成唯識論了義燈 2.54

2.54

The treatise says: 'How could the five consciousnesses lack a cognitive support?' Question: Among the twenty-five kinds of form, do the five consciousnesses cognitively grasp conceptual forms or real forms? Answer: There are two explanations. One says: The five consciousnesses cognitively grasp the real and do not grasp the conceptual; the conceptual is entirely apprehended by the mental consciousness. An objection says: If real form is cognitively grasped by the five consciousnesses, it is subsumed here under the rūpa-āyatana; if conceptual form is grasped only by the mind, relative to the faculty it should be subsumed under the dharma-āyatana. The explanation says: According to the treatise, the mind cognitively grasps the conceptual, which may be subsumed under the dharma-āyatana; by subsuming the conceptual under the real, it is clearly subsumed under the rūpa-āyatana. Another question: If the five consciousnesses do not cognitively grasp the conceptual, and forms such as long and short are not apprehended by the eye, then since tangibles such as rough and smooth are conceptual, should they likewise not be apprehended by the body consciousness? Answer: Forms such as long and short are mutually dependent and distant, hence they are not apprehended by the visual consciousness; various tangibles such as rough are positional conceptualities that are proximate, hence they are apprehended by the bodily faculty, or, like conceptual form, they are apprehended only by the mind. The second explanation says: They generally cognitively grasp both the conceptual and the real. When the five consciousnesses cognitively grasp the real, the conceptual must rely on the real, so when cognitively grasping the real, they also cognitively grasp the conceptual. If so, how does this differ from the Sautrāntika, such that their theory is refuted? Answer: One explanation says that when the five consciousnesses grasp long and short, they do not depart from real forms such as blue; because conceptual and real are joined, while they [posit] exclusively conceptual form, it is therefore not an object of the five [consciousnesses]. Another explanation says that what the Sautrāntikas cling to are sensory objects outside the mind, so they are purely conceptual and do not serve as conditions. Since the Mahāyāna does not depart from consciousness, the two schools are inherently distinct: from the viewpoint of Mahāyāna's own real forms, long and short are not real, but compared to those external forms, they are nevertheless real; hence the five consciousnesses grasping them is also not precluded in principle. If so, why is it said that the five consciousnesses apprehend an object of specific characteristic (svalakṣaṇa)? Answer: There are three kinds of specific characteristic: 1. Specific characteristic of āyatana, meaning the twelve āyatanas are each mutually distinct; 2. Specific characteristic of entity, because within a single āyatana the various forms are each distinct; 3. Specific characteristic of specific characteristic, meaning within blue form, breaking it down to the ultimate single paramāṇu. Here the statement is made on the basis of the specific characteristic of āyatana, so there is no contradiction. If so, how do the five consciousnesses apprehend an object of intrinsic nature, and why is it said only that the object of nature does not conform to the mind? One should consider that they also cognitively grasp an object of intrinsic nature. Question: If the five consciousnesses cognitively grasp the conceptual, why does the auditory consciousness not cognitively grasp the teaching? If it is accepted that it grasps it, by matching faculty to object, words and sentences should not be subsumed under the dharma-āyatana; if it does not grasp it, the visual consciousness should likewise not cognitively grasp long and short, since both are conceptual. Furthermore, if long, short, and so forth are not objects of the visual consciousness, they should be subsumed under the dharma-āyatana. Answer: Although forms such as long and short are cognitively grasped by the mental consciousness, by taking the conceptual to follow the real they are not in the dharma-āyatana. Another explanation: Names and the like are conceptual entities based on sound, being neither identical to nor separate from sound, so the ear does not cognitively grasp them; long and short based on form are themselves form, so although they are conceptual forms, the visual consciousness apprehends them. Question: Names and the like are conceptual entities based on sound, being neither identical to nor separate from sound; long and short are conceptual entities based on form, so why are they not [similarly] neither identical nor separate? Answer: Long and short are mutually relative; relying on dependent form, they are identical and not separate. Names and the like are not mutually relative; being doubly conceptual, they are therefore [both] identical and separate. Because names and the like are conceptually posited upon inflected conceptual sounds, they are doubly conceptual, unlike long and short. This explanation contradicts what is said below in the second [fascicle], where it states that speech is itself the expresser. This is also not so: that text refutes a different position, [holding that] spoken words are themselves the expresser; according to our own school's explanation, the āyatanas of dharmas and terms are distinct.