成唯識論了義燈 5.40

5.40

問：初二根本悅未極，悅於身、心分喜、樂，極苦中有迫未極，迫於身、心分憂、苦？答：二禪無五識，意喜悅根分喜、樂，中有六識俱，不於意憂分憂、苦。若爾初禪既有三識，應不於意分喜、樂？答：亦不遍，二根無識。又解定喜適悅勝，遍於身、心，分喜、樂中有未極迫非勝，不於憂受分憂苦。又具五識各迫於根，不假意憂分苦。問：初二意唯喜，從喜分於樂，雜受意唯憂，從憂離出苦？答：喜、樂相順得同種，故可從喜分於樂。憂、苦相違種不同，不得於憂分出苦。又二解同前。問：意俱之喜分之為二種或同，別生現是一，不得二受各別而生，無一心中有二受故，既於一受分為喜、樂，應當是假？答：適悅身心義有別故，不以悅心邊即名為樂，適身邊即名為喜，故是實有，猶如二智。問：二執約義分說，為世俗有，二受據義說，何得體成實？答：執依別境惠，說為世俗有，喜樂不依他，同智為實有。問：同從種生，何故悅根名樂非喜？答：意有分別故，根無分別故。

Question: In the fundamental absorptions of the first two [dhyānas], delight is not yet ultimate, and delighting body and mind divides into joy and pleasure; in the intermediate state of extreme suffering, affliction is not yet ultimate, so does afflicting body and mind divide into grief and pain? Answer: In the second dhyāna, there are no five consciousnesses; the mental joy delights the faculties and is divided into joy and pleasure. In the intermediate state, the six consciousnesses are all present, so grief of the mental consciousness is not divided into grief and pain. If so, since the first dhyāna possesses three consciousnesses, should joy not be divided into joy and pleasure in the mental consciousness? Answer: It also does not pervade them all; two faculties lack consciousness. Another explanation: The joy of absorption has superior delight, pervading body and mind, dividing into joy and pleasure; in the intermediate state, non-ultimate affliction is not superior, so it is not divided into grief and pain from the feeling of grief. Furthermore, possessing the five consciousnesses, each afflicts its respective faculty, so there is no need to divide pain from mental grief. Question: In the first two [dhyānas], the mental consciousness has only joy, and from joy pleasure is divided; in mixed feelings, the mental consciousness has only grief, so is pain differentiated from grief? Answer: Joy and pleasure conform to each other and can share the same seed; therefore, pleasure can be divided from joy. Grief and pain are mutually contrary and their seeds are not the same; one cannot divide pain from grief. Furthermore, the two explanations are the same as before. Question: If the joy associated with the mental consciousness is divided into two, either they share the same seed or they are generated separately; their manifestation is one, and two feelings cannot arise separately, for within a single moment of mind there cannot be two feelings. Since a single feeling is divided into joy and pleasure, should it not be nominal? Answer: Because delighting body and mind have distinct meanings, it is not that delighting the mind is precisely pleasure while delighting the body is precisely joy; therefore, they are substantial existents, just like the two types of wisdom. Question: The two clingings are spoken of as conventional existents by dividing according to meaning; how can the two feelings become substantial in substance based on being spoken of according to meaning? Answer: Clinging relies on the discernment of the particular state, so it is spoken of as conventional existence; joy and pleasure do not rely on another, and like wisdom, they are substantially existent. Question: Arising identically from seeds, why is delighting the faculties called pleasure and not joy? Answer: Because the mental consciousness has conceptual differentiation, whereas the physical faculties have no conceptual differentiation.