成唯識論了義燈 5.22

5.22

Question: When signs bind the perceiving [aspect], the sign is called a bond. When the perceiving [aspect] binds the self-witnessing [aspect], is it called the bond of perception, etc.? Answer: As explained in the Xunyao, it is also permitted to be called a bond. Some say: being of the same seed is not a bond; being of distinct seeds constitutes a bond. The Yaoji states: "Now I consider that the perceiving [aspect] has the three wheels and is not like an illusion, etc.; hence it is called the bond of signs. The other aspects are not like this, so they are not called bonds." Some say this contradicts the text, because it is only regarding giving and so forth that signs are not eliminated. Others say it contradicts reason, because the aspects of cognitive agent and object that arise as fruits from the same seed—how could one not allow them to be spoken of as the binding and bound? Now I consider that the Yaoji is self-contradictory before and after. How so? When refuting the view that says "some say," it states that it contradicts the text, for the text only says that in giving, etc., signs are not eliminated, which means it does not allow the other aspects to be called bonds. When refuting the view that says "others say," it refers precisely to the cognitive agent and object. If one allows the cognitive agent and object to constitute a bond, the former objection regarding the three wheels is invalid. If only the three wheels are called bonds, then neither the cognitive agent nor the object is a bond. If one says: the refutation of "some say" is based on the bond of signs, and the refutation of "others say" is based on the bond of cognitive agent and object, if so, could the bond of cognitive agent and object not be a bond? Since it itself allows it to be a bond, how can it refute the view that says "some say"? The view of "some say" harmonizes the treatise's discussion of the three wheels, since the text speaks according to what is easy to understand. Furthermore, the Śāstra states: Bonds are of many kinds. Sometimes two bonds are spoken of: first, the associated bond; second, the object-boundary bond. Sometimes another two bonds are spoken of: first, the cognizing agent bond; second, the object-boundary bond. Sometimes another two bonds are spoken of: first, the bond of signs; second, the bond of dauṣṭhulya. When the cognizing mind and mental factors are accompanied by afflictions, they do not attain mastery, because they are bound by the associated dharmas; being associated is itself the bond, named as a karmadhāraya compound. When the cognizing mind and mental factors are constrained by the objective boundary, it is called the object-boundary bond, which pervades minds with dharma-grasping. The cognizing agent bond means that the bound object is bound by the cognizing mind, as in the designation of the ālaya. The bond of signs means that the mind is constrained by signs; hence it is named the bond of signs. The bond of signs is threefold: First, one says all perceived aspects are called bonds; this is Master Sthiramati, speaking according to dharma-grasping, because of the grāhya and grāhaka; although knowing they are like illusions, they cannot be without intrinsic nature. Or, agreeing with Dharmapāla, it only relies on self-grasping failing to comprehend [them] as like illusions, not on dharma-grasping. It also says: when this manas is not yet extinguished, the bond of consciousness is never cast off. Since manas is absent in the three states, there is no bond of signs. Second, one says that merely sāsrava signs are called the bond of signs, exclusively excluding anāsrava, pervading the eight consciousnesses. One says it is based on dharma-grasping failing to comprehend illusions, grasping them as existent; another says it is based on self-grasping merely failing to comprehend illusions, which constitutes the bond of signs, thus pervading dharma-grasping. If illusions are not comprehended as illusions, the bond in saṃsāra is called the bond of signs, existing solely in self-grasping. Third, one says it is based on the signs of the three wheels in practicing the six pāramitās, residing solely in the signs objectified by the consciousness associated with the sixth self-grasping, whereby one cannot reach the other shore. If so, since wholesome minds all lack self-grasping and practicing the pāramitās is wholesome, should they be free from the bond of signs? Answer: It speaks according to alternation, whereby one cannot eliminate signs. Question: If being free from the intermixture of self is called signlessness, what difference is there between supremacy of skillful means and supremacy of purity? Answer: Skillful means is based on absence of grasping; purity is based on absence of regret. The various explanations of the bond of signs do not go beyond these. As for the bond of dauṣṭhulya, summarizing the various texts, dauṣṭhulya has four kinds: first, active sāsrava minds and mental factors, namely the twenty-four kinds of dauṣṭhulya spoken of in the Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā; second, the active two obstacles; third, the seeds of the two obstacles; fourth, the vāsanā of the two obstacles. Or alternatively, for the active states, one generally speaks of the sāsrava mental dharmas of the three natures, and the same should hold for seeds; because the dauṣṭhulya meaning of wholesome and indeterminate seeds is slightly subtle, it is generally omitted in brief. Now, speaking of the bond of signs, it is based on self-grasping, being cited with reference to the six pāramitās; in accordance with what is common and uncommon, confronting the Hīnayāna it is explained based on self-grasping, whereas according to one's own doctrine it is explained with reference to the six pāramitās. As for dauṣṭhulya, this Śāstra does not clarify it, but cited sūtra verses contain it; according to what is appropriate, both śamatha and vipaśyanā must be cultivated to eradicate it, and speaking generally there is no error.