成唯識論了義燈 7.85

7.85

「依無間定」等，此後無間即入見道，立「無間」名。若以智名「無間」，即無間之定，依主為名。此定無間即入見道，名「無間定」，即持業釋。不同明得，定非明故。無間非智，但無別隔，即名「無間」，智、定俱通。西明解：「第一法觀名為『無間』，此所依定名『無間定』，即依主釋」。闕持業釋。無間名寬，非唯智故，通二釋勝。不同前三，以名狹故。問：准《論》云：「名、義相異，故別尋求；二二相同，故合思察」。離合為四，與《瑜伽》同，何故無性《攝論》第六云：若名、若義自性差別，假立自性差別義，如是六種義皆無故。答：彼論談法有其六種：若尋思觀，即名、義別開；二自性、二差別合觀，故成四種。《瑜伽》三十六、《顯揚》第六、《無性》第六、《大莊嚴論》十二，皆說四尋思、四如實智，無說六尋思處。西明云「離即為六，合觀為四」者，准此知非。廣釋名、義、自性、差別，如《攝論》第六、《瑜伽》三十六明。

Regarding "based on the immediate samādhi" and so forth: immediately following this, one enters the darśanamārga; hence it is designated as "immediate." If "immediate" is used to name wisdom, then it is the samādhi of the immediate, taking its name as a tatpuruṣa compound. If it means that immediately upon this samādhi one enters the darśanamārga, so it is called the "immediate samādhi," this is a karmadhāraya compound. It is not like "obtaining light," because samādhi is not light. "Immediate" is not wisdom itself, but merely having no separation; thus it is named "immediate," and applies to both wisdom and samādhi. Ximing explains: "The contemplation of the supreme worldly dharma is named 'immediate,' and the samādhi upon which it relies is named the 'immediate samādhi,' which is a tatpuruṣa compound." This lacks the karmadhāraya explanation. The name "immediate" is broad and not confined to wisdom; thus, accommodating both compounds is superior. It is unlike the preceding three, because their names are narrow. Question: According to the treatise, it says: "Because names and referents differ in character, they are investigated separately; because the two sets of two are identical, they are contemplated together." Distinguishing and combining them makes four, which agrees with the Yogācārabhūmi. Why, then, does Asamāhita's commentary on the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, fascicle six, state: "Whether names or referents, intrinsic nature or distinction, designating intrinsic nature and distinction of referents—because such six kinds of referents are all nonexistent"? Answer: That treatise speaks of dharmas as having six kinds: regarding the contemplation of investigation, names and referents are opened up separately; the two intrinsic natures and two distinctions are contemplated together, thus forming four kinds. The thirty-sixth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi, the sixth fascicle of the Prakaraṇāryavācā, the sixth fascicle of Asamāhita's commentary, and the twelfth chapter of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra all speak of four investigations and four knowledges of reality as it is; nowhere do they speak of six investigations. When Ximing says that "distinguished they are six, and contemplated together they are four," one knows from this that he is incorrect. The broad explanation of names, referents, intrinsic nature, and distinctions is clarified as in the sixth fascicle of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha and the thirty-sixth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi.