成唯識論了義燈 6.35

6.35

《論》：「唯除見分非相所緣」等者，本釋如疏。西明四釋：於四釋中，初釋分二；第二釋中分三；第三釋中分四；第四釋中分六，成十五釋。總第四釋與本釋同，別分成六，即不同本。《要集》斷云：四釋之中，第四為正，無漏心等用周遍故。於變不變十五釋中，第十三為勝。正智證如及餘心等證自證者，皆不變相，此餘一切見等，緣相必變而緣。今謂：西明十五釋中，皆無一正，所以者何？且就第四分六釋中，一云，見緣相變，餘皆不變者不爾，既就體四分以辨相緣。見緣自相即是親緣，如何名變？若帶起名變，是自證分，故前第一卷云：變謂識體轉似二分，亦不關見，更變相緣無文說故，餘二緣相如何不變？二云，見緣三變，餘皆不變。此亦不爾，見緣相變有過同前，餘二緣三皆不變者，二緣相分如何不變？第四緣見不變相者，自證何殊？《要集》救云：兼正有別者，既兼正殊，何不變相，不變相齊如何兼正？三云，見緣四變，餘皆不變，過准前知；四云，三緣相變，緣餘不變，《要集》斷此解中為正。今謂，同前皆亦不正，何者見緣後二變相可爾？如何緣相更說變相，豈不親緣同體相分，又第四分緣相是兼，許變相緣。緣於見分亦兼非正，何不變相，說果緣他過亦准知。《要集》言：有說云，見緣自證變影而緣，證自證分緣相、見分，見緣三、四以隔越故，變影而緣，皆不應理，同體義分，何言隔越？見望自證，如何名隔？見緣自證既自內證，如何變緣？若變相緣，何名緣自？由此內證，不變而緣，三緣相分，變影而緣，不由隔越及由實性者。今依疏文，但云新得，即變影緣，無隔越語，以後二分望相名隔，見望第四義越名隔，理亦無違。若云既變相緣何名緣自者，此難亦非，如以鏡為緣還見自質，以心為緣，還見自心等言，豈不變相耶？見緣自證，變自證相故名為緣自，於理何違？

[Regarding] the text of the Treatise: "Except for the seeing aspect not being the objective support of the objective aspect," and so forth: The original explanation is as in the Commentary. Ximing has four interpretations: within the four interpretations, the first interpretation divides into two; the second interpretation divides into three; the third interpretation divides into four; the fourth interpretation divides into six, making fifteen interpretations. In general, the fourth interpretation is the same as the original commentary, but divided into six distinct ones, it is not the same as the original. The Yaoji determines: "Among the four interpretations, the fourth is correct, because the function of uncontaminated mind and the like is pervasive. Among the fifteen interpretations of transforming and not transforming an aspect, the thirteenth is superior. Correct knowledge realizing tathatā, and the other minds realizing the self-witnessing aspect, all do not transform an aspect; all the other seeing aspects and the like, in taking an aspect as an objective support, must transform an aspect to take it as an objective support." Now I say: Among Ximing's fifteen interpretations, none is correct. Why? First, concerning the fourth [interpretation] divided into six interpretations: The first says: "The seeing aspect transforms an aspect when taking the objective aspect as its object, while the rest all do not transform." This is not so. Since taking one another as an objective support is explained in terms of the four aspects of the entity, the seeing aspect taking its own objective aspect as its object is precisely a direct apprehension; how can it be called 'transforming'? If bringing [an image] forth is called 'transforming', that is the self-witnessing aspect; therefore the previous first fascicle says: "'Transforming' means that the consciousness-entity evolves to resemble two aspects." It does not concern the seeing aspect further transforming an aspect to take it as an objective support, because there is no text stating this. Why would the other two, when taking an objective aspect as their object, not transform? The second says: "The seeing aspect transforms when taking the [other] three as its object, while the rest all do not transform." This also is not so. For the seeing aspect to transform when taking the objective aspect has the same fault as before. If the other two do not transform when taking the three as their object, how could the two not transform when taking the objective aspect as their object? If the fourth does not transform an aspect when taking the seeing aspect as its object, how is it different from the self-witnessing aspect? The Yaoji rescues this, saying: "There is a difference between incidental and primary [cognition]." Since incidental and primary are different, why would it not transform an aspect? If they are equal in not transforming an aspect, how can there be incidental and primary? The third says: "The seeing aspect transforms when taking the four as its object, while the rest all do not transform." Its faults are known by analogy with the preceding. The fourth says: "Three transform an aspect when taking the objective aspect as their object, and do not transform when taking the rest as their object." The Yaoji judges this explanation to be correct. Now I say: like the preceding, this too is incorrect. Why? That the seeing aspect transforms an aspect when taking the latter two as its object may be permissible, but how could it be said that it transforms an aspect when taking the objective aspect as its object? Does it not directly take the objective aspect of the same entity as its object? Furthermore, for the fourth aspect to take the objective aspect as its object is incidental, and you allow that it transforms an aspect to take it as its object; yet taking the seeing aspect as its object is also incidental and not primary—why does it not transform an aspect? To say that the fruit takes the other as an objective support has faults that can also be known by analogy. The Yaoji states: "A certain explanation says: when the seeing aspect takes the self-witnessing [aspect] as its object, it transforms an image to take it as its object; when the witness of self-witnessing aspect takes the objective and seeing aspects as its object, and the seeing aspect takes the third and fourth as its object, because they are separated, they transform an image to take them as their object. These are all unreasonable. Being semantic divisions of the same entity, why speak of separation? Relative to self-witnessing, how can the seeing [aspect] be called separated? Since the seeing aspect taking the self-witnessing [aspect] as its object is an internal witnessing of itself, how could it transform [an image] to take it as its object? If it transforms an aspect to take it as its object, how could it be called cognizing itself? For this reason, in internal witnessing, it takes [the object] without transforming; the three taking the objective aspect as their object transform an image to take it as their object, not because of separation or because of a real nature." Now, relying on the text of the Commentary, it merely states that when newly acquired, it transforms an image to take it as an object; there are no words about 'separation'. Because the latter two aspects are called separated relative to the objective aspect, and the seeing aspect is called separated by semantic extension relative to the fourth, in principle there is no contradiction. If one says: "Since it transforms an aspect to take it as an object, how can it be called cognizing itself?"—this objection is also wrong. As when taking a mirror as a condition one still sees one's own original form, or taking the mind as a condition one still sees one's own mind, and so forth, do these not transform an aspect? When the seeing aspect takes the self-witnessing aspect as its object, it transforms the aspect of the self-witnessing [aspect], and therefore it is called cognizing itself; what contradiction is there in principle?