成唯識論了義燈 1
English (machine translation) 1
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1.1
Composed by the monk (bhikṣu) Huizhao of Dayun Monastery in Zizhou.
1.2
In explaining this treatise, four gates of distinction are presented: first, the causes for the arising of the treatise; second, clarifying sameness and difference; third, clarifying the ultimate purpose; fourth, explaining the primary text.
1.3
Regarding the first [gate], the causes of arising, it is further divided into four: first, clarifying the place of sectarian division; second, clarifying the year of sectarian division; third, clarifying the reasons for sectarian division; fourth, clarifying the causes and authors who composed the treatise. When the Tathāgata proclaimed the teaching, its essence was one tathatā; it benefited sattvas impartially, without real difference. Yet, in accordance with [their] faculties and dispositions, their awakenings and understandings were not the same; gradual and sudden differed, and so the proclaimed teachings varied. Therefore, the Lotus Sūtra says: although produced from one earth and moistened by one rain, the various grasses and trees grow differently. In the Ratnagotravibhāga, [it is said that] just as when three beasts cross the same river, the depth they attain differs. In the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, [it is said to be] like a single jewel that rains down differently according to what is sought. The Anantanirdeśa Sūtra says that it constantly expounds the single characteristic, yet according to differences in understanding, the fruits obtained differ. Hence, the Tathāgata's teachings differ according to the capacity [of listeners]. At first, addressing tīrthikas and the like, he taught that the self is non-existent and discussed phenomena as existent. Next, addressing the Hīnayāna, he refuted attachment to phenomena as existent and taught that phenomena are also non-existent. Later, in order to lead them to the real, he then explicitly taught neither empty nor existent. Thus, the commentary in the Yogācārabhūmi says: All classes of sattvas, from beginningless time, have lacked understanding and held perverted attachments regarding the true mark of dharmas, giving rise to delusions and initiating karma, transmigrating in the five destinies. The Tathāgata appeared in the world and, as appropriate, taught for them the wondrous principle that abides in the middle, causing all sattvas to fully realize that all dharmas are neither empty nor existent, to depart from doubts and attachments, and to initiate conduct that abides in the middle; according to what is appropriate, they eliminate hindrances, complete their respective cultivations, attain the three bodhis, and realize the bliss of quietude and cessation, and so forth. After the Buddha's parinirvāṇa, although Mahākāśyapa and Bāṣpa held recitations of the Tripiṭaka in two separate places, for one hundred years the Buddha Dharma remained of one flavor. At that time, there was a merchant captain's son named Mahādeva. Tripiṭaka Master Paramārtha's commentary on the Samayabhedoparacanacakra says [he was from] the country of Ayodhyā. Dharma Master Ci'en's commentary on the Samayabhedoparacanacakra says [he was from] Central India. He went forth to study the path and thoroughly penetrated the Tripiṭaka. However, according to the explanations of his five points in the commentaries on the Samayabhedoparacanacakra and others, there are slight differences from what Dharma Master Ci'en says in his Notes on the Yogācāra. This should be because the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna explain them differently; this is fully as expounded in those three places.
1.4
Beyond one hundred years [after the nirvāṇa], inside the Kukkuṭārāma Monastery in the city of Pāṭaliputra—the origin of this city being fully described in the Great Tang Records on the Western Regions and Paramārtha's commentary on the Samayabhedoparacanacakra—on the night of the fifteenth day, Mahādeva recited the Prātimokṣa Sūtra. Having finished reciting the Prātimokṣa Sūtra, he then expounded the five points. The verse says: / Led by others, ignorance, / Doubt, being made to enter by another, / The path arising because of sound: / These are called the true teaching of the Buddha. / None of the venerable and noble ones accepted them; they immediately overturned his statement in the fourth line, saying: / Your words are not the Buddha's teaching. / Because of this, the Hīnayāna divided into two sects. The assembly of noble ones took Mahākāśyapa from the time of the root recitation as their master, calling themselves the Sthaviravāda; Mahādeva's followers took Bāṣpa as their master, calling themselves the Mahāsāṃghika. Later, within two hundred years, the Mahāsāṃghika further divided into nine; within three hundred years, the Sthaviravāda divided into eleven. This is fully explained in the Samayabhedoparacanacakra and the Mañjuśrīparipṛcchā Prajñāpāramitā.
1.5
Regarding the causes and conditions of the sectarian divisions, Tripiṭaka Master Paramārtha explained them in detail one by one in his commentary on the Samayabhedoparacanacakra. In ancient times, when Ānanda was about to enter nirvāṇa, he thought: The Buddha predicted that in Jibin—newly rendered as Kaśmīra—there would be a monk named Madhyāntika who would spread the Dharma-eye in that country. He then transmitted the Dharma to the Venerable Madhyāntika, wishing to establish a monastery and propagate the Dharma in that country. This country had mountains that were high and steep on all four sides, with an extremely wide area in the middle and only one gate; it was the dwelling place of a Nāga King, and the middle was filled with water. The Venerable One exercised supernatural powers and descended from the sky, saying to the Nāga King that his wish was to beg for a piece of ground the size of a sitting mat. The Nāga King granted it. He then used his supernatural power to make the sitting mat expand, encroaching until the water was nearly exhausted. The Nāga King begged him, wishing that water fifteen li in circumference be preserved as a dwelling for the nāga. Thereupon, a monastery was established. The retinue of monks having become numerous, pure attendants (śramaṇoddeśa) also became plentiful. Later, the monks gradually dwindled, while the servants gradually grew numerous and powerful, establishing themselves as kings; hence it was called the Kingdom of Slaves. Later, the king of this country was named Kālirāja, who had very deep reverent faith and frequently invited the assembly of monks into the palace to preach the Dharma. During this period, the various sects lived intermingled, and the Dharma preached earlier and later differed from one another. The king asked for the reason, and they explained its causes in full. The king said: Which sect's determination should be taken now? At that time, Kātyāyanīputra, relying on the Sarvāstivāda, composed the Jñānaprasthāna to present to the king, and the king permitted its propagation. (The above is a traditional account; the canonical text has not yet been seen.)
1.6
According to the Biography of Vasubandhu, within three hundred years after the Buddha's extinction, there was an arhat named Kātyāyanīputra. His mother's clan was Kātyāyana, and he took his name from his mother. He initially went forth in the Sarvāstivāda school; he was originally a person of Central India, and later went to the country of Jibin. The country of Jibin is in Western India. Together with five hundred arhats and five hundred bodhisattvas, he compiled the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, keeping it secret without letting it circulate. A long time passed without any of the five regions of India seeing it. Later, in the country of Ayodhyā in Eastern India, there was a Dharma master named Vasubhadra, who was clever and possessed great wisdom; he went there to study, memorized it, and circulated it outside, fully as related there. Later, Kumāralāta and Śrīlāta both extensively composed treatises to propagate [it]. At first there were teachings [for] sattvas attached to existence, while the Mahāyāna Dharma-teachings were mostly concealed.
1.7
Beyond two hundred years, the Bodhisattvas Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva both appeared in the world in Southern India. Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna composed the Dàzhìdù lùn explaining the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, and composed the Akutobhayā in full ten thousand verses. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā was produced from within the Akutobhayā, having five hundred verses, as well as the Dvādaśamukha Śāstra and so on. Nāgārjuna's disciple Bodhisattva Āryadeva composed the Śataśāstra and so on. As extensively explained in the Transmission of the Dharma Pitaka and the Biographies of Nāgārjuna and others, in order to refute the Hīnayāna and the various tīrthikas' attachments to self and attachments to phenomena, they spoke of them as empty; at that time, many became attached to emptiness.
1.8
Nine hundred years later, in the territory of Northern India, in Puruṣapura—translated here as the City of Heroes—there was a royal preceptor Brahmin of the Kauśika clan who had three sons, all named Vasubandhu, which is translated here as Tianqin, now rendered as Fasuobandu, which is translated here as Shiqin. Although sharing one name, they established separate designations. The third Vasubandhu went forth in the Sarvāstivāda school and attained the fruit of arhatship, with the separate name Virañcivatsa. Virañci was his mother's name, and vatsa is translated as child or son. The eldest brother was of bodhisattva capacity; he also went forth in the Sarvāstivāda school, and later, having attained detachment from desire (vītarāga), when contemplating the meaning of emptiness he could not penetrate it, and wished to commit suicide. The arhat Piṇḍola, observing this matter in Pūrvavideha, came from that direction and expounded the Hīnayāna contemplation of emptiness for him; his mind was still not settled, thinking that the principle should not be like this. Consequently, mounting supernatural power, he went to Tuṣita Heaven to inquire of Bodhisattva Maitreya, who expounded the Mahāyāna contemplation of emptiness for him; returning below to contemplate, he immediately attained awakening, and therefore was named Asaṅga, translated here as Wuzhuo. Thereafter, he frequently went to Tuṣita Heaven to inquire of Maitreya concerning the meaning of Mahāyāna sūtras, and expounded them for others. Hearing them, many did not believe; he then made a vow himself, inviting Bodhisattva Maitreya to descend and preach the Mahāyāna, so that sattvas seeing him would all be able to believe and accept. His wish was fulfilled: descending at night, [Maitreya] emitted a great light, gathered the assembly of those with affinity, and expounded the Saptadaśabhūmiśāstra in the country of Ayodhyā. As it was recited, he explained its meaning as he went; after four months of nights, the Saptadaśabhūmi was complete. Although in the same hall, only Asaṅga could approach Bodhisattva Maitreya, while the other people could only hear from afar. Or when some saw differently, Master Asaṅga would further explain it to the others; because of this, the other people only then began to believe and accept the principles of the Mahāyāna Dharma.
1.9
The second son also went forth in the Sarvāstivāda school. Broad in learning and vast in hearing, he thoroughly understood the ancient classics; his spiritual talent was outstanding and radiant, with none who could be his equal, and his pure and lofty observance of precepts was difficult to match. Since the brothers had distinctive names, this Dharma master was simply called Vasubandhu; the remaining causes and conditions are fully as told in his original biography. Relying on the Yogācārabhūmi, he extensively composed various treatises explaining the Mahāyāna and propagating neither emptiness nor existence. As for the composition of this treatise, the commentaries of the ten masters, their combination and translation, all are as in the Shuyao. However, Bodhisattva Dharmapāla only appeared in the world eleven hundred years [after the nirvāṇa], composing this commentary on the treatise as well as the commentary on the Catuḥśataka. Bodhisattva Bhāviveka also appeared at the same time, composing the Karatalaratna. It was at this time that the Mahāyāna began to dispute emptiness and existence. The above generally distinguishes the meaning of the four gates. The wise will understand it; this is the cause for the arising of the treatise.
1.10
Second, clarifying sameness and difference is further divided into four: first, differences in the benefits of the teachings; second, distinctions in the advantages according to the times; third, differences in the doctrines explained; fourth, dissimilarity in the essential nature. As fully detailed in the Fayuan, a summary and brief explanation will be given.
1.11
Question: In the earlier discussion of wheel benefit and meaning benefit, how do the two principles differ?
1.12
Answer: 'Meaning' is designated in terms of the principle that is explained; 'wheel' is spoken of based on the path of severance. The two senses are each based on a particular perspective; therefore, they are spoken of as the two benefits of wheel and meaning.
1.13
Question: When matching teachings to capacities, the teachings have the distinction of three periods. I wonder whether the essence of the wheel is different or the same?
1.14
Answer: Since capacities and dispositions differ, the essence of the wheel is distinct. In terms of the initial teaching of existence, its essence is explained as usual. Within the teaching of emptiness, the essence is slightly different: taking the eightfold noble path of emptiness as the essence of realizing emptiness, the wisdom of principle is the essence. It takes the teaching expounding emptiness as the cause, the preparatory wisdom realizing emptiness as the cause, and emptiness as the cognitive object taken as the sphere. The remaining factors of awakening (bodhyaṅga) and so on have emptiness as their companion. It takes the path, concentration, and precepts of emptiness as retinue, and the emptiness of bodhi and nirvāṇa as the fruit. If it is the essence of the Dharma-wheel of the third period, it combines both of the preceding two, and can also be considered non-definitive. The correct explanation is as clarified in the Yogācārabhūmi and the fourth fascicle of the Lotus Sūtra Commentary.
1.15
Question: What is the benefit of speaking such esoteric words?
1.16
Answer: According to the eighth chapter of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, there are ten fruits, namely: to enable the speaker of Dharma to easily establish [it] because it summarizes the meaning, and so on up to enabling one to analyze meanings before the wise and enter into intelligence; secret words are spoken for the sake of these ten benefits.
1.17
Question: Within the benefit of meaning, there are the definitive and non-definitive; within the wheel, is there also that which is a wheel and not a wheel?
1.18
Answer: Contrasting Great and Small, and contrasting the hidden and the manifest, both can be maintained. Another explanation is that they are not analogous: the principle expounded has the manifest and the esoteric, so within meaning there are definitive and non-definitive; but in responding to capacities, all destroy hindrances, so all are wheels and none are non-wheels.
1.19
Another question: The Yaoji, relating the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, says it is definitive. Bhāviveka and others say: The statement that it is definitive is the language of the compilers of the council, not the true words of the Buddha?
1.20
Not so; his explanation does not resolve it well. One should say: Bhāviveka and the others mean that speaking in terms of conventional truth, this is the supreme, and is therefore called 'definitive meaning', but not in view of ultimate truth. If, on the grounds that there is a contradiction, one says it is not the Buddha's word, that would make the noble teaching altogether untrustworthy. As for definitive and provisional meaning, the Fayuan distinguishes four [categories]. Now the Yaoji says that one more category should be added: clinging to names and words is called provisional, while not clinging to names is definitive. Thus the Susthitamatidevaputraparipṛcchā-sūtra says in its first part: 'As for definitive sūtras, all sūtras are definitive. Because they rely on the meaning, and because all dharmas are inexpressible, when a bodhisattva understands in this way, it is called definitive meaning. If someone, regarding all sūtras, cannot rely on the meaning in this way, this is called provisional meaning. Why is it called provisional? Because that person does not understand the definitive meaning.' According to this sūtra passage, it says: 'Because that person does not understand the definitive meaning, it is called provisional meaning.' It does not judge the sūtra itself to be of provisional meaning.
1.21
Furthermore, the sūtra says: 'Bodhisattva Susthitamati, for one who relies on such a purport and dharma, all sūtras are definitive. For one who does not rely on them in this way, all sūtras are provisional.' According to this intent, for one who can refrain from clinging, all sūtras are what is understood as definitive meaning. If one clings, all sūtras are what is not understood, [hence] provisional meaning. One must not, based on the fact that an individual personally cannot understand, thereby judge the noble teaching itself to also be provisional. The Yaoji explains: 'It can cause faults to arise, or cause virtues to arise. Thus definitive and provisional are spoken of; this applies generally to all Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna sūtras.' This judgement is not so. If, because of non-understanding, a fault arises and it is therefore called provisional, it should also be called unwholesome, and it should also be called contaminated. That would not accord with reality and would entail many faults. Now the correct explanation should say: based on the doctrine, there are four divisions, as explained in the Fayuan. Moreover, adding [the division] based on the person, in contrast to understanding and not clinging, it is called definitive meaning; in contrast to those who cling, it is called provisional meaning. It is just like the two truths.
1.22
Regarding the distinguishing of the periods and their benefits, it is asked: Why did the Tathāgata first teach the doctrine of existence, in the middle expound the doctrine of emptiness, and at the end proclaim the doctrine of neither empty nor existent?
1.23
Answer: It is based on those of indeterminate lineage. When they have not yet set out, he temporarily causes them to awaken with shame [to the fact that] the self they cling to does not exist and there are only the dharmas such as the aggregates, sense fields, and realms; this is called the doctrine of existence. For those who have already set out and attained the lesser fruit, in order to make them advance toward the Great [Vehicle], he next makes them awaken to the emptiness of dharmas, observing that the realms, sense fields, and so forth to which they clung do not exist; this is called the doctrine of emptiness. Finally, for those who set out on all vehicles, he reveals that what is grasped does not exist, but what is not grasped does exist—neither exclusively empty nor entirely existent; this is the doctrine of neither empty nor existent. For the sake of those who awaken with shame, three periods of teaching are spoken of. If addressed to those of sudden awakening, there is no distinction of three periods. Furthermore, the teachings expounded are not necessarily in such a sequential order before and after to be judged as three periods. Rather, they are grouped according to the categories of meaning expounded, and viewed from those of indeterminate lineage, this corresponds to the third period. Otherwise, on the second seven-day period, the World-Honoured One immediately expounded the Avataṃsaka; how could it be that only after the Prajñā and so forth, in contrast to those of gradual awakening, did he first begin to proclaim it and have it judged as belonging to the third period?
1.24
This has two meanings: first, in terms of before and after; second, in terms of categories of meaning. In terms of before and after, there are also two meanings: first, teaching the emptiness of persons; next, teaching the emptiness of dharmas. Second: first, teaching the emptiness of persons secretly expounds the existence of dharmas; next, teaching the emptiness of dharmas secretly expounds the non-existence of dharmas; only at the end is it clearly revealed that the grasped objects of the two clingings to person and dharmas do not exist, and that if one is free from the two clingings, the ultimate and the conventional are not non-existent. Therefore, the sūtra says: 'Conditioned and unconditioned are called existent; the self and what belongs to the self are spoken of as empty.'
1.25
Question: If based on gradual entry, these teachings belong to the third period. The teachings of the third period are universally for those who set out on all vehicles. Now, for which vehicle is this single treatise specifically intended? If it is for the three vehicles, why does it refute them? If it is only for the Great Vehicle, is it not the third period?
1.26
Answer: The text refuting the self applies generally to entering the three vehicles. The places refuting the two vehicles cause them to enter only the Great Vehicle. Furthermore, it refutes their clinging, but does not refute their vehicle; therefore, it applies generally to the three.
1.27
If so, since the Lotus Sūtra also speaks of refuting the vehicles, should it belong to the second period?
1.28
Answer: For those of indeterminate lineage, it speaks of oneness in terms of the principle. It refutes their clinging to different principles and causes them to advance toward the Great [Vehicle]. If they are of determinate lineage, their contemplative practices differ, and it speaks of them as like medicinal herbs. The vehicles are thus distinct, and so it can apply generally. However, it was mostly for the indeterminate that this sūtra was spoken. It speaks solely of the one vehicle for the sake of the deeds done by the śrāvakas, and so forth.
1.29
If so, since the third period is universally for all, why does the Saṃdhinirmocana say: 'I do not disclose and expound it to the ignorant and foolish'? And why does the Abhidharma say: 'I reveal it to the superior'?
1.30
Answer: Broadly dividing into three periods, it is said to be for all. It does not say that each and every passage is individually for the three vehicles. Now in the overall context of this treatise, the Saṃdhinirmocana, and so on, it can apply generally to the three; therefore, they do not contradict each other.
1.31
Question: Since the three periods of teaching are spoken of in relation to gradual awakening, then the third period is also spoken for those of gradual awakening who advance toward the Great [Vehicle]. It is merely for the Great [Vehicle]; how can it be said to be universally for all?
1.32
Answer: Because the faculties are ripe and the wisdom and awakening are pervasive. Because it clearly teaches the dharmas of emptiness and existence observed by the three vehicles, it is said to be for all. In the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras, although the three vehicles each attain their own benefits, it does not yet clearly explain that dharmas are neither empty nor existent; therefore, it belongs to the second [period]. If in terms of sudden awakening, a single period may be established.
1.33
Question: If a single period is established, how is that different from the ancients? The Fayuan does not permit it.
1.34
Answer: The ancients established a single period based on the Buddha being able to teach suddenly at one time, and therefore called it a single period. Although the manifestation is unified according to his capacity, it is not so in relation to the capacities of the audience. Since the ripening of sentient beings' capacities has earlier and later stages, how can teaching the Dharma at one time be called a single period? Now, establishing a single period is based on the principle being one, and in relation to the ultimate fruit, it is called a single period. Furthermore, in terms of addressing people of sudden awakening, whichever teaching is expounded, they are able to awaken suddenly; the principle of the two emptinesses expounded in a single assembly eliminates both clingings at once, and is therefore called a single period. This is why when the wheel of Dharma of the four truths was first turned at the Deer Park, immeasurable bodhisattvas entered the first bhūmi and so forth; if they heard the four truths without awakening to the emptiness of dharmas, how could they enter the first Pramuditā-bhūmi and so forth? It is not fixed to a single assembly that it is called a single period; in terms of those of sudden awakening, whichever teaching they hear, they always awaken to emptiness and existence as well as to the two emptinesses, so that from beginning to end it is a single conversion, which is called a single period. In distinguishing periods, Liu Qiu established a five-period teaching; even if it is said to be based on gradual awakening, the principle is also not so. When the Benxing jing on the five precepts was spoken for Trapuṣa and others, they universally attained the noble paths of the various vehicles, so it cannot be called the first period as solely a human and heavenly teaching primarily for merchants, nor can it be called secondary; even in relation to the gradual, one cannot establish five periods based on fixed chronological sequence of months and years. Moreover, there is no scriptural passage, which is a fault. Furthermore, regarding gradual and sudden teachings, if the principle being exhausted in the two truths expounded in a single assembly is called sudden, then one should not call the Avataṃsaka, Śrīmālā, and so forth sudden and the Lotus, Prajñā, and so forth gradual, because in both cases the principle is exhausted in a single assembly. If it is said that addressing the Great without arising from the Small is called sudden, one should also not definitively call the Avataṃsaka and so forth sudden teachings and judge the Lotus and so forth as gradual teachings. In both there are gradual and sudden capacities present in the assembly; thus, while establishing gradual and sudden is not obstructed, definitively categorizing the teachings is not permitted. The original intent of the Fayuan should be understood in this way.
1.35
Furthermore, concerning the intent of distinguishing the periods, the Saṃdhinirmocana speaks of three periods of teaching. Under which period of teaching are this treatise and the like subsumed? However, the Yaoji and others say that distinguishing the periods of teaching based on these is called the 'basis of the teachings'. Now I say this is not so. It is not based on the time of teaching these dharmas—the half and full teachings, with-action and without-action, the two emptinesses of persons and dharmas, the verbal teachings of humans and devas—that they are taken as the basis. If based on these, each is its own time: the time of teaching vijñapti-mātra is the time of teaching vijñapti-mātra. Why would one need to further distinguish what period's teaching it is? If one distinguishes separately according to the doctrinal gates such as half, full, with-action, without-action, the emptiness of persons and dharmas, etc., the doctrinal gates are immeasurable; how could there be only so many? Furthermore, if one distinguishes according to distinct dharmas, it is just like their names: when teaching the doctrine of the dharma of vijñapti-mātra, why would one need to contrast and distinguish them? If one says that what is expounded in the various teachings is not the same, and the various masters establish periods and explain the teachings differently, [asking] under which this is subsumed, that also should not be so. Speaking of one, two, four, or five periods of teachings and so forth has no scriptural text and none can be relied upon. Why call them the basis of the teachings? Since they are not fixed by authority, it is a futile labour. However, the Yogācārabhūmi speaks of time as a basis in terms of the three times, not in terms of the periods of teaching; adopting this [here] is an error. Furthermore, to raise a discussion based on the treatise: in the noble teaching, the proclamation of the Dharma with a single voice has two differences: first, phrasing; second, doctrine. As the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa says, all consider that the World-Honoured One conforms to their phrasing, or generates revulsion, joy, and so forth in the Dharma.
1.36
As the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, fascicle twenty-four, says: 'Expounding a single dharma, whether a realm or an entrance, all sentient beings hear it each according to their original understanding.' This is an expounding of doctrine and phrasing combined. In a single phrase and sentence, many phrases and sentences appear; in a single sound, many sounds appear; therefore, each follows their original understanding, subsuming the provisional into sound. Because the various phrases and sentences differ according to the beings, yet are not separated from sound, it is collectively called 'hearing'. Furthermore, the Brahmajāla says in its first part: 'In a single voice, expounding immeasurable categories of dharmas.' It also says: 'Suffering, emptiness, impermanence, non-self: the sound of the single truth.' Both combine doctrine and phrasing. Or it only cites doctrine, as the Avataṃsaka says: if there are many defilements such as greed and anger, the eighty-four thousand impurities, each hears the counteracting dharma. It also says: 'Expounding the Dharma with a single voice.' Or there are sentient beings who study the Śrāvakayāna, and hearing the Buddha expound the Dharma, immediately understand the Śrāvaka Piṭaka. These merely explain the unobstructedness of doctrine, but also apply to phrasing, for hearing means hearing sound.
1.37
Furthermore, the Anantamukhanirhāra-sūtra says: 'Able with a single voice to respond universally to all sounds.' This is solely phrasing. Again, as the Vibhāṣā, fascicle seventy-three, says: 'The single voice is the voice of Brahmā. If a person of Cīna comes and sits in the assembly, he thinks the Buddha is speaking the phrasing and meaning of Cīna for him.' This applies to both doctrine and phrasing. It also says: 'When one of greedy conduct comes and sits in the assembly, he hears the Buddha speak the contemplation of impurity and so forth for him.' This is solely doctrine. Although each has its meaning, here we merely distinguish the single voice, not speaking of the rest. Question: Appearing in accordance with those who can hear, the sounds each differ; if in terms of what is expressed, the dharmas each differ; why is it called 'a single voice'?
1.38
Answer: It may be a single moment. Or a single uncontaminated state. Or provisionally following a single dharma that is expressed. Or following a single sentient being to be transformed. Or based on tathatā. Generally, it may be termed 'one'.
1.39
Question: If so, why does the Vibhāṣā say: 'The single voice is the voice of Brahmā. If a person of Cīna comes and sits in the assembly, he thinks the Buddha is speaking the phrasing and meaning of Cīna for him'?
1.40
Answer: We do not take the Hīnayāna as authoritative. Since it is like a wish-fulfilling jewel raining down gems according to one's wish, in accordance with the resonance of sentient beings, sounds appear individually. Or, because the sound is pure, it is called the voice of Brahmā; it does not necessarily mean identical to a single voice of Brahmā.
1.41
Question: When the Buddha speaks with a single voice, does it possess all doctrinal gates, or does it not possess them?
1.42
Answer: There are four explanations (as recounted in the Yaoji). The first says that the Tathāgata has a signless, perfect voice: because it is signless, the Buddha utters a single voice; because it is perfect, it universally responds to sentient beings. This answer is incomplete, because it says that it does not possess [all teachings]. Another says that the Tathāgata utters only a single voice, without it being known what its name is, yet within the minds of sentient beings, immeasurable approaches to the Dharma are heard. (This answer is not correct, because it does not answer the question, and it is also identical to what the tīrthikas Laozi and Zhuangzi say.) Another says that the Tathāgata, in accordance with those being converted, simultaneously possesses boundless approaches to the Dharma; in accordance with those who are primary recipients, it is called a single voice. The meaning of this is that the single voice possesses all approaches to the Dharma, and in accordance with those who are primary recipients, each individual sentient being is called "a single voice".
1.43
However, the answer is unclear. One should say: in accordance with the sentient beings being converted, whose regions and categories are different, in one single time he manifests all voices. Within each and every voice, all approaches to the Dharma are possessed; for the time being, in accordance with a single sentient being or those who are primary recipients, it is called a single voice. The phrase "a single voice" does not mean that it only expresses a single dharma. Although this answers the question, it is also not distinct. Another says that the single voice uttered by the Tathāgata is, in the nature of its sound, sovereign and inconceivable, and it is spoken for sentient beings in accordance with those boundless names, and so forth. A sūtra says: "Within a single utterance uttered by the Tathāgata, he expounds a boundless sea of sūtras." Although this interpretation is superior, it still does not fully exhaust the principle. As for the expression "a single voice", is it a single brahma-sound, or a single moment (kṣaṇa), or are the names and so forth each distinct, or within a single name does it manifest many names, and so forth? Now I say that each and every sound, a sound of a single moment, each and every name, and so forth, can each manifest many. Or a single sound manifests many names; or many sounds manifest a single name; or a single name manifests many names; or many names manifest a single name—phrasing and meaning should be understood accordingly; according to any of these meanings, it can be called a single voice. The Yaoji states: Bodhiruci speaks of the teaching of the single voice. The Fayuan extensively refutes it, but I fear this is inappropriate. This also fails to understand the intention behind the refutation. When he says that expounding all at once in a single voice is called the sudden teaching, it does not mean that within a single voice the teaching is all at once expounded to exhaustion, because the faculties and dispositions [of listeners] are earlier and later and not simultaneous; how could the teaching be all at once expounded to exhaustion in a single voice?
1.44
Furthermore, even if it were so, one should not separately classify the Avataṃsaka and so forth as sudden; moreover, to take a single voice as meaning a single time has no scriptural teaching to determinately classify it. Furthermore, to say that the half-letter and full-letter [teachings] constitute two periods—what is refuted by the Fayuan is also, I fear, inappropriate. The sūtra says: "Expounding the half-letter for śrāvakas"—is this not with reference to meeting the capacity [of the listener]? Therefore I fear it is not so. It also fails to understand the intended meaning of what the Fayuan says: its intention does not obstruct meeting the capacity [of the listener] in calling them half and full, but it merely does not allow classifying them as gradual and sudden capacities. Speaking of the half and full as the gradual and sudden teachings is because for people of determinate spiritual lineage he also expounds both the half and the full. As for "the doctrines expressed being distinct", the account of the tīrthikas is as refuted below; Master Ming's Commentary on the Yogācārabhūmi clearly recounts the Hīnayāna. The tenets are fully explained as in the Master's Commentary on the Heterodox Sects, and I will not cite them in full to avoid tediousness. As for clarifying our own school: the distinct school is precisely the Treatise on Vijñapti-mātra; however, the commentary briefly explains it as named "Cheng weishi"; hence, it takes vijñapti-mātra as its doctrine. Consciousness exists and is not empty; cognitive objects are absent and are not existent—this is taken as the doctrine. Although it fully clarifies all phenomena, none of them are separate from consciousness.
1.45
Ximing says: In terms of general characteristics, vijñapti-mātra is taken as the doctrine. Specifically, it is the three of object, practice, and fruit. This explanation is not different from the Fayuan; however, in the Shunyao, in explaining the title and outlining the text, the meaning of the doctrine is extensively clarified. As for "differences in essential nature", this is divided into three parts: First, determining the root explanation as in the Fayuan, which is further divided into three: 1. Generally presenting the essence; 2. Specifically presenting the essence of the teaching; 3. Clarifying the aggregation. Second, recounting variant interpretations: within recounting variant interpretations, first recounting the variants, and next evaluating and selecting among them. Third, presenting our own interpretation; our own interpretation will be determined below.
1.46
First, recounting variant interpretations: one explanation has five gates: 1. Subsuming the false into the real; 2. Subsuming signs into consciousness; 3. Subordinating the nominal to the real; 4. Determining the essence through the three dharmas; 5. Presenting the essence through dharmic enumeration. Another says that the Tripiṭaka Master expanded them into eight gates, opening two gates for each of the preceding three gates. That is: 1. Subsuming the false into the real; 2. The differentiation between the real and the false; the other two are understood by analogy. Another explains six gates: 1. The five dharmas, intrinsic nature, and essence (the five dharmas of mind, mental factors, etc.); 2. The distinction among the three characteristics (the doctrines of the three categories); 3. Subsuming the referent into the name (all phenomena subsumed under what is perfumed by nominal expression); 4. Subsuming the nominal into the real; 5. Subsuming the inferior into the superior (mind and consciousness); 6. Subsuming signs into their nature.
1.47
The early masters of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha had four gates: 1. Essence according to the distinction between names and referents; 2. Essence by subsuming the referent into the name; 3. Essence by subsuming dust-objects into consciousness; 4. Essence by subsuming phenomena into principle. The Yaoji has three: 1. The teaching apart from the expressive and the expressed. The second fascicle of the Ru lankajing says: "The Dharma-Buddha expounding the Dharma is apart from the essence associated with mind, because it is the realm of holy practice of internal realization"; the four-fascicle version is also identical, meaning that the Tathāgata's Dharmakāya, the principle of tathatā, generates the correct cognitive understanding, which is called expounding the Dharma. 2. Pertaining commonly to the expressive and expressed teaching. The eighty-first fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi says: "The essence of a sūtra is, in brief, of two kinds: first, the phrasing; second, the meaning." 3. Restricted solely to the expressive teaching. The Daśabhūmika says: "The speaker and the listener accomplish the two matters to the ultimate degree." Relying on the Tripiṭaka Master's eight gates, four gradual abbreviations are made: 1. The gate of subsuming the false into the real; 2. The gate of the distinction between the real and the false. Within the gate of the distinction between the real and the false: 1. The gate of subsuming signs into consciousness; 2. The gate of the distinction between consciousness and signs. Regarding this distinction between consciousness and signs, within the teaching there are two explanations in the Buddhabhūmi—possessing a basis and lacking a basis; from this arise four propositions, as stated by a certain explanation.
1.48
Within differentiated characteristics: 1. The gate of subsuming the nominal into the real; 2. The gate of the distinction between the nominal and the real. Within the gate of the distinction between the nominal and the real: 1. The gate of determining the essence through the three dharmas; 2. The gate of presenting the essence through dharmic enumeration. Within the gate of presenting the essence through dharmic enumeration, first presenting the essence through dharmic enumeration, and subsequently aggregation and manifestation. Within dharmic enumeration there are three gradual abbreviations, namely the contrast between internal and external; within the internal, the contrast between Great and Small; within the Great, the contrast between the Madhyamaka and the Vijñānavāda.
1.49
Next, regarding evaluation and selection: in the explanation with five gates, there is ambiguity in the names. If conditioned arising is called "false", this is indeed acceptable. But if viewed in terms of the five dharmas—sign, name, discrimination, correct cognition, and suchness—subsuming the former four entirely into suchness would mean that correct cognition is not false, and calling it all "subsuming the false" is therefore flawed. Furthermore, the Madhyāntavibhāga-kārikā states: "Unreal discrimination exists," and so forth, down to "This is then in accord with the Middle Way." Therefore, it is impossible to say that the anāsrava is called "false". Second, subsuming signs into consciousness: this also has flaws. If the nature of consciousness is called consciousness, it does not differ from the previous gate. If it refers directly to the eight consciousnesses, consciousness is also a sign. Nor can it be said that the sign portion transformed by the king of the mind is called a sign, because none of the five dharmas are separate from consciousness, and all are called consciousness. If the five dharmas are collectively called consciousness, since suchness is not a sign, apart from the five there are no dharmas that could be subsumed into them. If it is said that it is spoken with reference to the essence of the teaching, namely the transformed sign portion, the contemporaneous mental factors also transform names and so forth to serve as cognitive objects for the signs. Subsuming the nominal into the real is the original third gate. The three dharmas and dharmic enumeration together belong under the fourth gate, that of the distinction between nature and function. Moreover, it is not exhaustive: since it is based on the three dharmas, why not base it on the five dharmas and the three natures? If it is said to follow abbreviation, it should rely on four gates; why bother dividing it into five? As for dividing it into eight gates, its merits and faults are analogous to the above.
1.50
In the explanation of six gates, the latter three gates are precisely the original former three. The former three gates are precisely the fourth original gate of the distinction between nature and function. Although it further opens three, it still has the flaw of being too extensive or too brief, analogous to the aforementioned explanation. However, its intention was to define what is initially broader, attaining what is subsequently narrower. Furthermore, subsuming the referent into the name also has a slight flaw. Not all referents are subsumed by names. Because of nominal expressions, it is called the perfuming of nominal expression; it is not that it is identical with names.
1.51
In the early Mahāyānasaṃgraha masters' last two gates, the essence is also the original first; the first two combined are the discussion of the distinction between nature and function. It lacks the original third gate of subsuming the nominal into the real, and also has the flaw of being too extensive or too brief. In the Yaoji's three gates, apart from the expressive and expressed is precisely subsuming signs into their nature. Tracing the efficacy back to the root, it is furthermore the cognitive object of non-discriminative cognition. Arising cognition based on the cognitive object, saying that the Dharma-Buddha expounds the Dharma is discussed provisionally through expression, saying that it is apart from what is associated with mind. Because it is the realm of holy practice of internal realization, this is called the characteristic of the Dharma-Buddha expounding the Dharma. It is not that when true cognition directly realizes suchness, the cognizer and cognized have this activity of understanding, which is called expounding the Dharma. The latter two gates are also subsumed under the gate of discussing the distinction between nature and function.
1.52
The Yaoji states: Relying on the Tripiṭaka Master's eight gates, four gradual abbreviations are made: 1. Subsuming the false into the real; 2. The gate of the distinction between the real and the false. Within the gate of the distinction between the real and the false: 1. The gate of subsuming signs into consciousness, and so forth. The intention here is that moving from broad gradually to narrow is termed an abbreviation. However, subsuming the false into the real relies on a single dharma, down to presenting the essence through dharmic enumeration, which involves sound, name, phrase, and phoneme, which constitute multiple dharmas; how can this be called an abbreviation? I do not understand the reason. Now, as for gradual abbreviation, there are two meanings: 1. Abbreviation moving from general to specific, which is moving from beginning to end; 2. Abbreviation moving from many to few, returning with the branches to the root. For the time being, in determining gradual abbreviation with reference to the essence of the teaching: because in discussing the distinction between nature and function, the expressive and the expressed are different, the expressed meaning is manifested by means of the expressive phrasing. Abbreviating the expressed meaning, one takes only the expressive. Therefore, the Daśabhūmika-śāstra says that the speaker and listener both achieve ultimate completion through two matters: first, sound; second, correct phonemes. Within the expressive, there are sound, name, phrase, and phoneme, which is the distinction between nominal and real. Subsuming the nominal into the real takes sound as its essence. Therefore, the Abhidharmasamuccaya and so forth say: sound produced by completion serves as the essence of the teaching. With regard to the expressive sound, the transformer and transformed are distinct; subsuming it under the transformer, consciousness is taken as the essence. Within consciousness, nature and characteristics are distinct; subsuming characteristics into nature, the cited text is known. Regarding the statement in "aggregation and manifestation" that of the five minds, the first three are solely indeterminate, and the last two pertain to both good and afflicted: this meaning is incomplete. It contradicts the fifth fascicle of the Cheng weishi lun in its explanation of the five minds, since that allows the first two minds to occur within concentration. Since the text distinguishing them with reference to consciousness is lengthy, it will not be recounted.
1.53
The Yaoji states: Some say that because it apprehends a new cognitive object, it is called sudden (ābhoga/prathamamanaskāra/impulsive mind). Others explain that cognizing without intentionality is called sudden. Which is correct? The explanation says: The treatise speaks only of spontaneous operation. If one speaks of a new cognitive object, its text is not seen; however, following reason, both meanings should be combined. Now I say this is not so. The third fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi says: "Moreover, when the manovijñāna spontaneously and distractedly cognizes an unaccustomed object, without desire and so forth arising," it is called sudden. Since it says cognizing an unaccustomed object, this is precisely a new object. If merely spontaneously and distractedly cognizing an object without accompanying desire were called sudden, then except for the sixth [consciousness], at all other times it would merely be called sudden, and there should be no other minds. In the state prior to the transformation of the basis, all cognize solely spontaneously and distractedly. There are further agreements and differences, but they are too numerous to recount in full. As for "aggregation and manifestation", it is like saying "all conditioned phenomena are impermanent".
1.54
An explanation states: There are three interpretations in the West. One says: When the syllable [or phoneme] 'zhu' (all) is spoken, the preliminary [mind] is direct perception (pratyakṣa) and the inquiry [mind] faces the preceding objective sphere, not cognizing names and the like, but merely grasping the mark of sound; upon reaching the determinative mind, it fully manifests three marks, namely: sound, name (nāman), and phoneme (akṣara). When 'xing' (conditioned phenomena) is spoken, six manifest; when 'wu' (non-) is spoken, nine manifest; when the phoneme 'chang' (eternal) is spoken, twelve marks manifest. Together with the meaning expressed by the sentence (pada), they combine to make fourteen phenomena. Passing through sixteen minds, the assemblage is fully complete—that is, within each of the four phonemes there are four minds, namely four preliminary [minds] each of the ear and mental consciousnesses, plus four inquiry [minds] and four determinative [minds] of the mental consciousness. Another says: Because inquiry is not a means of valid cognition (apramāṇa) and also cognizes names and the like, the assemblage is obtained at inquiry as well. The four inquiry minds, in their respective order, obtain three, six, nine, and up to fourteen. By matching what precedes, one should know that, passing through twelve minds, the assemblage is fully complete. Another says: The mental consciousness cognizing along with the ear consciousness also cognizes names and the like; on this there are two explanations: One says: The four preliminary minds each obtain only three, and do not cognize the past because they are obtained by direct perception; this is not called assemblage, and only upon reaching the inquiry mind is it named the substance of the teaching. The other says: Because the simultaneous mental consciousness of the ear consciousness can be non-direct perception, it can cognize the past, and thus within eight minds the assemblage is fully complete. I now say that these have flaws. First, in the first explanation, many minds are passed through while few phenomena are assembled: What is assembled on the mental consciousness? Why does it pass through the four preliminary minds of the ear consciousness? Could it be admitted that the mental consciousness does not take the fundamental substance, but merely cognizes the sound transformed by the ear consciousness? Since it is admitted that the mental consciousness and the ear consciousness simultaneously cognize the fundamental substance on their own, it merely passes through the manifestation of twelve minds of the mental consciousness, and should not be sixteen. If one takes the preliminary [mind] of the ear, one should take the ear cognizing sound, which would result in eighteen phenomena. If, because the sounds are similar, one only speaks of fourteen phenomena, then because the minds are similar, one should likewise only speak of twelve minds. If spoken in accordance with reality: setting aside the four preliminary minds of the ear, it merely passes through the manifestation of twelve minds of the mental consciousness; the phenomena assembled are four instants of sound, four phonemes, four names, four objects expressed by the names—that is, four individual essences (svabhāva)—as well as one sentence, plus one meaning of distinction expressed by the sentence, making eighteen phenomena altogether that assemble and manifest; this is based on one general aspect. If infinite phonemes and the like manifest on one phoneme and so forth, the phenomena are not fixed. As for the [division of] consciousnesses and three natures in the five minds, their validity will be clarified below in the fifth [fascicle]. Furthermore, what was originally stated was that only at the two, 'conditioned phenomena' and 'eternal', is there determination, determinately knowing that 'all' expresses changing conditioned phenomena and is devoid of being eternal.
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- 成唯識論了義燈 — Classical Chinese