成唯識論了義燈 4.82

4.82

《論》：「又彼應非唯有執受」等。本疏意云：三業能感，身業是色，即有執受。約扶塵說，聲離質已，即非執受，意業現行，及三實業，亦非執受。前云：約執令生覺受而說，前第二說，種名執受，約同安危說故。今據諸論明十八界中，幾有執受，但云五色根，故言應非唯執受等。西明云：此說實能感五識業，說五識依故，唯思種實業，色、聲假說，非正感故，由此思種，唯非執受，唯非色蘊，唯非內處，違聖教說此三皆唯。《集》云：感相分種，非五識依，能感思業，即非色、聲，約生覺受，故思非執，無表是假，無感果用，故取有釋。今謂不爾，有說，所釋具言，假身、語業，并實思業。《論》云：非唯故通有執等，不云唯非有執受等，顛倒論文，故非為正，前第二說，執受有二：謂諸種子及有根身，若謂今據生覺受說者，且五色根為唯取現，為亦兼種，唯現可爾，通種即非，唯有執受。若云：據現者，何故前難云：又諸聖教說眼等根，皆通現、種，執唯是種，與教相違耶？故知五根通於種、現，據生覺受，自亦不唯，何但難他？故本釋正，阿賴耶識於有色界遍依諸根，與《楞伽》同者（後更撿文）。

Regarding the Śāstra's statement: 'Furthermore, it should not be solely with appropriation (upātta)...' and so on: The intended meaning of the original commentary is: The three karmas are capable of inducing; bodily karma is rūpa, so it is with appropriation. Speaking in terms of the supporting physical elements (upacayamahābhūta), once sound has separated from its substance, it is without appropriation; the manifest mental karma and the three real karmas are also without appropriation. Earlier it was said: this is spoken in terms of appropriation causing the arising of sensation; in the second explanation above, seeds are called appropriated because they share common welfare and peril. Now, according to the treatises clarifying how many among the eighteen dhātus are with appropriation, they only mention the five physical faculties; hence it says 'should not be solely with appropriation', etc. Ximing says: 'This speaks of karma that is truly capable of inducing the five consciousnesses, because it speaks of the bases of the five consciousnesses; thus only the seeds of volition (cetanā) are real karma, while rūpa and sound are nominal, not the direct inducers; therefore these seeds of volition are solely without appropriation, solely non-rūpa-skandha, and solely non-internal āyatana, contradicting the sacred teachings that state these three are solely [appropriated, rūpa, internal]. The Abhidharmasamuccaya says: the seeds that induce the image part are not the bases of the five consciousnesses; the volition-karma capable of inducing is not rūpa or sound; in terms of generating sensation, volition is not appropriated; avijñapti is nominal and has no function of inducing a fruit, so the explanation holding it to be existent is adopted.' Now I say this is not so. In what is explained by some, it completely mentions nominal bodily and vocal karma together with real volition-karma. The Śāstra says 'not solely', thus encompassing both with appropriation and the like; it does not say 'solely not with appropriation' and the like. This reverses the text of the treatise, so it is not correct. The second explanation above stated that appropriation is of two kinds: namely, all seeds and the body possessing faculties. If it is said that now it is based on generating sensation: do the five physical faculties solely take the manifest, or do they also include the seeds? If solely the manifest, it could be so; if including seeds, then it is not solely with appropriation. If it is said to be based on the manifest, why did the earlier refutation say: 'Furthermore, sacred teachings state that faculties such as the eye encompass both manifest and seeds, and grasping them as solely seeds contradicts the teachings'? Thus we know the five faculties encompass both seeds and manifest; based on generating sensation, they themselves are also not solely [appropriated]—why merely refute the other? Therefore the original explanation is correct: the ālayavijñāna in the form realm universally relies on the faculties, identical to the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra (to be checked against the text later).