成唯識論了義燈 6.95

6.95

《論》：「九實、三假」等，據何名假？答：本釋云：顯生、異、滅三相位，別名生、老、死，體即識等。故有、生、老死三是假也，此自無體，攬他為故，不約多法，名之無假。名色、六處亦多法故、亦不剋性辨其假實，行支非一，通假身語，名為行故，不可云思有三非一非約色聲，亦應無明、觸、受及愛俱非一事，各有多故。雖六觸、受及四愛等，不名多事，故色、聲、思多事是行。故知有支無其自體，即已潤六支，生、老死支即前識等三相位，別更無異體，故名為假。西明三釋：一云，識等多法立三依來生等；一云，識等五法隨名出體，在不相應；一云，合前二說，故名為假。今謂不爾，若多法立說有名假，名色等同，若依來生，論不應言三相位別，生、異、滅相非未來故，生、老支非不相應故。又言或可，體不異故說為假，此同本釋，故可為正。《要集》雖更多云：自為問答愛、取相例，還云愛、取體用俱別，行等用別體同。准此既云：用別體同，名之為有，故是假者。此即前因，何勞別說。

The Treatise: 'Nine are real and three are nominal, etc.' On what basis are they called nominal? Answer: The original explanation states: Manifesting the three states of the characteristics of arising, change, and cessation, they are distinctively named birth, aging, and death, their substance being consciousness, etc. Therefore existence, birth, and aging-and-death are nominal; these lack their own substance, being gathered from others, and are not designated nominal on the basis of a multiplicity of dharmas. Name-and-form and the six sense bases also comprise multiple dharmas; nor is nominal versus real determined strictly by their essential nature. The action limb is not single, for it nominally covers body and speech, being named action; one cannot say volition has three and is not single, nor is it in terms of form and sound, for ignorance, contact, feeling, and craving would likewise all not be a single phenomenon, each having many. Although the six contacts and feelings and the four cravings, etc., are not termed multiple phenomena, form, sound, and volition are multiple phenomena that constitute action. Hence we know the existence limb lacks its own substance, being simply the six moistened limbs; and the limbs of birth and aging-and-death are simply the three distinct characteristic states of the preceding consciousness, etc., having no other substance apart from them, and are therefore called nominal. Ximing gives three explanations: One says that on multiple dharmas such as consciousness, three are posited based on future birth, etc.; one says that the five dharmas such as consciousness have their substance posited according to their names, residing in the unassociated [dharmas]; one says that combining the preceding two explanations, they are therefore called nominal. We now say this is not so: If posited on multiple dharmas it is said to have nominal existence, name-and-form, etc., would be the same; if based on future birth, the treatise should not say 'the three characteristic states are distinct', because the characteristics of arising, change, and cessation are not future, nor are the limbs of birth and aging unassociated [dharmas]. Furthermore, it says: 'Alternatively, because their substance is not distinct, they are said to be nominal'; this agrees with the original explanation, so it can be taken as correct. Although the Yaoji speaks further, constructing its own questions and answers and drawing an analogy with craving and grasping, it still says that craving and grasping are distinct in both substance and function, whereas action, etc., are distinct in function but identical in substance. According to this, since it says 'distinct in function but identical in substance' is named existence, and therefore it is nominal, this is just the preceding cause; why labor to explain it separately?