成唯識論了義燈 5.41

5.41

《樞要》兩釋憂根，一云：不通無記；一云：雖無文說，理通無記，悔必憂俱，彼既無記，憂何妨爾？《瑜伽論》說非無記者，隨轉理門。然《要集》云：《樞要》云：悔必憂俱。今有兩釋，應云：許必憂俱，何以故？即《瑜伽》云：若通一切識身者，遍與一切根相應。若不通一切識身者，意地一切根相應，說一切言無簡別故，即許俱生身邊見等亦與憂俱。彼既無記，憂亦定爾，以悔許字少相近故，寫者有誤。又解應云：悔必憂俱，准第七《論》。二師俱云：悔憂受俱。不說身見等與憂受俱。《瑜伽》自簡云：皆於三受現行可得，不說五受。後即釋前，故但三受。然《要集》云：下論二師，俱不許悔得與憂俱。斷此說非，此亦不爾。下第七卷二師俱許悔與憂並。初師云：有義惡作憂、捨相應不說苦受。後師加苦，故第二師云：有義此四亦苦受俱，何得說云：二俱不說悔與憂俱？然准下釋，悔通淨無記，不通染無記。身、邊見等既染無記，故不得並，但可苦俱。故知證憂是無記者取前許俱，不爾相違。然《瑜伽論》云：若任運生，皆於三受現行可得，亦攝憂、喜。是總說故，於分別惑有俱、不俱，方別說之。故彼《論》云：不任運生，一切煩惱隨其所應諸根相應。我今當說貪於一時，樂、喜相應，或於一時憂、苦相應。若於此中，唯說三受，何故不任運，即通說憂、喜？故以此義准通無記。然不定判此解為正。問：何故憂受非染無記？答：有云：以非報故不通無記。若爾威儀、工巧亦非是報，何通無記？今解明、昧二相別，故不通無記。問：若爾喜亦明利，何得無記？答：上地有喜以定力故，或雖明顯然皆無記，故得染俱，欲無定伏，或明利者，即非無記。下云：恃苦劣蘊憂相應者，是分別惑，必不善故，於無記事而起憂者，是淨無記。若不活畏等，雖緣資具無記事生，由分別我起故不善。

The Shunyao gives two interpretations of the grief faculty. One says: it does not extend to the non-defined. Another says: although no text states it, by principle it extends to the non-defined; remorse must be accompanied by grief, and since remorse is non-defined, why should grief not be so? What the Yogācāra-śāstra says about its not being non-defined is an adaptable provisional explanation. However, the Yaoji states: 'The Shunyao says remorse must be accompanied by grief. Now there are two explanations: it should say "conceding that it must be accompanied by grief." Why is that? Namely, the Yogācāra states: If it extends through all consciousness-bodies, it is universally associated with all faculties; if it does not extend through all consciousness-bodies, it is associated with all faculties of the mental stage. Because it speaks of "all" without exclusion, it thereby concedes that innate view of self, extreme view, and so forth are also accompanied by grief. Since those are non-defined, grief must also be so; because the character "remorse" (hui) and "conceding" (xu) are somewhat close in form, the copyist made an error.' Another explanation: it should say 'remorse must be accompanied by grief,' according to the seventh fascicle of the treatise. Both masters say: remorse is accompanied by the grief feeling; they do not say that view of self and the like are accompanied by the grief feeling. The Yogācāra itself excludes them, saying: 'All are obtainable in manifestation among the three feelings,' not mentioning five feelings. The latter immediately explains the former, so there are only three feelings. However, the Yaoji says: 'Below, neither of the two masters of the treatise concedes that remorse can be accompanied by grief; I judge this statement to be incorrect.' This is also not so. Below, in the seventh fascicle, both masters concede that remorse is accompanied by grief. The first master says: 'Some say remorse is associated with grief and equanimity,' not mentioning pain feeling. The latter master adds pain, and thus the second master says: 'Some say these four are also associated with pain feeling.' How can it be said that neither says remorse is accompanied by grief? However, according to the explanation below, remorse extends to pure non-defined, but does not extend to defiled non-defined. Since view of self, extreme view, and the like are defiled non-defined, they cannot be concurrent [with grief]; they can only be concurrent with pain. Therefore, we know that to prove that grief is non-defined, one adopts the former 'conceding concurrence'; otherwise, it would be contradictory. However, the Yogācāra-śāstra states: 'If spontaneously arising, they are all obtainable in manifestation among the three feelings'; this also subsumes grief and joy. This is a general statement; it is only with regard to conceptually differentiated afflictions, which have concurrence and non-concurrence, that it explains them separately. Therefore, that treatise states: 'Regarding non-spontaneously arising ones, all afflictions are associated with the respective faculties as appropriate. I shall now explain: greed is at one time associated with pleasure and joy, or at another time associated with grief and pain.' If it spoke only of three feelings here, why would it generally speak of grief and joy for non-spontaneous ones? Therefore, based on this principle, it is inferred to extend to the non-defined. However, I do not decisively determine this explanation to be correct. Question: Why is grief feeling not defiled non-defined? Answer: Some say: because it is not a fruition [of ripening], it does not extend to the non-defined. If so, deportment and crafts are also not fruitions; why do they extend to the non-defined? Now I explain: clarity and dullness are two distinct characteristics; hence, it does not extend to the non-defined. Question: If so, joy is also clear and sharp; how can it be non-defined? Answer: In the upper stages there is joy through the power of absorption, or although distinct and obvious, all are non-defined; hence, it can be concurrent with defilement. The desire realm lacks the subduing power of absorption; or if it is clear and sharp, it is not non-defined. Below it says: 'Relying on suffering and inferior aggregates to associate with grief' refers to conceptually differentiated affliction, which must be unwholesome; grieving over non-defined matters is pure non-defined. Although fear regarding livelihood and the like arises conditioned on non-defined material requisites, because it arises through conceptually differentiating a self, it is unwholesome.