, whereas he says all is empty; how could there be agreement? Furthermore, the four ultimate truths and four conventional truths are all established in the Yogācārabhūmi, Prakaraṇāryavācā, and so forth. Bhāviveka does not necessarily accept four of each; why must one say 'the ultimate truth of the ultimate truth' in an inference that repudiates everything? Ximing then takes the inference from the Zhangzhen lun (Karatalaratna) and points out faults, saying: 'If relying on the ultimate truth, the thesis proves what is already accepted; if relying on conventional truth, it contradicts the sacred teachings.' Now I say this is not so. It is not the fault of proving what is already accepted, for the reason explained above; nor does it contradict sacred teachings, because the inference explicitly states that it is spoken based on ultimate reality. Therefore, what the basic Commentary states genuinely accords with the profound intent.