成唯識論了義燈 6.36

6.36

《論》：「諸業謂福、非福、不動」等者。准《雜集》第七云：不動業者，謂色、無色繫善。問：何故色、無色繫業，名不動耶。答：如欲界中餘趣圓滿善、不善業，遇緣轉得，餘趣異熟，非色、無色繫業有如是事，所受異熟界地決定故，是故約與異熟不可移轉，名為不動。本疏云：如資下業生五淨居，非不移轉，故此解非。論第二釋云：又定地攝，故說為不動。本疏云：以定能住於一境故，此釋為勝。西明釋云：《雜集》初釋就任性業說，若約勝緣，非無移轉，後說上地散善從定假名不動。今謂不然，豈欲界業，不遇別緣，雖任性業，亦別趣處受耶？若爾總不定，何得有定受，又復五趣應無定異因。若爾，如何《瑜伽》、《雜集》等，俱說定異，即各別感五趣因果，若許遇緣方別趣受，無緣不別，與上何殊不名不動。有解釋云：熏禪同地，但非異界地，故名不動。《要集》云：有解為勝。今謂不爾，豈欲繫業於異界地受耶？亦同地趣不定應同不動。若許異界受，即異地漏隨增，亦別界別受，違諸聖教，故為不可。又云：《雜集》後解，但云：定地攝故名不動業，若定、若散皆定地攝，不可難言散善非定，應非不動。今謂不爾，若許散善非別處受，自性不動，何須定攝？若許別處受，何得名不動？若云以定不動，從定名不動，亦應定俱名為修惠，聞惠從定，亦名修惠。此既不爾，彼云何然？又許散善定地攝，故名為不動，即有覆無記業，亦應名不動，同定地攝故。問：許業異熟移轉異受，如何十因立定異因？答：非說諸業，皆名定異，皆可移轉。但據總報定業界地起異立為定異，不定別報許移轉於異趣受故，同地總報不妨異受，如生淨居。故《雜集》云：如欲界中餘趣圓滿善、不善業，遇緣轉得餘趣異熟，不說引業，又圓滿業所得異熟有共、不共，如鹿王膊、師子臆等，為共通善、惡趣故，頂肉髻、雙佉，大通人、天趣立定異因，轉餘受業，各據別義皆不相違。

Regarding the passage in the treatise, "All actions refers to meritorious, non-meritorious, and immovable [actions]," etc.: According to the seventh fascicle of the Samuccaya, immovable actions refer to wholesome [actions] bound to the form and formless realms. Question: Why are actions bound to the form and formless realms called immovable? Answer: Just as wholesome and unwholesome actions completing other destinies in the desire realm, when encountering conditions, shift to obtain the vipāka of another destiny, this does not occur in actions bound to the form and formless realms; because the realm and stage of the vipāka experienced is definitively determined, they are called immovable in terms of their vipāka being non-transferable. The original commentary says: Because actions of lower stages can be supported to be born in the five pure abodes, they are not entirely non-transferable; hence this explanation is incorrect. The second explanation of the [Samuccaya] śāstra says: Furthermore, because they are subsumed under the concentrated stages (samāhita-bhūmi), they are said to be immovable. The original commentary says: Because concentration can abide on a single object, this explanation is superior. Ximing explains: The first explanation of the Samuccaya speaks with respect to actions done in accord with nature; if considered with respect to superior conditions, they are not without transference. The latter explanation states that the distracted wholesome [actions] of the higher stages are metaphorically called immovable by following concentration. Now I say this is not so. Could it be that actions of the desire realm, when not encountering distinct conditions, even when done in accord with nature, are also experienced in a different destiny? If so, then generally all would be undetermined; how could there be determined experiencing? Furthermore, the five destinies would lack a definitive-distinction cause (niyatabheda-hetu). If so, why do the Yogācārabhūmi, the Samuccaya, and others all speak of definitive distinction, which is individually producing the causes and effects of the five destinies? If one allows that only when encountering conditions are they experienced in a different destiny, and without conditions they do not differ, how does this differ from the higher [stages] so that they are not called immovable? A certain explanation says: Meditations perfumed within the same stage only do not cross to a different realm or stage, and are therefore called immovable. The Yaoji says: This explanation is superior. Now I say this is not so. Could actions bound to the desire realm be experienced in a different realm or stage? If they also remain within the same stage yet the destiny is undetermined, they should equally be immovable. If you permit experience in a different realm, then the defilements of a different stage would increase accordingly, and there would be distinct experiences in distinct realms, which contradicts all sacred teachings; thus this is unacceptable. Furthermore it says: The latter explanation of the Samuccaya merely says that because they are subsumed under the concentrated stages, they are called immovable actions; whether concentrated or distracted, all are subsumed under the concentrated stages, so one cannot object that distracted wholesome [actions] are not concentration and thus should not be immovable. Now I say this is not so. If you allow that distracted wholesome [actions] are not experienced in another place and are by their own nature immovable, why must they be subsumed under concentration? If you allow that they are experienced in another place, how can they be called immovable? If you say that because concentration is immovable, they are called immovable by following concentration, then that which is concurrent with concentration should also be called cultivation-wisdom, and hearing-wisdom should also be called cultivation-wisdom by following concentration. Since this is not the case, how could that be so? Furthermore, if distracted wholesome [actions] are called immovable because they are subsumed under the concentrated stages, then defiled neutral actions should also be called immovable, because they are equally subsumed under the concentrated stages. Question: If you permit the vipāka of actions to shift and be experienced differently, how can the definitive-distinction cause be established among the ten causes? Answer: It is not said that all actions are called definitively distinct, or that all can shift. It is only based on the primary retributions (sarvatraga-vipāka) having definitive realm and stage and arising distinctly that the definitive distinction is established; undetermined secondary retributions (parikalpita-vipāka) are permitted to shift to be experienced in different destinies. Therefore, with primary retribution of the same stage, there is no obstacle to distinct experiences, as in rebirth in the Pure Abodes. Thus the Samuccaya says: Just as wholesome and unwholesome actions completing other destinies in the desire realm, when encountering conditions, shift to obtain the vipāka of another destiny—it does not speak of leading actions (ākṣepaka-karma). Furthermore, the vipāka obtained from completing actions has both common and uncommon aspects: just as the calves of an antelope-king, the chest of a lion, etc., are common to both wholesome and unwholesome destinies, the flesh-protuberance on the crown and the double-edged sword [conch-shell sign] largely pertain to human and heavenly destinies; establishing the definitive-distinction cause and the action of shifting to other experiences each rely on different senses, and do not contradict each other.