成唯識論了義燈 5.22

5.22

問：相縛於見，說相名縛。見縛自證，名見縛等？答：如《樞要》解，亦許名縛。有云：同種非縛，別種為縛？《要集》云：今謂見有三輪，非如幻等，故說相縛。餘分不爾，故不說縛。有說違文，但於施等，不亡相故。有云違理，同種生果分能所緣，如何不許說能所縛？今謂《要集》前後自違，何者？難有說即云：違文，文但說施等不亡相故，即是不許餘分名縛。難有云：即能所緣故。若許能所緣為縛，前難三輪。非若唯三輪名縛，即能所俱縛非。若云：難有說據相縛說。難有云：據能所緣縛說，若爾能所緣縛可非縛耶？既自許縛，如何難有說？有說會論說三輪，文據易了說故。又《論》：縛者有其多種，或說二縛：一、相應縛；二、所緣縛。又說二縛：一、能緣縛；二、所緣縛。又說二縛：一、相縛；二、麁重縛。能緣王、所與或俱時，不得自在，為相應法之所縛故。相應即縛，持業為名。能緣王、所，為境所拘，名所緣縛，通法執心。能緣縛者，即所縛境為能緣心縛，如阿賴耶名。相縛者，心為相所拘名為相縛。相縛有三：一、云一切相分皆名為縛，即安惠師，據法執說，能所取故，雖知如幻，不能無自性故。或同護法，但據我執不了如幻，非據法執。又云：此意未滅時，識縛終不脫。三位既無末那，即無相縛故。二、云但有漏相即名相縛，唯除無漏通於八識。一云據法執不了幻故，執之為有；一云據我執但不了幻，即為相縛，故通法執。若幻不了如幻縛，在生死名為相縛，唯在我執。三、云據行六度三輪之相，但在第六我執相，應識所緣相，由此不能成到彼岸。若爾善心皆無我執，行度是善，應無相縛？答：據間雜說不能亡相。問：若無我雜即名無相，巧便最勝與清淨最勝，二二何有別？答：巧便據無執，清淨據無悔，諸說相縛不過於此麁重縛者。總攝諸文，麁重有四：一、現行有漏諸心心所，即《雜集》說二十四麁重；二、現行二障；三、二障種子；四、二障習氣。或可現行，通說有漏三性心法，種子應然，以善、無記種子，麁重義稍隱故，諸略不說。今說相縛據我執，引及六度說，依共不共，對小乘故依我執說，據自義故，約六度說。言麁重者，此《論》不明，引經頌有，隨其所應皆修止觀方能除之，通說無爽。

Question: When signs bind the perceiving [aspect], the sign is called a bond. When the perceiving [aspect] binds the self-witnessing [aspect], is it called the bond of perception, etc.? Answer: As explained in the Xunyao, it is also permitted to be called a bond. Some say: being of the same seed is not a bond; being of distinct seeds constitutes a bond. The Yaoji states: "Now I consider that the perceiving [aspect] has the three wheels and is not like an illusion, etc.; hence it is called the bond of signs. The other aspects are not like this, so they are not called bonds." Some say this contradicts the text, because it is only regarding giving and so forth that signs are not eliminated. Others say it contradicts reason, because the aspects of cognitive agent and object that arise as fruits from the same seed—how could one not allow them to be spoken of as the binding and bound? Now I consider that the Yaoji is self-contradictory before and after. How so? When refuting the view that says "some say," it states that it contradicts the text, for the text only says that in giving, etc., signs are not eliminated, which means it does not allow the other aspects to be called bonds. When refuting the view that says "others say," it refers precisely to the cognitive agent and object. If one allows the cognitive agent and object to constitute a bond, the former objection regarding the three wheels is invalid. If only the three wheels are called bonds, then neither the cognitive agent nor the object is a bond. If one says: the refutation of "some say" is based on the bond of signs, and the refutation of "others say" is based on the bond of cognitive agent and object, if so, could the bond of cognitive agent and object not be a bond? Since it itself allows it to be a bond, how can it refute the view that says "some say"? The view of "some say" harmonizes the treatise's discussion of the three wheels, since the text speaks according to what is easy to understand. Furthermore, the Śāstra states: Bonds are of many kinds. Sometimes two bonds are spoken of: first, the associated bond; second, the object-boundary bond. Sometimes another two bonds are spoken of: first, the cognizing agent bond; second, the object-boundary bond. Sometimes another two bonds are spoken of: first, the bond of signs; second, the bond of dauṣṭhulya. When the cognizing mind and mental factors are accompanied by afflictions, they do not attain mastery, because they are bound by the associated dharmas; being associated is itself the bond, named as a karmadhāraya compound. When the cognizing mind and mental factors are constrained by the objective boundary, it is called the object-boundary bond, which pervades minds with dharma-grasping. The cognizing agent bond means that the bound object is bound by the cognizing mind, as in the designation of the ālaya. The bond of signs means that the mind is constrained by signs; hence it is named the bond of signs. The bond of signs is threefold: First, one says all perceived aspects are called bonds; this is Master Sthiramati, speaking according to dharma-grasping, because of the grāhya and grāhaka; although knowing they are like illusions, they cannot be without intrinsic nature. Or, agreeing with Dharmapāla, it only relies on self-grasping failing to comprehend [them] as like illusions, not on dharma-grasping. It also says: when this manas is not yet extinguished, the bond of consciousness is never cast off. Since manas is absent in the three states, there is no bond of signs. Second, one says that merely sāsrava signs are called the bond of signs, exclusively excluding anāsrava, pervading the eight consciousnesses. One says it is based on dharma-grasping failing to comprehend illusions, grasping them as existent; another says it is based on self-grasping merely failing to comprehend illusions, which constitutes the bond of signs, thus pervading dharma-grasping. If illusions are not comprehended as illusions, the bond in saṃsāra is called the bond of signs, existing solely in self-grasping. Third, one says it is based on the signs of the three wheels in practicing the six pāramitās, residing solely in the signs objectified by the consciousness associated with the sixth self-grasping, whereby one cannot reach the other shore. If so, since wholesome minds all lack self-grasping and practicing the pāramitās is wholesome, should they be free from the bond of signs? Answer: It speaks according to alternation, whereby one cannot eliminate signs. Question: If being free from the intermixture of self is called signlessness, what difference is there between supremacy of skillful means and supremacy of purity? Answer: Skillful means is based on absence of grasping; purity is based on absence of regret. The various explanations of the bond of signs do not go beyond these. As for the bond of dauṣṭhulya, summarizing the various texts, dauṣṭhulya has four kinds: first, active sāsrava minds and mental factors, namely the twenty-four kinds of dauṣṭhulya spoken of in the Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā; second, the active two obstacles; third, the seeds of the two obstacles; fourth, the vāsanā of the two obstacles. Or alternatively, for the active states, one generally speaks of the sāsrava mental dharmas of the three natures, and the same should hold for seeds; because the dauṣṭhulya meaning of wholesome and indeterminate seeds is slightly subtle, it is generally omitted in brief. Now, speaking of the bond of signs, it is based on self-grasping, being cited with reference to the six pāramitās; in accordance with what is common and uncommon, confronting the Hīnayāna it is explained based on self-grasping, whereas according to one's own doctrine it is explained with reference to the six pāramitās. As for dauṣṭhulya, this Śāstra does not clarify it, but cited sūtra verses contain it; according to what is appropriate, both śamatha and vipaśyanā must be cultivated to eradicate it, and speaking generally there is no error.