成唯識論了義燈 5.28

5.28

問：五識、三性許得容俱者，且善眼識至等流已，不善耳識所緣，緣至起率爾心。爾時意識亦同聞聲，為是率爾，為等流心，若等流心當與眼識同是善性，率爾無記，未轉依位前三無記，不可二性一心並起。若是無記，眼識爾時如何成善，無善意識為能引故？答：且通初難，五心義說，善等流意與耳同緣，雖是善性，亦名率爾，以其聲境創墮心故，不可說是等流之心，前未聞聲故，不得唯率爾，亦與眼識仍同緣故，故因通二。然是善性，言前三心未轉依位唯無記者，或據全未轉依，不得自在別別五心，多分而說。若已分得轉依之者，得自在者，五心俱者，可通三性，不爾如何《論》云：非取聲時即便出定，領受聲已。若有希望，後時方出，此言希望，即尋求心，不得說言欲希望時即便出定。《論》云：若有希望後方出定故，亦不得言定前加行立期願云。若聞異聲，即便出定尋求境事，故言希望，非於定中作尋求，何者希望聲時，為在定內，為已出定。若在定內，希望之心即是尋求，尋求之心與欲俱故。若此希望非尋求者，是何心攝？若云：希望即已出定，與《論》文違。《論》云：若有希望，後時方出故。西明釋云：若依正本，非即彼定相應意識能取此聲。由此釋家，二釋不同。今謂不爾，違《論》文故，所引釋家非經論故，不可為證。釋後難者，《論》言五識由意識引成善染者，據初起說，非約相續善染之時恒由意引，故下《論》云：諸處但言五俱意識亦緣五境，不說同性。西明云：唯率爾、染淨、等流三心與五識俱，尋求、決定唯緣過去比量之心，不與五俱。問：如前第四云：遇非勝境，可許率爾心後五識間斷。遇勝境位，率爾心後五不間斷，豈不中間起尋求已？方起決定、染淨、等流，若有尋決，云何不與五識俱耶？解云：遇勝境位雖多剎那，率爾不斷，而無餘心，若爾率爾唯是無記。如忿恚天既是勝境，可唯無記，不見憤恚成無記故。解云：許此初起率爾無記，從此心後起於染淨、等流二心，以不善故。若爾五識成善、染者必意引生。若不尋求，云何起憤恚？若起尋求，云何非五俱？解云：三藏。一解云：許五俱意通有比量，而《集量》說五俱現量，不說唯言，如緣教等有比量故。又解不許，若爾前難猶未能通。解云：五俱率爾，雖同無記不起尋求，由前勢分力，意成善、染，引五成善、染。此亦不然。若由前力，何不初遇由前力故，即成善、染？解云：可爾。此亦不然，許率爾心唯無記故，云何善、染？若云除初念比量相違，又若前心已逢不善，可由前力，前惑無記，強力忽至，起於憤恚，豈前有恚耶？今者解云：率爾、尋求亦許五俱，言緣過去約間斷說。今言俱者據相續說，故無緣過去，現、比同時失。

Question: If it is accepted that the five consciousnesses and the three moral natures can occur together, then when, for instance, a wholesome visual consciousness has reached [the stage of] an uninterrupted-flow [mind] (niṣyanda-citta), and an unwholesome auditory consciousness has its cognitive object arrive, thereby giving rise to an inadvertent mind (samāvarjana-citta)—at that time, the manovijñāna also hears the sound together [with the ear]: is it an inadvertent mind or an uninterrupted-flow mind? If it is an uninterrupted-flow mind, it ought to be of the same wholesome nature as the visual consciousness; [yet] the inadvertent mind is morally indeterminate (avyākṛta), and in states prior to the transformation of the basis (āśrayaparavṛtti), the first three [minds] are indeterminate; two natures cannot arise simultaneously in a single mind. If it is indeterminate, how at that time could the visual consciousness become wholesome, since there would be no wholesome manovijñāna to induce it? Answer: First, to resolve the former objection, in terms of the doctrine of the five minds: the wholesome uninterrupted-flow mind, having the same cognitive object as the auditory [consciousness], although wholesome in nature, is also called inadvertent, because the sound object has newly fallen upon the mind; it cannot be called exclusively an uninterrupted-flow mind because it had not previously heard the sound; yet it cannot be solely inadvertent either, because it still shares its cognitive object with the visual consciousness. Hence, in terms of cause, it extends to both. However, it is wholesome in nature. As for the statement that prior to the transformation of the basis the first three minds are exclusively indeterminate, that is spoken either on the basis of not having attained the transformation of the basis at all, being unable to achieve mastery over the discrete five minds, or spoken as the predominant case. If one has already partially attained the transformation of the basis and attained mastery, then where the five minds occur together, they may extend to all three moral natures. Otherwise, why does the treatise say: "It is not that upon apprehending a sound one immediately emerges from absorption; having experienced the sound, if there is a desire [to know], only afterward does one emerge"? This word "desire" (hoped-for intent) is precisely the seeking mind (santīraṇa-citta); one cannot say that the moment one wishes or hopes, one immediately emerges from absorption. Because the treatise says: "If there is a desire, only afterward does one emerge from absorption," one also cannot say that prior to absorption, in the preparatory stage, one made a vow saying: "If I hear a strange sound, I will immediately emerge from absorption to seek out the circumstance of the object." Thus the word "desire" does not mean that one does not engage in seeking within absorption. For when one desires the sound, is it within absorption or already emerged from absorption? If within absorption, this desiring mind is precisely seeking, because the seeking mind occurs together with desire (chanda). If this desire were not seeking, under which mind would it be subsumed? If one says that desiring means one has already emerged from absorption, that contradicts the text of the treatise, for the treatise says: "If there is a desire, only afterward does one emerge." The Master of Ximing explains: according to the primary text, it is not the case that the manovijñāna associated with that absorption itself can apprehend this sound. Because of this, the two explanations among commentators differ. We now say this is not so: it contradicts the text of the treatise, and the commentators cited are neither sūtra nor śāstra, so they cannot serve as proof. To resolve the latter objection: when the treatise says that the five consciousnesses are induced by the manovijñāna to become wholesome or defiled, that is spoken with respect to their initial arising, not that throughout the continuous succession of wholesomeness or defilement they are constantly induced by the manovijñāna. Hence the treatise below says: "Various passages merely state that the manovijñāna concurrent with the five [consciousnesses] also cognizes the five objects, without stating that they share the same moral nature." Ximing says: only the three minds—inadvertent, defiled/purified, and uninterrupted-flow—occur together with the five consciousnesses; seeking and determining minds are exclusively inferential cognitions (anumāna) cognizing the past, and do not occur together with the five. Question: As stated earlier in Fascicle Four, when encountering an inferior object, it is admissible that the five consciousnesses are interrupted after the inadvertent mind; but when encountering a superior object, the five are not interrupted after the inadvertent mind. Could it be that in the interim, after seeking has arisen, only then do determining, defiled/purified, and uninterrupted-flow minds arise? If there are seeking and determining minds, why would they not occur together with the five consciousnesses? The explanation says: when encountering a superior object, although there are many moments of inadvertent mind without interruption, there is no other mind. If so, then the inadvertent mind would be exclusively indeterminate. But an angry deity is a superior object; could it be exclusively indeterminate? For one never sees anger becoming indeterminate. The explanation says: it is granted that the initial arising is inadvertent and indeterminate, and after this mind, the two minds of defiled/purified and uninterrupted-flow arise, because of being unwholesome. If so, for the five consciousnesses to become wholesome or defiled, they must be induced by the manovijñāna. If there is no seeking, how could anger arise? And if seeking arises, why would it not be concurrent with the five? The explanation says: the Tripiṭaka Master offered one explanation: it is granted that the manovijñāna concurrent with the five extends to inferential cognition; the Pramāṇasamuccaya says that what is concurrent with the five is direct perception (pratyakṣa), without using the word "exclusively," because when cognizing the teaching and the like, there is inferential cognition. Another explanation does not grant this. If so, the earlier objection is still not resolved. The explanation says: although the inadvertent mind concurrent with the five is equally indeterminate and does not give rise to seeking, by the force of the momentum of the preceding state, the manovijñāna becomes wholesome or defiled, inducing the five to become wholesome or defiled. This too is incorrect. If it were due to the preceding force, why, upon first encountering [the object], would it not immediately become wholesome or defiled by that preceding force? The explanation says: it could be so. This too is incorrect, for having granted that the inadvertent mind is exclusively indeterminate, how could it be wholesome or defiled? If one says it excludes the first moment, that contradicts the inferential reasoning. Moreover, if the preceding mind had already encountered what is unwholesome, it could be due to the preceding force; but if the preceding state were indeterminate regarding delusion, and a strong force suddenly arrived, giving rise to anger, how could there have been anger previously? Now the explanation is: inadvertent and seeking minds are also granted to be concurrent with the five; the statement that they cognize the past is spoken in terms of interruption. Here, stating that they are concurrent is based on uninterrupted continuity; hence there is no fault of cognizing the past or of direct perception and inference being simultaneous.