成唯識論了義燈 4.82

4.82

Regarding the Śāstra's statement: 'Furthermore, it should not be solely with appropriation (upātta)...' and so on: The intended meaning of the original commentary is: The three karmas are capable of inducing; bodily karma is rūpa, so it is with appropriation. Speaking in terms of the supporting physical elements (upacayamahābhūta), once sound has separated from its substance, it is without appropriation; the manifest mental karma and the three real karmas are also without appropriation. Earlier it was said: this is spoken in terms of appropriation causing the arising of sensation; in the second explanation above, seeds are called appropriated because they share common welfare and peril. Now, according to the treatises clarifying how many among the eighteen dhātus are with appropriation, they only mention the five physical faculties; hence it says 'should not be solely with appropriation', etc. Ximing says: 'This speaks of karma that is truly capable of inducing the five consciousnesses, because it speaks of the bases of the five consciousnesses; thus only the seeds of volition (cetanā) are real karma, while rūpa and sound are nominal, not the direct inducers; therefore these seeds of volition are solely without appropriation, solely non-rūpa-skandha, and solely non-internal āyatana, contradicting the sacred teachings that state these three are solely [appropriated, rūpa, internal]. The Abhidharmasamuccaya says: the seeds that induce the image part are not the bases of the five consciousnesses; the volition-karma capable of inducing is not rūpa or sound; in terms of generating sensation, volition is not appropriated; avijñapti is nominal and has no function of inducing a fruit, so the explanation holding it to be existent is adopted.' Now I say this is not so. In what is explained by some, it completely mentions nominal bodily and vocal karma together with real volition-karma. The Śāstra says 'not solely', thus encompassing both with appropriation and the like; it does not say 'solely not with appropriation' and the like. This reverses the text of the treatise, so it is not correct. The second explanation above stated that appropriation is of two kinds: namely, all seeds and the body possessing faculties. If it is said that now it is based on generating sensation: do the five physical faculties solely take the manifest, or do they also include the seeds? If solely the manifest, it could be so; if including seeds, then it is not solely with appropriation. If it is said to be based on the manifest, why did the earlier refutation say: 'Furthermore, sacred teachings state that faculties such as the eye encompass both manifest and seeds, and grasping them as solely seeds contradicts the teachings'? Thus we know the five faculties encompass both seeds and manifest; based on generating sensation, they themselves are also not solely [appropriated]—why merely refute the other? Therefore the original explanation is correct: the ālayavijñāna in the form realm universally relies on the faculties, identical to the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra (to be checked against the text later).