成唯識論了義燈 2

English (machine translation) 2

Language: English

2.1

Composed by the Śramaṇa Huizhao of Dayun Monastery in Zizhou

In stating the Sāṃkhya and other theories of self, it says: "The self grasped by you, etc." Stating the thesis, setting up the syllogism (prayoga), and identifying their fallacies are as in the Commentary and the Shuji / Shuyao. However, in the Shuyao, the first syllogism is assigned the fallacy of a reason contradictory to the special property of the subject (dharmi-viśeṣa-viparīta-sādhana); an alternative explanation also gives the fallacy of a reason contradictory to the essential nature of the subject (dharmi-svarūpa-viparīta-sādhana). The subject of the grasped self is precisely what is disputed, because space is not a self. The syllogism runs: "The self grasped by you should not be a self; because it is accepted to have no beginning or end; like space." Another explanation: Although one debates with the opponent over the existence or non-existence of a self, there is still no concordant example (sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta); hence one skillfully reveals the self to be permanent, pervasive, etc. If one accepts it to be permanent and pervasive, it exists apart from consciousness. Following this, there is the fallacy of contradicting the essential nature of the subject, and the rest may be inferred accordingly. In the third syllogism, the Shuyao states: "The reason 'conforming to the body' has the fallacy of being unestablished for one party (anyatarāsiddha); on the concordant example of space, it is absent, and thus it is an inconclusive reason that is too exclusive (asādhāraṇa-anaikāntika). For the thesis of being permanent and pervasive, space is the concordant example, and a pot is the discordant example (vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta). The reason 'conforming to the body and performing action, etc.' is absent from both the concordant and discordant examples." The Yaoji says: "The character of this inconclusive reason that is too exclusive is difficult to understand. Since space is universally accepted to be pervasive and permanent, one cannot reduce it to a discordant example." That [author], because of misreading the character "pot" (瓶) in cursive as the cursive character "difficult" (難), supposed that the Shuyao reduced space to a discordant example. Thus he challenged the Shuyao, saying: "One cannot take space as a concordant example and then challenge it as a discordant example. Furthermore, the two examples are not juxtaposed; how could one say it is absent from both? Therefore, one should say this is the fallacy of unestablished predicate in the example (sādhyavikala). Taking this as certain," he did not reflect: not knowing that the character was a copyist's error, he labored in vain. He also says: "Or perhaps, space is the concordant example, and other dharmas such as form are the discordant example. The reason 'acting and experiencing according to the body' is present in some and absent in other discordant instances; hence it becomes contradictory." Now I say this is not so: regarding the Sāṃkhya, one should say 'experiencing pleasure and pain according to place'; one cannot say 'performing karma', because the other school does not accept it. Apart from the self, nothing else experiences pleasure and pain. For the Vaiśeṣika, only the self performs karma and experiences pleasure and pain, while form and the like do not either. How could one say it is present and absent among discordant instances? He also says: "The former Shuyao's explanation of the special property of the subject represents one master, but according to another master, the explanation is slightly different: namely, if the property (dharma) and subject (dharmin) are explicitly stated in the thesis, both are called essential nature (svarūpa); what is intended in the thesis and whose character extends to other dharmas is called the special property of the predicate (dharma-viśeṣa); what resides solely in one dharma and does not extend to other dharmas is called the special property of the subject (dharmi-viśeṣa). For instance, when Dharmapāla confronted Nanda and others, intending to prove that the eighth consciousness uses the seventh consciousness as its simultaneous support (sahabhū-āśraya), he did not explicitly state that the seventh is the support. He expediently formulated: 'The ālayavijñāna must have a simultaneously born distinct support; because it is of the nature of consciousness; like the six consciousnesses.' This reason contradicts the special property of the subject. The counter-syllogism runs: 'The ālayavijñāna should not receive perfuming and hold seeds; because of being of the nature of consciousness; like the sixth.' Receiving perfuming and holding seeds resides solely in the eighth; hence it is a special property of the subject." Now I say this is not so. Consider the syllogism concerning 'having an object-support' (sālambanatva): is it contradictory to the special property of the subject? Does one take solely 'having an object-support' as the special property, or does one also take 'not having an object-support' as the special property? If one also takes 'not having an object-support' as the special property, 'not having an object-support' does not reside solely on the subject. If one takes solely 'having an object-support' as the special property, to what is it a special property, and what is contradicted? Moreover, 'not having an object-support' is also not explicitly stated; why would it not be a special property? If one says that what is specified resides solely in one dharma, like 'the true use for another' (parārthatva) which also resides solely in one dharma, then it should not be a special property of the predicate. Furthermore, as when the Sāṃkhya establishes that thought (cetanā) is the self: 'self' is explicitly stated and is termed the essential nature. Is the self that experiences fruition or the self that does not experience fruition, which is implicitly intended, called a special property of the subject or a special property of the predicate? If it is called a special property of the predicate, its character does not extend to others. If it is called a special property of the subject, it resides on the currently present dharma; further, one cannot claim that the Sāṃkhya may only establish that the self is thought and cannot establish that thought is the self—there is no distinct justification. Moreover, the Nyāyamukha says: 'Observing what is established by them, one establishes dharma and dharmin, non-quality and quality.' The intent here is that the self-nature and the special properties of all dharmas are named dharma or dharmin according to what is established; it is not fixed that the self-nature is always called the subject and the special properties of dharmas are always called the predicate. Furthermore, the example of the six consciousnesses also contradicts the essential nature, since they are not the ālaya; thus it should contradict both, not merely the special property. He also says: 'For example, when a Mahāyāna master confronts a Hīnayāna master, intending to establish the seventh consciousness, he does not explicitly state that there is a seventh consciousness. He expediently formulates: 'The definitively established manovijñāna must have a simultaneously born adhipati distinct support; because it is included under any of the definitively established six consciousnesses; like the five consciousnesses.' This reason is contradictory to the special property of the predicate (dharma-viśeṣa-viparīta-sādhana). The counter-syllogism runs: 'The definitively established manovijñāna does not use the seventh as its simultaneous distinct support; because it is included under any of the definitively established six consciousnesses; like the five consciousnesses.' Not taking the seventh as a distinct support extends to the eighth; hence it is a special property of the predicate.' If one examines this according to the hetuvidyā refutation of 'use for another', this also fails. One should say: 'Because it takes what is not the seventh consciousness as its simultaneous distinct support; because the five sense faculties such as the eye are not the seventh consciousness.' If one says: 'Not taking the seventh consciousness as its simultaneous distinct support merely negates and does not affirm, and there is no distinct dharma contradicting the seventh,' then for what is it a reason? Only after deep reflection will this be understood.

2.3

In the chapter 'Refuting the Self', it says: 'Grasping the self as permanent and pervasive, its inference is like space; it should not experience pleasure, pain, etc. conforming to the body.' If this were a syllogism accepted by both (saṃbhāṣā / ubhayasiddha), both thesis and reason would be unestablished for one party (anyatarāsiddha), for Buddhism does not accept a permanent, pervasive self. If it were Buddhism's own inference (svānumāna), the thesis would have self-contradiction, the reason would be unestablished for oneself (svayam-asiddha), and it would also have an unestablished locus for oneself (svāśrayāsiddha). Space lacks substantial entity, so it lacks both-unestablished; taking the unconditioned space as the support is permissible. Here, it is an inference for the opponent (parānumāna), framed to refute the opponent; the setting aside of fallacies is as in the Commentary.

2.4

Ximing states: Regarding the refutation of the Vaiśeṣika ātman, [the text] says: "It should lack movement/transference." He questions himself: "Their school also accepts that the ātman lacks movement/transference; now to establish that it lacks transference, does this not commit the fallacy of proving what is already accepted (siddhasādhana)?" He explains: "There are two interpretations. The first says that both the substance and its functions lack movement/transference. The second says that the functions possess movement/transference. Therefore, the preceding inference has two senses. First, if following the initial interpretation, the author of the treatise, about to refute them, first formulates their inference: 'The substance and function of the ātman in your school should lack movement/transference; because its substance is permanent and omnipresent; like space.' Now, we say this is not so: since they posit that both its substance and function lack movement/transference, why is it necessary to construct an inference? This would be completely superfluous. Because they accept it themselves, one need only specify it as their proposition; there is no need to formulate an inference. Second, if it means that the functions have movement/transference, this explains that the author of the treatise sets forth their school's inference to demonstrate their self-contradiction. The inference would run: 'The functions of the ātman you grasp must lack movement/transference; because its substance is permanent and omnipresent; like space.' This is also not right. Taking 'permanence and omnipresence' as the reason, there would be the fault of both parties not accepting the reason (ubhayāsiddha). Since they accept that the function moves while the substance does not, they hold that the substance is permanent and omnipresent, but the function is neither permanent nor omnipresent. According to the later text of the treatise: 'Function is not separate from substance, so function should always exist,' we know that they accept that function possesses movement/transference and is neither permanent nor omnipresent. Thus, the reason of being permanent and omnipresent does not exist in the function. How could one use the permanence and omnipresence of the substance as a reason to contradict their tenet? If one were to establish it according to the treatise, one should say: 'The function of your ātman should also be permanent and omnipresent; because it is not separate from the substance; just like the substance.' How could one use their 'permanence and omnipresence' as the reason? Therefore, one should rely on what the primary commentator clarified, correcting this treatise as: 'The ātman you grasp should not be able to produce diverse karmas in accordance with the body; because you accept that it lacks movement/transference; like great space.' Because in this text there are three inferences, as there are three reasons: first, permanence; second, omnipresence; third, lack of movement/transference. When the text says 'how could it be' (ruhe), the meaning is 'it is not so' (buyi). The word 'should' (ying) stated above should properly be placed above the two characters 'how could it be' (ruhe). For stylistic ease in the text, it was placed on the reason, which is why the sequence is disturbed; failing to grasp the original intent, [the other master] explained it arbitrarily. This is also like the treatise on hetuvidyā (Nyāyamukha), which says: 'Here, the thesis (pakṣa) refers to that which is extremely well-established (dharmin) and extremely well-established (dharma), because of the nature of differentiation (viśeṣa). What is spontaneously desired to be established as its own property is called the thesis.' Later, Dharma Master Wengui arbitrarily altered the treatise's text, saying: 'it takes differentiation as its nature' (chabie wei xing), taking the character wei (為) to mean 'to make/act as' (zuo), meaning that it takes differentiation as the essential nature of the thesis. If so, having first stated 'here, the thesis refers to...', explaining it as 'taking differentiation as its nature' would have already finished showing the thesis. Why would it need to further say 'this is called the thesis'? The text would be redundant. The original treatise says 'because of the nature of differentiation' (chabie xing gu), which has two meanings. Why? Because through differentiation, the thesis's substance is established, and below 'spontaneously desired' faults are excluded. Now, the character 'because' (gu) is intended to exclude the ancient teachers who took both the dharmin and dharma together as the thesis. Now, excluding the ancient teachers' doctrine, because of the nature of differentiation, mutual incompatibility is the very substance of the thesis. If one said 'takes it as its nature,' there would be no exclusion of the ancient error. Second, it is said that the ancient teachers had five faults of the thesis; now Bodhisattva Dignāga added the latter four. Because both the extremely well-established dharmin and dharma are extremely well-established, they can serve as the locus of the thesis; because the nature of differentiation is the thesis-substance, it is established upon that dharmin and dharma, and only then is it concluded as: 'this is called the thesis.'"

2.5

Furthermore, is the grasped ātman one or different? If one says it is different, their substances should intermingle. The Yaoji states the inference: 'Devadatta's true ātman should intermingle with Yajñadatta's ātman in substance; because they mutually pervade one another; like Yajñadatta's ātman.' Now we say: the reasoning in this statement is also rather difficult. If they accept that Yajñadatta's ātman intermingles in substance, then Devadatta's would be likewise, committing the fault of proving what is already accepted (siddhasādhana). If they do not accept intermingling, the example lacks the property to be proved (sādhyavikalatā); how could it constitute an inference? Ximing says: 'The reason states "because of mutually pervading one another," which is without fault. Both the ātman of Devadatta and that of Yajñadatta have the meaning of mutually pervading the other, like the reason "because of being produced" (kṛtakatvāt).' The Yaoji says: 'Some say that taking permanence and omnipresence as the reason necessarily requires looking to two phenomena before it can be called mutual pervading.' This too is illogical, because it contradicts the text of the treatise. Some explain: 'It is called mutual pervading in the sense of one ātman being similar [to another].' This too is illogical, because a single substance cannot be said to mutually pervade, which contradicts reason. The Yaoji says: 'A certain explanation is correct: because the ātman of Devadatta and others has the meaning of mutually pervading other ātmans. Just as the reason "being produced" necessarily depends on a maker; even without explicitly showing that it is solely conditioned by the tongue and the like, the reason "being produced" is established.' Now we say this is not so. Why? If one says: 'The ātman of Devadatta and others has the meaning of mutually pervading other ātmans,' then does it intermingle with the other or not? If one says it intermingles, there is the fault of proving what is already accepted; if it does not intermingle, the example lacks the property to be proved, and the example is not established. The intention of the primary commentary is: Yajñadatta's ātman is permanent and omnipresent, yet its substance is one. Therefore, the inference is established: 'Devadatta's ātman and Yajñadatta's ātman' is the subject (dharmin); 'should become one in substance' is the predicate (sādhya-dharma); 'because of being permanent and omnipresent' is the reason (hetu); 'like Yajñadatta's ātman' [is the example]. Yajñadatta's ātman is one, and furthermore permanent and omnipresent. The example is endowed with both things to be established, so it can form an inference. This grasps the intention of the treatise; the wise should believe it, while the rest are inaccurate.

2.6

Furthermore, as the previous inference states: 'Take, for instance, other Yajñadattas and the like: when Devadatta performs various actions, they should also perform the actions; because the ātman is one; just like Devadatta and the like.' Other people do not understand this inference, supposing that 'other Yajñadattas and the like, at the time Devadatta performs actions' is taken in its entirety as the subject (dharmin). They then immediately object: 'How can one again take the subject as the example?' This is due to not understanding the intention. The intention is: 'like other Yajñadattas' is the subject (dharmin); 'at the time another, Devadatta, performs actions, also performs the actions' is the predicate (dharma). Specifying that when Devadatta performs actions, Yajñadatta should also perform actions is because the substance of the ātman is one. If one did not say 'at the time Devadatta performs actions, [he] should also perform actions,' then when Devadatta has not yet performed an action such as causing a schism in the Sangha, one could cause Yajñadatta and others to also perform the act of schism, and then the positive example would lack that which is to be proved (sādhyavikalatā). To eliminate this fault, it says 'at the time Devadatta performs actions, [he] should also perform actions,' so that the example possesses both things to be established. Question: The outsider, relying on matter that is non-separate from the same location (sahabhū-rūpa), formulates the fault of inconclusiveness (anaikāntika). He constructs the inference: 'The ātman grasped by me definitely cannot be one in substance; because you accept that they mutually pervade; like the matter non-separate from the same location in your Mahāyāna.' What fault does this have? Answer: This inference has two faults. First, it has the fault of a reason that contradicts the subject's own nature (dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana). The ātman is also in dispute; because the substance of matter non-separate from the same location is not an ātman, this reason of 'mutually pervading,' by taking matter of the same location as the positive instance, operates solely in the negative instances of the ātman, since there is no other omnipresent thing that is an ātman to serve as a positive instance. Second, it has the fault of a reason that contradicts the intended property of the subject (dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana). The ātman as the subject is explicitly stated, whereas a conventional ātman or real ātman is the intended specification of the subject. In the Mahāyāna school, matter non-separate from the same location is precisely a conventional ātman; furthermore, they mutually pervade, so the example possesses both things to be established, but there is no real ātman to serve as an omnipresent positive example. Therefore, one establishes the inference: 'The ātman you grasp should be a conventional ātman and not a real ātman; because you accept that they mutually pervade; like matter non-separate from the same location.' The Yaoji states: 'The Tripiṭaka Master had three explanations. First: non-separateness in the same location in the Yogācārabhūmi follows the provisional perspective of the Sautrāntika, not the definitive Mahāyāna doctrine. Second: it is also the definitive doctrine of Mahāyāna, yet what is transformed by consciousness is conventional and not real; because none of it is separate from mind, they interpenetrate. It is not like their school, where the eye and so on are real entities that do not interpenetrate. Third: the seven physical elements are of different categories, so in the same location they do not intermix; the ātman has no categorical differences, so in the same location they should intermix. The Tripiṭaka Master favored the second.' The Yaoji says: 'Now examining the first explanation, it has the fault of inconclusiveness from the opponent's perspective; relying on the second explanation, although transformed by consciousness and conventional, the seven do not become one, hence it is also inconclusive; relying on the third explanation, external vessels of the same category do not intermix into one in the same location, hence it is also inconclusive. Therefore, now the reason states: "because being of the same category, without increase or decrease, they mutually pervade," so there is no fault of inconclusiveness. "Same category" excludes the seven physical elements; "without increase or decrease" excludes external vessels, for external vessels have increase and decrease, whereas the ātman does not. Alternatively, the reason states: "because being included under either of the two ātmans of Devadatta or Yajñadatta, they mutually pervade," so there is also no inconclusiveness.' Now we say: this explanation does not accord with the correct principle, adding superfluous words to the treatise's text. When the primary commentary stated that one should say 'permanent and omnipresent,' he immediately objected that it had the fault of contradicting the treatise; now, in adding five characters, how could that not be a fault? Moreover, saying 'alternatively, because being included under either of the two ātmans, they mutually pervade' also adds to the text of the treatise. Furthermore, in both explanations, the positive examples lack the property to be established. The faults are as demonstrated before, and there is also the fault of an inconclusive reason counterbalanced by an opposing inference (viruddhāvyabhicārin); one should rely on the primary commentary.

2.7

Question: In explaining the latter three classes of postulated selves, the Yogācārabhūmi (fascicle sixty-four, etc.) has four classes in total, yet it includes only the first two and does not subsume the third. If so, why does that treatise say that all those who, based on discrimination of a self, postulate its existence are subsumed within these four kinds of postulations, and that apart from these there are no others—why does it not include it? Answer: That [treatise] relies on the intrinsic nature of the grasp of self, which does not exceed those four. Here, it relies on emotional understanding, falsely claiming it to be a self, and hence explains and refutes it; in reality it is a grasp of dharmas. Question: If so, how can it be severed below by [the realization of] the emptiness of persons? Answer: That text speaks in general terms, not assigning it distinctively to each; the text is general while the intent is distinctive—this is the general pattern of this text. Furthermore, there is another explanation in the Shuyao, which is not recorded here as it is found there. Ximing says: The first, which is identical with the aggregates, refers to the Śulika tīrthikas. They postulate that all aggregates possess an aggregate-nature. Just as our internal tradition states that all dharmas take tathatā as their nature, they postulate the nature of the aggregates to be the real self. This corresponds to the twenty views of the real personality (satkāyadṛṣṭi) spoken of in the Mahāvibhāṣā. Now I say: This explanation is somewhat difficult to accept in detail. The grasp of the twenty views of the body and so forth takes the five aggregates of form and so on directly as the self; they grasp at the nature of form. How can one say it is identical with the twenty views? Now, to explain provisionally: although both are identical with the aggregates, their grasps differ. One grasps form and so forth directly as its self; one grasps the nature of form as its self. Although the nature is not directly form, it is subsumed under the aggregates because it is the nature of the aggregates. Or else, they grasp the nature of the aggregates as not subsumed directly under the aggregates; just as the tathatā of the Mahāyāna, though the nature of the aggregates, is not subsumed under the aggregates, it should be subsumed under the second alternative: different from the aggregates yet dwelling within the aggregates. Or else, they grasp the nature of the aggregates—"nature" meaning substance—and grasp this substance of the aggregates as their self, because the others do not posit the existence of the five aggregates, the term "five aggregates" being spoken of by the Buddha-Dharma; inspect the Vibhāṣā further. Ximing also says: Among the latter three, why are there only three, with no alternative of "both identical and separate"? The explanation says: "Neither identical nor separate" is itself "both identical and separate", so it is not separately stated. What is its meaning? If affirming identity and separateness, it forms the third alternative; if negating identity and separateness, it forms the fourth alternative. That is to say, because it is identical, it is not separate; because it is separate, it is not identical. Therefore, the Prakaraṇāryavācā, the Vibhāṣā, and so on all state this. The third and fourth alternatives differ in sense, yet their substance is not distinct. However, this third and fourth alternative may have the same substance or different substances, as appropriate to know. Now I say: They need not necessarily form four alternatives. Just as when speaking of extreme views, there are only annihilation and permanence, and four alternatives are not posited; [the views of] ideation and non-ideation and so on are all likewise—why should this self alone be forced into four alternatives? Furthermore, the postulation of a self is spoken of based on having a real substance; since the third and fourth alternatives have no separate substance, there is no such postulation. Ximing also says: The third and fourth alternatives mutually subsume one another; the third in this treatise is identical with the former two of that [treatise]. Why is this? Because being "not identical," it corresponds to being separate from the aggregates; because being "not separate," it corresponds to being identical with the aggregates. Therefore this treatise says: "admitting that it is established depending on the aggregates." Were it not so, it would contradict the Yogācārabhūmi's statement that all postulations of self do not exceed four kinds. Now I say: This is not so. If following this explanation, merely this single third class of postulated self would subsume the four kinds of postulations in the Yogācārabhūmi. How could it be said that there are either three or four? Furthermore, if it is identical with the former two, why does the treatise state it separately as the third? What benefit is there in setting up such cumbersome distinctions? Therefore, one should follow the original commentary and the Shuyao, taking their explanation as correct. The Yaoji says: There is an explanation that the four postulations in the Yogācārabhūmi are exclusively discriminative (parikalpita), whereas the third here is subsumed under the innate (sahaja), because the spontaneous grasp of self does not calculate identity or separateness. Below, it explains in full that the two views depend on the aggregates and do not arise by taking a self as an object. If the explanation and refutation of the postulations did not cover both grasps, it should not universally show that the two grasps take the aggregates as object. The Ji says: Now I consider that the Yogācārabhūmi speaks only of the discriminative, while this treatise covers both; this point is tenable. Regarding the third in this treatise, how can one know that it is exclusively innate and without discrimination, exclusively internal [to Buddhism] and not tīrthika? The Tripiṭaka Master [Xuanzang] handed down the tradition: the Vātsīputrīyas' postulation of a self resembles the postulation of the Vātsīputrīya tīrthikas. If so, why not refute the tīrthikas, rather than restricting the discriminative exclusively to that Hīnayāna innate [grasp]? Furthermore, when those Vātsīputrīyas discuss those who have not yet attained the holy state, how could they not consider that discriminative views arise within the bodies of worldlings? Hence, for this third alternative to universally explain and universally refute both the discriminative and the innate is superior in principle. Now I say: This is not so. If it were exclusively discriminative, it would accord with the treatise text. They posit five repositories (kośa), and the self is in the fifth, ineffable repository; how could an innate view form such a postulation? Furthermore, one cannot say that the Vātsīputrīya school's postulation is merely discussing past postulations and not based on present postulations; this is also not reasonable. In the Samayabhedoparacanacakra, they are currently described as uniformly postulating a self. Schools such as the Sammatīya were originally not tīrthikas, yet they also postulated a self. Furthermore, in the Kośa, fascicle twenty-nine, citing a sūtra to challenge the Vātsīputrīyas, it says: The sūtra states that giving rise to the view of self, falling into evil views, leads to the same destinies as the tīrthikas, and so forth extensively. That school resolved it by saying: this sūtra is not valid authority (pramāṇa), as it has never been recited in our school. If so, how could an aśaikṣa give rise to a view grasping a self? The answer is as explained before: or else, one may say that only śaikṣas and ordinary persons make such a postulation, for the text makes no exclusion.

2.8

In the syllogism (pramāṇa) refuting the self that is both-negated, the commentary says: If refuting the alternative of "both", the other tradition also says that the self is not the alternative of "both"; hence it incurs the fallacy of proving what is already accepted (siddhasādhana), and furthermore lacks an example of similarity (sādharmyadṛṣṭānta). The meaning is: the other posits a self that is neither identical nor separate, and it also cannot be designated as the alternative of "both self and non-self", because it is ineffable. Just as the Mahāyāna says: the substance of tathatā is not subsumed under the alternative of "both existent and nonexistent", and so forth. Now, if one refutes them saying, "It should be ineffable as self and non-self," it incurs the fallacy of proving what is already accepted, and furthermore lacks an example of similarity. Like the hair of a turtle, although it cannot be designated as a self, it can be designated as non-self; hence it is not an example of similarity. Conditioned and unconditioned as examples are also like this. Furthermore, if one takes both self and non-self together as the probandum (sādhya-dharma), then between conditioned and unconditioned, whichever one is cited can also serve as an example; why is it necessary to cite both conditioned and unconditioned together? Now I assist the explanation by saying: although their intention is that it cannot be designated as self or non-self, they nevertheless admit that the self exists in the ineffable repository, and the self within the ineffable repository cannot be designated as self or non-self. Now we challenge them: since it cannot be designated as self or non-self, one should also not be able to say that there is an aggregate of what cannot be designated as self or non-self, in which the self exists as a member. Why? Just as with the conditioned and the unconditioned, your self cannot be designated as conditioned or unconditioned, so one does not state that there is an ineffable conditioned or unconditioned as an ineffable repository. Since your self cannot be designated as self or non-self, how can you establish that there is an aggregate of what is ineffable as self or non-self as an ineffable repository? Therefore, the conditioned and unconditioned are cited as examples of similarity. Furthermore, it should also follow that although it cannot be designated as self or non-self, you still admit grasping it as a self; so it should also follow that although it cannot be designated as conditioned or unconditioned, you grasp it as conditioned or unconditioned. However, the intent of the commentary is: although that school's postulation of a self does not designate it as self or non-self, permanent or impermanent, conditioned or unconditioned, they nevertheless grasp it as a self. Therefore it says: taking self and non-self merely as an analogy, without stating the rest. The syllogism says: "The self you postulate should be ineffable as a self"—this is spoken based on their original grasp; although it cannot be designated as self or non-self, they nevertheless grasp it as a self, so here it is specifically refuted. Furthermore, the syllogism says: "The self you postulate, in the sense of the aggregate of self and non-self, should also be ineffable," and so on. One should formulate the syllogism: "Your self, within the aggregate of self and non-self, should not be designable as existing therein; because of being ineffable (hetu); like the conditioned and unconditioned (dṛṣṭānta)." The meaning is: "ineffable" does not mean being beyond words and hence ineffable; it simply takes the ineffability of being conditioned or unconditioned, self or non-self, upon the self as the reason (hetu), and like the conditioned and unconditioned as the example. This takes the sense of ineffability as conditioned or unconditioned upon the self as the example, and does not take the separate substance of conditioned or unconditioned as the example of similarity. The general meaning is: it cannot be designated as existing within the meaning of the aggregate of self and non-self, just as it cannot be designated as existing within the conditioned and unconditioned; because of being ineffable, one does not take its substance. Were it not so, the self being the subject (dharmin), what other dharma could be called the aggregate of self and non-self? Therefore, this syllogism is correct. Both Ximing and the Yaoji take the syllogism rejected by the Shuyao as correct. The rejected syllogism runs: "The self you postulate should not be designated as one's own self and not another's self; because you admit it is ineffable; like the conditioned and unconditioned." They take this as correct. Moreover, Ximing says: "The self you speak of should not be designable as one's own self and not another's self; because of being ineffable as conditioned or unconditioned; like a sky-flower." As rejected by the Shuyao, this should not be taken as correct. Furthermore, although their original postulation grasps the existence of a self, it cannot be designated as self or non-self and is subsumed under the ineffable repository. If one designates it as one's own self and not another's, how could it be called ineffable? If one says it is ineffable as conditioned or unconditioned and therefore exists in the ineffable [repository], then those conditioned dharmas are also ineffable as unconditioned and as a self, and should likewise be in the ineffable repository. The Yaoji says: Saying "one's own self and not another's self" merely refutes one master's single self, not all of them. If so, which tīrthikas postulate the self as another's self? The Sāṃkhya's self that experiences the result is oneself and not another; the Vaiśeṣika's postulated agent and experiencer self are all likewise. The statement of the Tripiṭaka Master's syllogism, "one's own self and not another's self," was formulated by others; the Tripiṭaka Master was merely recounting others' views, not giving his own correct explanation. Since the text of the treatise says, "Furthermore, since it is ineffable as conditioned or unconditioned, it should also be ineffable as self or non-self," this is citing an example, not taking it as the reason. If it were taken as the reason, why would it say "it should also be ineffable as self or non-self"? To what does the word "also" refer? Therefore, the original commentary is correct. Question: The Mahāprajñāpāramitā also speaks of five repositories: the three periods of time are three, the conditioned is one called the conditioned repository, and the unconditioned is one also called the ineffable repository—what is the difference between that and this? Answer: The treatise has distinct standards, which can be understood.

2.9

The treatise says: "Furthermore, the various views of a self do not take a real self as their object," and so forth. The Yaoji says: The Śataśāstravaipulya formulates the syllogism: "The view of a self definitely does not take a real self as its object; because it is commingled with marks of male, female, and so forth; like the mind that, apprehending the body and so forth, gives rise to commingling with marks of male and so forth. Furthermore, the view of a self does not take a real self as its object; because it possesses an intentional object; like other minds and so forth. Furthermore, the object of the view of a self is not a real self; because it is the intentional object of a mind with marks of male and so forth; just like the body and so forth." From this, it is known: none of the views of a self have a real self as their intentional object, but take only the unreal body and so forth as their object; because they arise following the conceptual awareness of one's own false discrimination; like the inverted understanding of a snake when observing a rope in the dark. Inheriting the original explanation, it says: "Furthermore, the various views of a self do not take a real self as their object"—this does not mean a view of a self that forms the understanding of a self. If framed in terms of the view of a self not apprehending it, that would incur the fallacy of proving what is already accepted. Now, saying "does not take as object" is framed in terms of the view that apprehends a self being afflicted wisdom (kliṣṭa-prajñā); framing it around this as the view, it challenges them so that it does not take [a real self] as its object, and therefore there is no fallacy of proving what is already accepted.

2.10

The commentary says: "In reality, there also is, and is not without, a fundamental basis (mūlālambana), because it is innate." Therefore, what is spoken of here as the five grasping aggregates and so forth all give rise to mental representations (pratibimba); the word "also" means that the objective aspect (nimittabhāga) is also the fundamental basis; there is no one who, without an image, calculates it to be a self, which is why it says "giving rise to an image of one's own mind; there also is, and is not without, a fundamental basis." Therefore it says "taking the five grasping aggregates as object."

2.11

[Regarding the phrase] 'in the subsequent path of cultivation, it can only be abandoned through repeated cultivation': if explained in terms of suppressing active manifestations, in the Mahāyāna compassion and wisdom are both intensified; furthermore, there is a distinction between fearing and not fearing afflictions; and there is also the innate self-grasping of the sixth consciousness. Whether it is abandoned by seeing or abandoned by cultivation has five explanations in total, as distinguished in the Shunyao. Furthermore, in terms of arising by taking the aggregates collectively or individually, regarding the distinction of abandonment in the sequential attainment of the fruits, five explanations are also made: First, it is said that whether collective or individual, it is all abandoned at the ninth grade of [the stage of] neither-perception-nor-non-perception; if so, there is the fault of subsequently abandoning what belongs to lower stages. Second, it is said that the collective is abandoned at the ninth grade of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, while the individual is abandoned across the nine grades of each and every stage. This has two errors: if collective, the fault of subsequently abandoning lower stages; if individual, the fault that what is subsequently attained does not abandon the affliction. Third, reversing the previous second explanation, it also shares the previous error, having both faults. Fourth, it is said that the collective and individual are separately abandoned in each of the nine grades of each and every stage; if so, there is the fault that what is subsequently attained does not abandon the affliction. Fifth, it is said that the collective and individual are each abandoned at the ninth grade of their own respective stages. This explanation is correct, being free from the previous two faults; whether cultivation and abandonment are repeated or not can be known by applying this. Question: What is the meaning of the sequential śrāvaka? Answer: The various Hīnayāna schools explain this differently. Relying provisionally on the Mahāyāna to discuss the Hīnayāna fruits: it is said that there are śrāvakas whose faculties are either sharp or dull. Prior to the path of seeing, they do not suppress the afflictions of cultivation, suppressing only the afflictions of seeing; when entering the path of seeing, they abruptly abandon the afflictions of the path of seeing of the three realms, attaining the fruit of the srotāpanna. In the path of seeing, abandoning all views of self grasping the aggregates as identical or separate, they abandon them in the three-mind path of seeing; the sequence is as explained in the Shunyao. From this path of seeing of sixteen minds onward, later in the path of cultivation, they sequentially abandon the eighty-one grades of afflictions to be abandoned by cultivation across the nine stages of the three realms. According to what is appropriate, they attain the latter three fruits, which is called sequential attainment. The five explanations regarding the abandonment of [afflictions] deluded about principle or phenomena are as before, and repeated abandonment and repeated cultivation are also to be understood in accordance with the five explanations.

2.12

As for stating that 'because it is subtle, it is difficult to abandon', 'subtle' has four meanings: First, contrasted with grades: subsumed under the ninth grade among the nine grades, relative to the other [afflictions] deluded about phenomena, this is the same as the ninth; if spoken of in terms of its own category, it also has nine grades. Second, contrasted with discriminative and innate: this arises spontaneously. Third, contrasted with seeing and cultivation: this is abandoned solely by cultivation. Fourth, contrasted with higher and lower paths: it is abandoned only by the higher path; hence it is called subtle. In repeated cultivation and abandonment, the two vehicles of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas have distinctions. Among śrāvakas, there are further two distinctions: sequential and leaping. The former was spoken in terms of persons who attain the fruits sequentially. As for persons who leap, there are three types: 1. leaping only over the first fruit; 2. leaping over the first two fruits; 3. leaping over the middle two fruits. First, as for leaping over the first fruit: it refers to a śrāvaka whose faculty is sharp, who formerly while an ordinary person aspired to higher rebirth, and using the worldly path of the six practices of duḥkha, audārika, and so forth, suppressed the first six grades of the coarse afflictions deluded about phenomena that are innate to the six consciousnesses in the desire realm. Later, meeting conditions, they redirected their course to seek the fruit of a śrāvaka. Practicing the seven preparatory practices as the application, upon entering the path of seeing, in a single moment seeing and cultivation are abandoned together, attaining the second fruit. Because those six grades were already suppressed previously, the path of seeing is able to abandon them; although afflictions deluded about principle were not previously suppressed, because their counterparts were suppressed, upon entering the path of seeing, they are also abandoned simultaneously. The repetition of path and abandonment can be understood by applying this. Second, leaping over the first two fruits and attaining the third: it refers to a śrāvaka whose faculty is sharp, who formerly while an ordinary person used the six practices to suppress the nine grades of afflictions deluded about phenomena of the desire realm, up to the nine grades of phenomenal afflictions of [the stage of] nothingness. Later, entering the path of seeing, those previously suppressed and those not suppressed are abandoned simultaneously together with the afflictions of seeing. Repeated cultivation and abandonment can be understood by applying this. Question: Why do the former two types of persons not suppress afflictions deluded about principle? Answer: Because they do not understand how to cultivate contemplation of principle. Afflictions deluded about principle do not conflict with contemplation of phenomena, and thus cannot be suppressed. Question: Why can they not suppress afflictions of the summit of existence? Answer: Because that [stage] is subtle, there is nothing higher to aspire to; they do not undertake the six practices, and thus cannot suppress them. Furthermore, that affliction is subtle and does not obstruct the stage of training; hence they only abandon those. Leaping over the first two fruits: the foregoing is based on the correct doctrine; collateral explanations are incorrect and too tedious to recount. Those who say it is abandoned in the path of simulated seeing are not in accord with correct principle. The Yogācārabhūmi only says that worldly and supramundane paths abandon afflictions deluded about phenomena without eliminating [afflictions] deluded about principle; nor can one say that true seeing of principle eliminates them while the path of simulated seeing abandons afflictions deluded about phenomena. Nor can one say that after the path of simulated seeing, a distinct path is aroused to abandon them. The Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya says that both those who leap over the first two fruits and sequential persons establish the noble fruit at the sixteenth mind, not arousing a distinct path. Furthermore, fascicle 57 of the Yogācārabhūmi states: 'Question: What is the faculty of wanting to know the unknown the basis for? Answer: It is the basis for realizing the first, second, and third fruits of asceticism. Question: What is the faculty of having known the basis for? Answer: Up to the vajropamasamādhi, it is the basis for realizing the fruit of asceticism of non-training.' Therefore, at the sixteenth mind one attains the first three fruits. Furthermore, fascicle 57 states: 'Question: By how many faculties does one attain the fruit of srotāpanna? Answer: Either one or eight. By how many does one attain the second? By either two or nine one attains the fruit of sakṛdāgāmin. Question: By how many faculties does one attain the fruit of anāgāmin? Answer: Either eleven or two.' For the first fruit, 'either one' refers to the faculty of wanting to know the unknown; 'or eight' adds the five faculties of faith and so forth, as well as the mind and equanimity faculties; this is spoken according to the definitively sequential person. For the sakṛdāgāmin, 'either two or nine' is explained as with the first fruit in terms of one who leaps; for the sequential person, it is the faculty of having known; one attains it through either one of the two, not definitely attaining it through both. Therefore it says 'either two or nine': the seven including faith and so forth are definite, while of the two including the unknown, etc., either one is indeterminate; it allows attainment by nine faculties, not definitely having nine conjoined. Because it remains indeterminate, this word 'or' is placed. Since it is already based on the first sāmantaka, it has only the equanimity faculty.

2.13

Question: By how many faculties does one attain the fruit of anāgāmin? Answer: Either eleven or two. For one who leaps, it is as explained for the first fruit; for a sequential person, it relies on the faculty of having known. One attains it through either one of the two, hence it says 'either two or eleven': to the previous nine, add joy or pleasure, according to the dhyāna relied upon to enter seeing. The sāmantaka of the first dhyāna and the fourth dhyāna rely on equanimity; the mūladhyāna of the first two have joy, while the third has pleasure. One of the three feelings as appropriate, hence it says 'or eleven', not that the three feelings are conjoined. Alternatively, one of the three feelings, adding one life faculty, and one of either female or male, thus making eleven. If one adds both joy and pleasure, the three feelings are not conjoined, so how could it make eleven? The former explanation is correct. There is an explanation that eight removes the faculty of the unknown and adds life; nine further adds joy; eleven adds pleasure and grief. This explanation is incorrect. Fascicle 57, in the text on the first fruit, states: although the grief faculty is a basis of the path, it is not subsumed under the path, hence it is not taken here. In the fruit of anāgāmin, it also says: the principle of the grief faculty should be known as before, hence grief is not taken. Relying on the first mūladhyāna, the sequential [person] also enters; relying on the upper three dhyānas, only one who leaps over fruits enters. Question: By how many faculties does one attain the fruit of an arhat? Answer: 'Either one or ten.' 'One' refers to the faculty of having known; 'ten' refers to removing the faculty of wanting to know the unknown from the eleven. This speaks of being able to attain, not having already attained, hence it excludes the faculty of one who possesses knowledge. Broad refutations of other [views] would merely present tedious words. As for leaping over the middle two fruits and attaining the fourth: it refers to a śrāvaka whose faculty is sharp, who formerly while an ordinary person did not suppress afflictions of cultivation. In the seven preparatory practices, they only suppressed the afflictions of seeing; upon entering the path of seeing, they completely abandoned the afflictions of the path of seeing of the three realms; having attained the first fruit, they have not yet further abandoned [afflictions of] cultivation. Due to the power of inclination having capability, relying on the first sāmantaka without yet having attained the mūladhyāna, they comprehensively bunch the afflictions of cultivation of the six consciousnesses of the nine stages across the three realms into nine grades. As with the first grade of desire, up to the summit of existence, the afflictions of the first grade are combined into one grade, and the remaining eight are understood in like manner. As for the subtle afflictions deluded about principle of the sixth consciousness, though there are nine grades in each and every stage, now together with the afflictions conjoined with the seventh consciousness, they are combined into one grade. Simultaneously and abruptly abandoned along with the ninth grade of afflictions deluded about phenomena, one becomes an arhat; repetition of path and abandonment can also be understood by applying this. Question: Having made nine grades, when abandoning the six grades of cultivation afflictions of desire, why does one not attain the second fruit? When abandoning the nine grades of desire, why does one not attain the third? Answer: When the six of desire are abandoned, six grades are also abandoned in each of the upper two realms; furthermore, because one does not cease striving and has not emerged from contemplation, one does not attain the second. When the nine grades of desire are abandoned, afflictions of the summit of existence are also completely abandoned, immediately attaining the fourth; therefore one does not take the middle two. Question: Is it only a person of the first fruit who has not advanced to abandon afflictions that can leap over the middle two, or can one who has abandoned remaining grades also leap? Answer: Applying the Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya which cites the Aṅguli-sūtra, only one who has not abandoned the rest can accomplish the noble intention; it does not say that others are able. Because upon attaining the fruit, one possesses superior capability. If one advances even slightly to abandon them, one is not of this category, lacking superior capability. Pratyekabuddhas have two distinct categories: 1. The rhinoceros-horn metaphor. Throughout a trichiliocosm, only a single one emerges; therefore their faculties are sharp. Formerly in the stage of an ordinary person, using the six practices, they suppressed afflictions from [the stage of] nothingness on down. Cultivating their faculties for a hundred kalpas, upon entering the path of seeing, because the eight stages on down had their counterparts suppressed, they are abandoned simultaneously with the afflictions of seeing. Emerging from the path of seeing, they separately arouse nine ānantaryamārgas and nine vimuktimārgas, abandoning the nine grades of afflictions of the stage of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, becoming this person of the rhinoceros-horn metaphor. Those who cultivate their faculties for less than a hundred kalpas, and those from the stage of decisive discernment of śrāvakas when rebirth is not yet determined, who from this point forward become pratyekabuddhas, all emerge in groups. Although without relying on a teacher they awaken to the path on their own and are called solitary awakened ones, many are permitted to emerge, hence they are called group-farers. There is another explanation, as in the tenth record: this applies to both determined and undetermined gotras; if one cultivates faculties for a hundred kalpas and attains pratyekabuddhahood, they are exclusively of the determined gotra; the remaining meanings should be understood in accordance with what precedes.

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成唯識論了義燈 — Classical Chinese