成唯識論了義燈 6.154

6.154

《論》：空有三者等。本疏不分假實，但總相釋。《要集》云：或空無我，初中性、諦俱實，後即性實諦假。云有說，空無我皆性、諦實者，非也。二空所顯及所執性，非苦諦故。今謂不爾，一疏文不判，尋聽此解理然。若云二空所顯及所執性，非苦諦者，何故自斷云，空無我初中性、諦俱實，豈計所執苦諦攝耶？今云空及無我性、諦俱實者。以空無我二種行相，與彼相似，亦此行相，所行境故，遍計性無名空無我，圓成實性空無我性，亦空無我。苦諦本性，非我所故空，非一常故無我，能觀所觀行相俱通，故說俱實，據實二性非苦諦攝，初後二行，性實諦假，應知苦下四行，各三如次依遍計、依他、圓成，各分三行。初後皆性實，《辨中邊》說即彼性故，從諦皆假，中即依他。性、諦俱實，然依他中，無漏依他是道諦攝，有漏依他是苦諦攝，攝依他少分。准法師《辨中邊疏》解無常行相，云今無常通緣三性故，說能緣行相，有計所執等，實非此行，通初後性，又以理准，無常緣三諦，初性非諦收，言緣彼者，通一切心緣無常語，假說為無常行，實非此行收，又以彼性假名無常，下諸行相，准此應悉。今准此釋，無常苦等，是苦諦行相，非初後性行相，說初後性者，皆是假說，准空無我攝初後性，亦是假說，彼非諦攝故，非此行相。今又助釋，前解據三乘苦、集等諦，不攝真如，依大乘宗四諦，亦攝圓成實性，故《涅槃經》云：聲聞之人，有苦有諦而無其實，菩薩之人亦有其實，實即真如。菩薩亦能依四諦，詮觀圓成實，故苦、集諦，亦攝彼二，雖非苦、集而是彼性。若依此釋，四三各後性、諦俱實，又邪行如等，即諦真性，約詮顯體，如通四諦，故四三後性、諦俱實。

[Regarding] the treatise text: "Emptiness has three types..." and so forth. The foundational commentary does not distinguish nominal from real, but explains in general terms. The Yaoji says: "Perhaps for emptiness and non-self, in the first and middle natures and truths both are real, while the last is nature-real and truth-nominal." It says: "Some say that for emptiness and non-self all natures and truths are real; this is incorrect. Because what is revealed by the two emptinesses and the imagined nature are not the truth of suffering." Now I say this is not so. First, the commentary text does not decide [this], and when one searches and listens to this explanation, the principle is evident. If it is said that what is revealed by the two emptinesses and the imagined nature are not the truth of suffering, why does he himself conclude that for emptiness and non-self, the first and middle are nature- and truth-real? How could the imagined nature be subsumed under the truth of suffering? Now, when it is said that emptiness and non-self are both nature- and truth-real, it is because the two ākāras of emptiness and non-self resemble them, and they are also the cognitive objects upon which these ākāras operate; because the parikalpita nature lacks [real existence], it is called emptiness and non-self, and the pariniṣpanna nature is the nature of emptiness and non-self, so it is also emptiness and non-self. The fundamental nature of the truth of suffering is empty because it is not mine, and non-self because it is neither unitary nor permanent; both the apprehending and apprehended ākāras apply universally, hence they are said to be both real. In reality, the two natures are not subsumed under the truth of suffering; the first and last two practices are nature-real and truth-nominal. One should know that under the truth of suffering the four practices each have three, sequentially divided into three practices based on the parikalpita, paratantra, and pariniṣpanna. The first and last are both nature-real, because the Madhyāntavibhāga says they are just those natures; in terms of the truth, they are both nominal; the middle is paratantra, which is both nature- and truth-real. However, within paratantra, uncontaminated paratantra is subsumed under the truth of the path, while contaminated paratantra is subsumed under the truth of suffering, subsuming a minor portion of paratantra. In accordance with the Master's Madhyāntavibhāga-ṭīkā explaining the ākāra of impermanence, it says: "Now impermanence universally takes the three natures as objects, so it is said that the apprehending ākāra includes the imagined and so forth; in reality, this practice does not extend to the first and last natures. Moreover, inferring by principle, impermanence takes the three truths as objects; the first nature is not subsumed under the truths. Saying that it takes them as objects universally refers to all minds taking impermanence as an object, nominally called the practice of impermanence, but in reality it is not subsumed under this practice. Moreover, by that nature it is nominally called impermanent." The various ākāras below should be understood accordingly. Now, following this explanation, impermanence, suffering, and so forth are ākāras of the truth of suffering, not ākāras of the first and last natures; saying they are the first and last natures is in all cases nominal expression. By extension, that emptiness and non-self subsume the first and last natures is also nominal expression; because they are not subsumed under the truth, they are not these ākāras. Now, to offer a supporting explanation: the previous interpretation is based on the truths of suffering, origination, and so forth of the three vehicles not subsuming tathatā. According to the Mahāyāna doctrine, the four truths also subsume the pariniṣpanna nature. Therefore, the Nirvāṇa-sūtra says: "For śrāvakas, there is suffering and there is truth, but there is no reality; for bodhisattvas, there is also reality, and reality is just tathatā." Bodhisattvas are also able to contemplate the pariniṣpanna based on the designation of the four truths; therefore, the truths of suffering and origination also subsume those two; although they are not suffering and origination, they are their natures. If according to this explanation, for each of the four groups of three, the last is both nature- and truth-real. Furthermore, wrong conduct, tathatā, and so forth are the true natures of the truths; in terms of expressing the essence through designation, tathatā extends through the four truths, so the last of each of the four groups of three is both nature- and truth-real.