成唯識論了義燈 1.86

1.86

Furthermore, explaining those who are qualified to compose a treatise and those who are not qualified to compose a treatise, in total there are four categories of four types of persons. As for the first four persons: 1. the ignorant; 2. the doubting; 3. the inverted; 4. those who have crossed over. The 'ignorant' are dull-rooted ordinary beings who do not understand either the Dharma or the meaning at all; therefore they are called 'ignorant.' Second, the 'doubting' are intelligent ordinary beings who, although they understand the Dharma and meaning, still have doubt regarding the principle of the four noble truths, and have not yet been able to enter noble status. Third, the 'inverted' are persons of the first fruition [srotāpanna] who have already comprehended the four noble truths, but still have inversion. There are three types of inversion: 1. [regarding] time; 2. [regarding] characteristic; 3. [regarding] locus. As for 'time': impermanence is time, and at the time of impermanence they conceptualize permanence. Second, as for 'characteristic': within non-self, they conceptualize a self. Third, as for 'locus': regarding impure places and painful places, they conceptualize them as pure and pleasurable. Although a person of the first fruition has eliminated the two instances of permanence and self, the afflictions to be abandoned by cultivation have not yet been eliminated. In relation to external sensory objects, they still give rise to the latter two; therefore, practicing non-brahmacarya, they still conceptualize the impure as pure, and call what is devoid of pleasure 'pleasurable.' Fourth, 'those who have crossed over' are those who have crossed over the previous three afflictions; they are the people beyond training [arhats]. Among the former three persons, the first is one who refuses to know, the second has lost the way, and the third is on a deviant way. Among these four persons, only the fourth person is qualified to compose a treatise. If speaking in terms of actual reality, an ordinary bodhisattva is also counted as the fourth person, and is thus qualified to compose a treatise. Furthermore, there are four types: 1. those relying on words as superior: they can only recite the text but do not understand the meaning. Just as a parrot can only recite words without understanding their meaning and cannot attain the path, this is the lowest and most inferior; 2. those relying on others as superior: adhering to a virtuous person, they are then able to do good, while adhering to an evil person, they only do evil. Just as a painted person follows the painter's intention—if painted sitting, he sits all day; if painted standing, he always stands. Although like this, they can be transformed; by encountering a good friend, they can be transformed to enter the path, which is still superior to the first person; 3. those relying on discrimination as superior: upon hearing others speak, they do not understand at first, and only awaken when an explanation is obtained; one must make discriminations for them. For instance, it is said: 'All conditioned factors are impermanent; they are phenomena of arising and cessation; having arisen, they must cease; calm cessation is bliss.' If, upon hearing that all conditioned factors are impermanent, they do not yet understand why they are phenomena of arising and cessation, one explains that impermanence: the future is arising, the past is cessation, and the present is arising and cessation. Since conditioned factors have the three times, they are impermanent. 'Having arisen, they must cease' further explains the meaning of the future being impermanent. If the future were only arising without cessation, it would be permanent. Furthermore, it is explained: depending on the cessation of the past, the future is called arising; having arisen, there must be cessation, so the future is impermanent. The first three lines are saṃsāra, and the fourth line is nirvāṇa. When such discriminations are made, this third person then understands; 4. those superior in opening wisdom: wisdom of itself is able to open up and perceive the principle, without waiting for discrimination. Just as Śāriputra heard Assaji speak the meaning of half a verse, and within that half verse understood a thousand meanings, immediately attaining the noble path. Such as this is one who is superior in opening wisdom. For example, a venomous snake wound on the body may be tiny as a hair, yet by the power of the venom it pervades the body in an instant; such a person is further superior. This fourth person is properly qualified to compose a treatise; the remaining three persons are not appropriate. Those like Śāriputra, Maudgalyāyana, Kāśyapa, and the like all have the nature of a pratyekabuddha; it was only by seeing the Buddha that they became śrāvakas; hence they belong to the fourth. As for the third set of four persons: 1. those who afflict themselves; 2. those who afflict others; 3. those who afflict both themselves and others; 4. those who afflict neither themselves nor others. Just as tīrthikas holding eternalist views, for the sake of future retribution, torment their own bodies by sitting and lying on thorns and the like, this is afflicting oneself. Just as tīrthikas holding annihilationist views, not seeing future fruits, in the present world seek peace and happiness for their own bodies or rob others of wealth and food, these are all afflicting others. Eternalist tīrthikas, practicing self-mortification, afflict themselves, and by slaughtering cattle, sheep, and the like, binding them without food to sacrifice to the gods, afflict others. Those who afflict neither are persons who have attained the principle: because they know shame and conscience, they know that afflicting others produces guilt and afflicting oneself brings no merit; wishing to be free from guilt and produce merit, they afflict neither. Because they do not afflict others, they are free from annihilationism. Because they do not afflict themselves, they are free from eternalism. Only the fourth person may be qualified to compose a treatise. As for the fourth set of four persons: 1. a person heading toward the lower paths, that is, an icchantika, who will certainly enter the evil paths; 2. one heading toward the path of saṃsāra, that is, a renounced tīrthika, who, because of giving rise to views, attachment to precepts and vows, and the like, revolves in the six destinies; 3. one heading toward self-benefit, that is, the two vehicles. Persons of the two vehicles, although they recognize transcendence, only fear suffering for themselves, are exhausted by transforming others, and quickly seek liberation; therefore they are said to head toward self-benefit; 4. one heading toward benefiting others, that is, the bodhisattva. Bodhisattvas take universal salvation as their aspiration, and always wish to benefit sentient beings; therefore they are said to head toward benefiting others. Only the fourth person may be qualified to compose a treatise. These four types of the fourth person are precisely four virtues. If a single person is endowed with these four virtues, only then is he competent to compose a treatise. 1. The virtue of having crossed over, free from icchantikas. Icchantikas crave saṃsāra; if one has already crossed over the three [afflictions], one recognizes the correct path, and is thus free from icchantikas. 2. The virtue of afflicting neither oneself nor others, free from the tīrthikas' clinging to the two views of annihilation and permanence, because of having attained the principle. Free from annihilationist and eternalist views, one does not afflict oneself or others, and is free from tīrthika views. 3. The virtue of superiority in opening wisdom, free from the śrāvaka vehicle. Persons of the śrāvaka vehicle awaken by relying on others, and cannot arrive at realization on their own. Persons of great, sharp faculties are able to comprehend boundless meanings in all phenomena, and are thus free from the śrāvakas. 4. The virtue of heading toward benefiting others, free from pratyekabuddhas. Although the faculties of a pratyekabuddha are sharp, they lack the aspiration to save sentient beings; a person of great practice always wishes to benefit sentient beings, and is thus free from pratyekabuddhas. Furthermore, the She jueding lun says: the treatise also explains that a person without four faults is competent to compose a treatise: 1. not displaying one's own virtues; 2. having no conceit; 3. having a mind to benefit others among fellow practitioners; 4. having a mind of loving-kindness and compassion toward sentient beings. If one has no mind to display one's own virtues, one is free from the fault of icchantikas. Free from the fault of icchantikas, one attains the virtue of having crossed over. If one has no conceit, one is free from the fault of tīrthikas. Free from the fault of tīrthikas, one attains the virtue of afflicting neither oneself nor others. If, seeing that fellow practitioners lack skillful means to benefit others, one explains skillful means to benefit others to them, one is free from the fault of śrāvaka practice. Free from the fault of śrāvaka practice, one attains the virtue of opening wisdom. If, toward sentient beings, one has the mind to relieve suffering and give happiness, one is free from the fault of pratyekabuddha practice. Free from the fault of pratyekabuddha practice, one attains the virtue of benefiting others. Having become free from the four faults and fully endowed with the four virtues, one is a bodhisattva aspiring to seek buddhahood. Buddhahood has four virtues; for the sake of seeking these four virtues, one practices the causes of the four virtues. Being free from icchantikas is practicing the cause of the virtue of purity. Being free from tīrthikas is practicing the cause of the virtue of selfhood. Being free from śrāvakas is practicing the cause of the virtue of bliss. Being free from pratyekabuddhas is practicing the cause of the virtue of permanence. Having practiced the causes of the four virtues, desiring to benefit oneself and others, the mind is not stained by afflictions, and one is constantly able to forget self-interest to benefit sentient beings. If one is such a person, only then is he competent to compose a treatise. Although Bodhisattva Vasubandhu resided in the stages prior to the [ten] bhūmis, he was fully endowed with the previous four virtues, and was also competent to compose a treatise. Furthermore, the World-Honoured One spoke the teaching of vijñapti-mātra and is named the 'author' (kartṛ), because he is the master of the teaching. Masters such as Vasubandhu explained the principle of vijñapti-mātra spoken by the Buddha, and are named 'commentators', because they arise depending on the teaching; this is the contrast between sūtra and śāstra. If Vasubandhu and others composed the Thirty Verses, they are named 'authors'; Dharmapāla and others explaining them are named 'commentators'; this is the contrast between the root treatise and its commentary. Now, herein, it is simply the contrast between sūtra and treatise; because Dharmapāla and others explained those verses, one pays reverence to both masters. Therefore, before expounding the various treatises and various meanings, one must state the names of both masters. Paying reverence to the author is paying reverence to the Dharma; paying reverence to the commentator is paying reverence to the meaning. The Dharma is the phrases, expressions, and names; the meaning is the principle revealed by the phrases, expressions, and names. The author first speaks the phrases, expressions, and names, and the verbal teaching exists in the world. If the author has already entered nirvāṇa and later people cannot attain understanding of this verbal teaching, the commentator further composes a treatise to explain it, and the import of the meaning is then revealed. Therefore, in paying reverence to the author one should revere the Dharma, and in paying reverence to the commentator one should revere the meaning.