成唯識論了義燈 6.33

6.33

《論》傍論已了等。本有二解，意云：四緣依十五依處下是傍論。前解四緣，並是正論。何以故？以結止傍，應辨正論已。下即辨本識中種容作三緣生現分別等。西明二釋，即取四緣已下，皆為傍論。頌意為顯，緣生分別。意非欲辨緣差別故。《要集》云：若扶頌意為正論，不扶頌意為傍論，即有釋後解為勝。今謂不然，本釋外難，若無外境分別不生難。論主頌答：由種子識展轉力故，彼分別生，即顯由緣分別方起。故辨四緣緣生分別，俱為正論，如下生死果因皆正論。若說四緣，非為正論。云何論結止傍論已？猶約四緣辨生分別，如何後結依斯內識，互為緣起，分別因果理教皆成，捨正執邪，何固執也？

[Regarding] the text of the Treatise: "The secondary discussion has been completed," and so forth: Originally there are two interpretations. The idea [of the first] is: from "The four conditions rely on the fifteen bases" downwards is the secondary discussion. The preceding explanations of the four conditions are all the primary discussion. Why? Because after concluding and ending the secondary discussion, it should clarify the primary discussion. Below, it precisely clarifies that the seeds in the fundamental consciousness can serve as three conditions to generate active conceptualization, and so forth. In Ximing's two interpretations, from the four conditions onwards, all are taken to be secondary discussion. The stanza's intent is to demonstrate that conceptualization arises from conditions, not intending to clarify the distinctions among conditions. The Yaoji states: "If supporting the stanza's intent is the primary discussion, and not supporting the stanza's intent is the secondary discussion, then of the explanations, the latter interpretation is superior." Now I say this is not so. The original commentary explains the external objection: the objection that if there are no external objects, conceptualization would not arise. The treatise master's stanza answers: "Through the reciprocal power of the seed-consciousness, / Those conceptualizations arise," which precisely demonstrates that it is through conditions that conceptualization only then arises. Therefore, clarifying the four conditions and that conceptualization arises from conditions are both primary discussion, just as below, the fruits and causes of cyclic existence are all primary discussion. If one says that the four conditions are not primary discussion, why does the treatise, having concluded and ended the secondary discussion, still clarify the arising of conceptualization in terms of the four conditions? And how could it conclude later: "Relying on this internal consciousness, they are mutually conditioned arisings; the causes and fruits of conceptualization are established by both principle and teaching"? Abandoning the correct and grasping the perverse—why be so obstinate?