成唯識論了義燈 6.32

6.32

《論》：「若增上果，十因、四緣一切容得」者。問：相違因以何為增上果？《要集》云：有說章云：如霜等與青葉等，為相違因，黃葉為相違果。西明釋云：即由霜故，令青等不生，即相違果。《要集》云：今有釋勝，若由霜等黃葉生者，是不相違，非相違因。又云：由霜等損青葉故，令青葉等失緣不生，得非擇滅，霜為違因，非擇滅為相違果。今謂二釋俱難，何者若青等不生，即相違果者？不生者是何法？若彼青等不生，即無體法，如何無法與有為果？又不相違因云：此相違因，若闕若離，是不相違因，不可無法與有為因。若云：青等失緣不生，得非擇滅。霜為違因，非擇為果者。亦不爾，若望非擇還是順因，不可與青等為相違因，別取非擇為果。又論釋：因順益義，緣是建立，故知不與、不生住等為因。若云望不生住等，是順益者，復不得云相違因，又無體故誰為果耶？問：若爾相違誰之因果？答：今謂本釋取黃等為果，即黃等因。若爾，相順何名相違？答：此言無過，如四相違因與相違法為因故。〈菩薩地〉云：若雜染品諸相違因，當知即是清淨法因；若清淨品諸相違因，當知即是雜染法因。是故，此論總說十因得增上果，望義別故。《要集》問云：十因、四緣但約有法有為而說，亦通無法及無為耶？答：云有說章云：但依有為為論，無法無體，無為無作用，故非因果。《要集》自云：今謂觀待應有無法、無為為因，境界依處，亦通無為，如何得說非立因果？今謂《要集》大有朋附之心。本疏正釋：此文十因、四緣得增上果。問：云然不相違中攝無為，如何得增上？答：十因皆得無不得者，不同小乘，無為非六因、五果之因果，不言有取與為因，然與所不障礙為因，所不疑即是此無為之果也。無與取義，不同小乘也。又撿本章得果門中云：問既由假者所證，何故真如不名士用果？答：若五蘊假者為士夫，真如非士用果。若約懃劬之所得別別法所顯，何妨士用果？以正智證故，不說無為非是因果，重總略問。問：依《雜集》論名、想、見三是語因，即得名為隨說因不？答：准前釋語為隨說因，非名想見。問：既是語因，何不名為隨說因耶？答：此不說為隨說因者，意以一切法為所說，語隨彼說，名隨說因。此即隨所說之因，即能說為體，不欲明彼語因為隨說因。若說此為因，即言隨所說家能說之因，望所說法，以疎遠故。問：論言謂除前四所餘得果，是增上果者，為據法士用、假者士用。若法士用攝法盡故，更有何法得增上果？答：俱無失，然法士用中，不攝無為，無為不障餘法得生，皆增上果。問：相違因即染善，云何不說得異熟果耶？無聞滅依及根依處，俱通三性，何故攝受不得異熟果耶？答：無間滅依及根依處，并相違因，俱是現行。異熟果者，約望種得。問：若爾，如何名有異熟？答：據實能有名、有異熟，去果稍遙不說得之。

[Regarding] the text of the Treatise: "As for the sovereign fruit, all ten causes and four conditions can obtain it": Question: What does the conflicting cause take as its sovereign fruit? The Yaoji states: "A certain explanation's essay says: Just as frost and the like are the conflicting cause with respect to green leaves and the like, yellow leaves are the conflicting fruit." Ximing explains: "Precisely through frost, green [leaves] and the like are caused not to arise; this is the conflicting fruit." The Yaoji states: "Now there is an explanation that is superior: if yellow leaves arise through frost and the like, this is non-conflicting, not a conflicting cause." It also says: "Because frost and the like damage the green leaves, causing the green leaves and the like to lose their conditions and not arise, obtaining uncalculated cessation, frost is the conflicting cause, and uncalculated cessation is the conflicting fruit." Now I say that both explanations are fraught with difficulty. Why? If the non-arising of the green [leaves] and the like is the conflicting fruit, what phenomenon is this 'non-arising'? If the non-arising of those green [leaves] and the like is an entityless phenomenon, how can a nonexistent entity serve as a conditioned fruit? Furthermore, regarding the non-conflicting cause, it says: if this conflicting cause is lacking or separated, that is the non-conflicting cause; it is impossible for a nonexistent entity to serve as a conditioned cause. If one says: "Green [leaves] and the like lose conditions and do not arise, obtaining uncalculated cessation; frost is the conflicting cause, and uncalculated [cessation] is the fruit"—this is also not so. In relation to uncalculated [cessation], it would still be a concordant cause; it cannot be that it serves as a conflicting cause to green [leaves] and the like while separately taking uncalculated [cessation] as the fruit. Furthermore, the treatise explains: cause has the meaning of compliant assistance, and condition has the meaning of establishment; hence we know that it does not serve as a cause for non-arising, non-abiding, and so forth. If one says that in relation to non-arising and non-abiding it is compliant assistance, then again it cannot be called a conflicting cause; moreover, having no entity, what would be the fruit? Question: If so, of what is the conflicting [cause] a cause and fruit? Answer: Now I say that the original commentary takes the yellow [leaves] and the like as the fruit, meaning it is the cause of the yellow [leaves] and the like. [Objection:] If so, since they are mutually concordant, why call it conflicting? Answer: In this statement there is no flaw, just as the four conflicting causes serve as causes for conflicting phenomena. The Bodhisattvabhūmi states: "The conflicting causes of the defiled category should be known to be causes of pure phenomena; the conflicting causes of the pure category should be known to be causes of defiled phenomena." Therefore, this treatise generally states that the ten causes obtain the sovereign fruit, because it is considered from differing perspectives. The Yaoji asks: "Are the ten causes and four conditions spoken of only in terms of existent and conditioned dharmas, or do they also extend to nonexistent and unconditioned [dharmas]?" Answer: It says that a certain explanation's essay says: "They are discussed only relying on the conditioned; nonexistent [dharmas] lack an entity, and unconditioned [dharmas] lack functional activity; therefore they are neither cause nor fruit." The Yaoji itself states: "Now I consider that relative to dependence there should be nonexistent and unconditioned [dharmas] as causes, and the objective support basis also extends to the unconditioned; how can one say that causes and fruits are not established?" Now I say that the Yaoji has a strong tendency to show favoritism. The main commentary correctly explains: in this text, the ten causes and four conditions obtain the sovereign fruit. Question: [The treatise] states: "Yet the unconditioned is subsumed under the non-conflicting"; how does it obtain the sovereign [fruit]? Answer: All ten causes obtain it, none failing to obtain it. Unlike the Hīnayāna, where the unconditioned is not cause or fruit among the six causes and five fruits, it is not said to be a cause by grasping and giving [a fruit]; rather, it serves as a cause by not obstructing, and not obstructing is precisely the fruit of this unconditioned. It does not have the meaning of grasping and giving, unlike the Hīnayāna. Furthermore, examining the section on obtaining fruits in the original essay, it says: Question: Since it is realized by a designated person, why is tathatā not called a fruit of virile activity? Answer: If the five-aggregate designated person is the agent, tathatā is not a fruit of virile activity. If considered as that which is acquired through effort and revealed by distinct dharmas, what is to prevent it being a fruit of virile activity? Because it is realized by correct knowledge, it is not said that the unconditioned is not cause and fruit. Let us review the questions in brief. Question: According to the Abhidharmasamuccaya, name, conception, and view are the causes of speech; can they then be named the cause of conventional expression, or not? Answer: Based on the preceding explanation, speech is the cause of conventional expression, not name, conception, and view. Question: Since they are causes of speech, why are they not called the cause of conventional expression? Answer: That they are not stated to be the cause of conventional expression means: all dharmas are that which is spoken of, and speech conforms to that speaking, hence named the cause of conventional expression. This is precisely the cause conforming to what is spoken of, taking the expressing [speech] as its essence; it does not intend to clarify that the cause of speech is the cause of conventional expression. If one spoke of these as the cause, then one would be speaking of the cause of the expressive agent conforming to what is spoken of, which is distant with respect to the dharmas spoken of. Question: The treatise states, "That which obtains a fruit apart from the preceding four is the sovereign fruit"; is this based on the virile activity of dharmas or the virile activity of a designated person? If the virile activity of dharmas subsumes all dharmas completely, what further dharma obtains the sovereign fruit? Answer: Neither has any flaw. However, the virile activity of dharmas does not subsume the unconditioned; the unconditioned does not obstruct other dharmas from being able to arise, and all are sovereign fruits. Question: Since the conflicting cause is defiled and wholesome, why is it not said to obtain the ripening fruit? The immediately antecedent cessation basis and the faculty basis both extend through the three natures; why does the sustaining [cause] not obtain the ripening fruit? Answer: The immediately antecedent cessation basis and the faculty basis, along with the conflicting cause, are all active manifestations. Ripening fruits are obtained when viewed in relation to seeds. Question: If so, how can they be called 'possessing ripening'? Answer: In reality, they are called 'possessing ripening' through their capacity to exist; because they are somewhat distant from the fruit, it is not said that they obtain it.