成唯識論了義燈 3.37

3.37

[Regarding] the text of the Śāstra: “Such two dharmas…,” the mind perceiving a vase and so forth—the “and so forth” including minds perceiving clothing, food, carts, etc.—under which pramāṇa is it subsumed? Answer: Originally it was said to be subsumed under non-pramāṇa (aprāmaṇya), because it does not directly apprehend the self-essence (svalakṣaṇa) of the dharma, and because it is not inferential deduction; hence it is subsumed under non-pramāṇa; non-pramāṇa does not require solely a persistent adherence. Ximing’s intention is identical. Another explanation says that pseudo-direct perception is subsumed under inference; hence the Nyāyamukha states: “Those [pramāṇas] such as testimony and analogy are subsumed herein; therefore there are only two pramāṇas.” Some say: If one opens it into three different categories—direct perception, inference, and non-pramāṇa—the cognizing mind may encompass all three pramāṇas. However, the Yaoji concludes: “Nominally positing vases, etc., has the same sense as names and so forth; although they are not mental factors, yet both concentrated and dispersed minds can perceive a vase. Therefore the previous three masters are all unreasonable; the fourth should be taken as correct.” Now I say: The first two meanings are indeed true, while the latter two are unreasonable. Why is that? First, the third master says that the mind perceiving a vase is pseudo-direct perception, which is subsumed under inference; this principle is simply not so. The two pramāṇas, direct perception and inference, are subsumed under correct cognition. Pseudo-direct perception and pseudo-inference are subsumed under confusion and error. How could it be called inference? If because it perceives a common characteristic (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) it is subsumed under inference, then all confused minds and pseudo-inferential minds with false attachments should be subsumed under inference. If that were permitted, what difference would there be between true and pseudo? Since pseudo-inference and the like are not subsumed under true inference, pseudo-direct perception should also be like this. Furthermore, the Nyāyamukha explains inferential cognition as: “Born from direct perception, or born from inference.” The mind perceiving a vase is subsumed under pseudo-direct perception. How could it be said to be subsumed under inference? As for what the Nyāyamukha states: “Those [pramāṇas] such as testimony and analogy are subsumed herein; therefore there are only two pramāṇas,” this is stated with reference to apprehending the essence of dharmas without error; it does not mean that pseudo-direct perception and pseudo-inference are also admitted to be subsumed under the two. How could one attain self-awakening? If both were subsumed, how could one attain self-awakening? If, according to the fourth master, the mind perceiving a vase... If both were subsumed, how could one attain self-awakening? If, according to the fourth master, the mind perceiving a vase encompasses all three pramāṇas, it contradicts the Nyāyamukha’s statement. That [text] says: “In this way, among all conventional existents, vases, carts, etc., are all pseudo-direct perception, because with respect to real existents one produces other mental images (ākāra), falsely combining other meanings, and operates through conceptual differentiation (vikalpa).” The Pramāṇasamuccaya also says: “Namely, all those who have cognition, conceptually discerning vases, clothing, etc., produce differentiation, because their domain is not the self-characteristic with respect to the referent; thus it is called pseudo-direct perception, not inference, as explained before.” What was stated is unreasonable. Question: If so, do the concentrated minds of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas not perceive a vase? Answer: It does not prevent them from perceiving a vase, but their minds do not produce the understanding of a really existent vase; they apprehend the self-characteristics of the four sensory dusts upon which the vase depends, and with respect to real existents they do not produce other mental images or operate through conceptual differentiation falsely combining other meanings. Because they can know that worldly beings perceive it and form the understanding of a real vase, it is a realm of direct perception. Just as with the parikalpita nature, an ārya's penetration of its nonexistence also serves as an ārya realm; it is not the same as an ordinary being's clinging, yet it is called an ārya realm. The original Commentary says that the mind perceiving a vase is non-pramāṇa: this is spoken with reference to producing the understanding of a real vase; it does not mean that discerning the vase as nominal is also subsumed under non-pramāṇa. Even if one perceives a vase and forms an inferential understanding, it is also a pseudo-inference, not a true inference; because there is no real vase essence, it is also non-pramāṇa. Is it not that pseudo-direct perception and pseudo-inference are subsumed under non-pramāṇa, because they do not match the object, and are erroneous cognitions?