成唯識論了義燈 3

English (machine translation) 3

Language: English

3.1

Composed by the monk Huizhao of Dayun Monastery in Zizhou

The treatise says: "There are three conditioned characteristics of the conditioned..." fully explained as in the commentary. However, according to the *Vibhāṣā*, fascicle 38: Just as the Dārṣṭāntikas hold that all conditioned characteristics are subsumed under the skandha of non-concurrent formations, which is slightly similar to the Mahāyāna, this refers to the original teachers of the Sautrāntika. Yet whether [they are] separate from consciousness or not separate from consciousness is refuted by analogy below. The Vibhajyavādins say that these characterizing marks are all unconditioned. The Dharmaguptakas say that the three characteristics are conditioned, while the characteristic of cessation is unconditioned. Those who establish them as unconditioned are not what is refuted here. They will only be refuted by analogy below under the unconditioned. Although these [schools] establish them as conditioned characteristics, they are not non-concurrent formations, because the proposition and conclusion in the text of the treatise solely refute non-concurrent formations. Some say that since they have already been refuted by others, they are not refuted here. I now say this is not so. It is not that because others have already refuted them, they are not refuted here; for all non-concurrent formations were already refuted by the Sautrāntikas, yet they are refuted again here. Or, although they are unconditioned, nevertheless they serve as characterizing marks; now the meaning of characterizing marks is refuted, and below the meaning of the unconditioned is refuted. Both sections being refuted does not conflict with principle either. What is spoken by śramaṇas of similar continuity—that the arising, staying, aging, and impermanence of material phenomena have materiality as their essence, up to the arising, staying, aging, and impermanence of consciousness phenomena having consciousness as their essence—is refuted by analogy below and not refuted separately. If it were not so, since the essence of matter and mind is just matter and mind, there would be the fault of proving what is already accepted. The Sautrāntika masters establish—according to what the *Vibhāṣā* says—the four characteristics of a single lifetime in common with the Mahāyāna. The Sarvāstivādin masters say: "They are solely characteristics of generic resemblance (sabhāgatā), not conditioned characteristics." This meaning says: the four characteristics of a single lifetime only serve as characterizing marks for generic resemblance, not characteristics of all conditioned phenomena, because all conditioned phenomena, moment by moment, possess all four characteristics; thus the Sarvāstivādins do not accept [it]. Basing oneself on the sūtras to establish the four characteristics of a single lifetime is not precluded according to conventional truth. The *Vibhāṣā*, fascicle 38, provides multiple alternate explanations; other aspects are as distinguished in various treatises.

3.3

Regarding the statement that "it is not the sixth case (genitive) that indicates a distinct substance, and so forth": The opponent establishes the inference: "The term 'characteristics of the conditioned'; definitely has a distinct substance; because there is the word of the sixth grammatical case; just like Devadatta's clothing, etc." According to this inference, there are three fallacies: First, the fallacy of contradiction with inference within the thesis (pratijñā-viruddha). The fallacy is stated: "The term 'characteristics of the conditioned'; does not definitely have a distinct substance; because there is the word of the sixth case; just like the solidity of earth, etc." The thesis does not say that it definitely has no distinct substance, but merely contradicts their assertion of definitely having a distinct substance; hence there is no fallacy of inconclusiveness (anaikāntika). Second, their inference has the fallacy of inconclusiveness, as can be understood from the text. Third, it also has the fallacy of contradiction with the essence of the locus (dharmisvarūpa-viparītasādhana). Does this inference not only establish a distinct substance, but also reveal that it is separate from that which is characterized and is a conditioned characterizing mark? If it is clothing or the like, it is not a conditioned characterizing mark, and therefore it becomes contradictory. Outside of these four characteristics, there is no other similar example (sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta). All the rest are not conditioned characteristics and thus become dissimilar instances (vaidharmya). Because the word of the sixth case applies to dissimilar instances, it is like the inferences establishing existence, non-existence, substance, quality, action, etc., in the *Nyāyapraveśa*.

3.4

The treatise says: "If the conditioned characteristics are distinct from the substance of that which is characterized, etc.": The inference states: "Your unconditioned characteristics; should exist separately from substance; because of the expression 'characteristics of [it]'; just like conditioned characteristics." However, someone explains: "This inference has the fallacy of inconclusiveness for the other (parānekānta). It says: for dissimilar instances such as solidity, the statement of 'characteristics of [it]' is an inconclusive fallacy." This also has no fault, because it resides in the thesis; for since they accept its existence, the general challenge forces it to have this distinct existence. Moreover, it says: "You have no fallacy of self-contradiction." The inference of Ximing states: "The substance of the unconditioned characteristic; should be distinct from that which is characterized; because it is subsumed under either the conditioned or the unconditioned; just like conditioned characteristics." Someone explains: "This inference has [the fallacy of the reason being] unestablished for both (ubhayāsiddha), because the reason 'subsumed under either the conditioned or the unconditioned' exists in that which is characterized, but is absent in the characterizing mark." This is also not so. The conditioned characterizing mark is conditioned, and the unconditioned characterizing mark is also unconditioned; how could the unconditioned characterizing mark be among the conditioned, so as to say it is absent in the characterizing mark? The Yaoji follows this by saying that this explanation is superior, and further refutes the other, saying: "The substance of your conditioned characteristics is not distinct from that which is characterized, or there should be no distinct real characteristics serving as characteristics; because it is subsumed under either conditioned or unconditioned characteristics; just like unconditioned characteristics." The Yaoji says: "Some say and some explain that solely for this inference, there is the fallacy of contradicting the property of the subject (dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana) in the reason of this inference." The inference states: "The substance of conditioned characteristics; should not be a designated non-concurrent formation; because it is subsumed under either the conditioned or the unconditioned; just like unconditioned characteristics." Hence, one should only refute them by analogy through principle, and should not formulate an inference—this statement is incorrect. Why is that? Because in setting up the thesis it says "the substance of your conditioned characteristics", which refutes the opponent's inference in terms of the opponent's own tenet and does not establish one's own [position]; how could it formulate a contradiction of the property of the subject against the author of the treatise? Furthermore, designated not being distinct from that which is characterized, real not being distinct from that which is characterized, having distinct real existence, and not having distinct real existence—these are distinctions. However, according to formulating a contradiction, it is a contradiction with the property of the subject (dharmiviśeṣa), so it should omit the word "having". If formulated as a contradiction with the property of the subject, it is a distinction. Moreover, even if it were so, the contradictory inference they establish would also have this fault, since real-existent non-concurrent and non-real-existent non-concurrent are the intended distinctions. Formulating the inference as real-existent non-concurrent, now one formulates a contradiction of the property of the subject against it. The inference states: "Your real conditioned characteristics; should not be real-existent non-concurrent formations; because they are subsumed under either the conditioned or the unconditioned; just like unconditioned characteristics." Therefore it cannot constitute a contradiction with the essence of the locus or a contradiction with the property of the subject; that is, it demonstrates that their setting up a distinct characterizing mark apart from the conditioned, like Yajñadatta's clothing and so forth, has the inference's decision of contradiction with the essence of the locus (dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana) and decision of contradiction with the property of the predicate (dharmaviśeṣaviparītasādhana). Furthermore, the faults are as before; thus what was said and explained is without fault.

3.5

Regarding the treatise's statement, "Furthermore, if the characteristics such as birth exist simultaneously in substance...", the original commentary says: First it refutes the ancient masters, whose characteristics and functions are sequential; then, from "duration, difference, and cessation" downwards, it refutes the new Sarvāstivādins, whose three characteristics and functions are simultaneous. The structural analysis of Ximing says: Both sections apply to both the new and the old. Some explain this by taking the former as correct. The Yaoji says: Taking Ximing's view is correct, because the text and meaning of the Mahāvibhāṣā contain two explanations. The first says that the times of their operation are different, which means the three characteristics are sequential. It also says that the Mahāvibhāṣā states that only at the time of cessation do decay and cessation have operation, and hence they are simultaneous. Now I say this is not so. Earlier it cited the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle 39, which says: It shows that a single moment possesses all three characteristics. Question: If so, should not a single dharma simultaneously undergo birth, decay, and cessation? [Answer:] Because the times of their operation are different, they are not contradictory. That is to say, when the dharma is being born, birth has operation; when it ceases, only then do decay and cessation have operation. Although their substances are simultaneous, their operations are sequential. This intention specifically answers that the operations of all three characteristics have sequence; it does not say separately that cessation and decay are simultaneous. The treatise states: In order to stop other schools and reveal the correct meaning—for just as the Dārṣṭāntikas hold that if there are three characteristics within a single moment, then a single dharma would at one time be born, decay, and cease. But there is no such principle, because they contradict one another. One should say that the initial arising of conditioned formations is called birth, their final exhaustion is called cessation, and their intermediate declining is called decay. In order to ward off that attachment, it reveals that a single moment possesses all three characteristics. Question: If it is like this, then should not a single dharma simultaneously be born, decay, and cease? Answer: Because the times of their operations are different, there is no contradiction. And up to: Although their substances are simultaneous, their operations have sequence. When the operations of birth and cessation of a single dharma are completed, that is called a single moment. Therefore, there is no error. Alternatively, the states of birth and cessation are not a single moment; however, a single moment possesses all three substances. Therefore, it is said that the three characteristics are in the same single moment. (Above is the text of the treatise.) When it says that only at the time of cessation do decay and cessation have operation, it is because decaying dharmas are only revealed at the time of cessation; hence it says that only at the time of cessation do decay and cessation have operation. Therefore, the concluding summary below states: Although their substances are simultaneous, their operations have sequence. Furthermore, it does not state that duration and cessation are simultaneous; therefore, we know that the ancient masters held that characteristics and functions are sequential. One should not divide it into two explanations, because there is no difference in the text. Furthermore, the fifth fascicle of the Kośa, in refuting the Sarvāstivādins, says: Furthermore, if the operations of the three such as duration are all present at once, then a single dharma-substance within a single moment would have abiding, decaying difference, and destructing cessation. At the time when the characteristic of duration can make this dharma abide, is it called abiding, is it called decaying difference, or is it called destructing cessation? Those who say that the operations of duration and the others are not simultaneous—their statement contradicts the doctrine of momentary cessation. Since the others themselves speak of the characteristics and operations having sequence, the objection is framed in terms of simultaneity. For the ancient Sarvāstivādins, there is an objection of proving what is already accepted (siddhasādhana); for the new Sarvāstivādins, if characteristics and operations have sequence, it is likewise proving what is already accepted. Therefore, relying on the original commentary is correct.

3.6

Regarding the treatise's statement, "The causes and conditions that are depended upon would not be originally existent": The commentary answers the external objection: An insubstantial and sparse dharma, although it presently has seeds, cannot arise without external conditions because it is weak and inferior. How can your real dharma be compared with it? The Yaoji says: This explanation does not fully exhaust the reasoning. I now say that although the substance of seeds is constant, the causes and conditions depended upon were originally non-existent and now exist; turning and revolving boundlessly, they are not constantly complete, and therefore they do not constantly arise. Hence the Yogācārabhūmi, fascicle 51, says: Although conditioned formations have their distinct productive causes, they must nevertheless depend upon conditions before they can grow and develop, and so forth, up to: therefore this. The treatise says: Unlike the tīrthikas, because the conditions are not constantly absent, things do not arise all at once. If one takes this explanation now, it is no different from the original text in needing to wait further for external conditions. External conditions are those outside the direct seed. When the external conditions have not converged, things cannot arise; that is, because the conditions do not constantly exist, this is just the preceding cause. Why labor to state it separately? Now let us raise a further objection: Just as for me, outside consciousness, when external conditions are incomplete, things do not arise all at once; in the Mahāyāna, where there is only one's own mind, does it not rely on dharmas outside consciousness to arise all at once? Answer: The direct cognitive object is only one's own consciousness; saying 'mind-only' means that one cannot cognize what is external. It is not that there are no other sentient beings as empowering conditions; when these external factors are incomplete, there is no sudden arising. The outsider rescues again, saying: Although your seeds presently exist, being insubstantial and sparse they depend on nominal conditions. My dharma-substances are real existents; they still depend on real external conditions. If so, then postulating the two births is entirely useless.

3.7

Regarding the treatise's statement, "The entity that possesses the characteristics constantly exists, yet birth and the others combine with it": Question: What difference in reasoning is there between this refutation and the previous one? Answer: Previously, because their school does not establish distinct characterizing marks apart from the unconditioned, we analogously refuted the conditioned, not allowing them to establish them separately. Now, because they hold that the substance of the conditioned constantly exists, and say that birth and the others combine with it, we analogously argue that since the substance of the unconditioned likewise constantly exists, birth and the others should also combine with it. Therefore, the two passages are different. The Kośa says: If it is identical to the preceding, difference is not established; if it is different from the preceding, it is not a single dharma. If the differentiated dharma is just that which previously abided by duration, the meaning of difference is not established. If it is not what previously abided, but a distinct dharma, then it is not a single dharma.

3.8

Regarding the treatise's statement, "What fault is there in having it indicate the subsequent non-existence of this as its characteristic?": The original commentary says: It is precisely the present dharma, at the subsequent time of its non-existence, that is designated as 'cessation'; conventionally spoken of as past, the past has no substantial substance, and is not really that time-period.

3.9

The Ximing commentary explains: The characteristic of cessation is nominal, subsumed under the saṃskāra-skandha. As a designation, it relies on a present reality, but in reality it resides in the past. If one speaks of it as present, it would rely on a different time-period; this means the characteristic of cessation. The treatise says that the last one is non-existence, so it is the past. If one speaks of it as relying on the present, it would be mutual dependence across different time-periods. He answers his own objection, saying: If it relies on the past, then it would lack a locus of reliance. He answers: Just as in a formal inference, when establishing that a property is non-existent, that reason, though relying on non-existence, can also be established. It is not like an existent inference, where the reason must have an existent basis. The characteristic of cessation is non-existent; what fault is there in relying on non-existence?

3.10

Some explain by taking the former, original commentary as correct: although the latter explanation avoids relying across different time-periods, it involves indicating across different time-periods; furthermore, what has already ceased is non-existent, like the hair of a tortoise, and is not conditioned. The intention of the Yaoji takes the latter explanation as correct: Fascicle 52 says: Based on the state of having arisen and then disintegrated, impermanence is established. Fascicle 46 also says: Based on the existent division, one type of conditioned characteristic is established; based on the non-existent division, one type of conditioned characteristic is established. Furthermore, this treatise says: The time of non-existence is called cessation. As for the temporal states spoken of here, one cannot speak of an existent state at a time of non-existence, nor can one speak of a non-existent state at a time of existence. By this we may infer that based on the state of having already ceased, the past is established; and there is much more discussion. I now say that what the original commentary states is correct. Why? For when the treatises establish time-periods, time-periods are established based on dharmas. Although they speak of the past and future, the past and future lack substance and still rely on present dharmas. Contemplating what has been and what will be, the past and future time-periods are established. The characteristic of cessation is in the past; since the past is nominally established based on present dharmas, the characteristic of cessation, in true principle, relies on the present. Therefore, the first fascicle of the Buddhabhūmi-śāstra states: A state nominally established upon conditioned dharmas, or an image of a state upon the mind; the time spoken of here pervades the three time-periods, but it is only upon the present that the three are nominally established.

3.11

The second fascicle of the Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā says: Time refers to the conventional designation of time upon the continuous transmigration of cause and effect. The third fascicle also says: Relying upon the present, the past and future are nominally established; therefore, with respect to what is to be attained, the future is nominally established, and with respect to what has been attained, the past is nominally established. Furthermore, this treatise says: It indicates the subsequent non-existence of this. It also says: Cessation indicates that the existent dharma is subsequently non-existent. If one does not rely on present dharmas to observe the meaning of having previously existed, but solely takes the non-existence of the dharma to have already established the past time-period and the characteristic of cessation: since the treatise says that the time of non-existence is called cessation, and the past is truly non-existent, then both the characteristic of cessation and the time-period would be real existents; how could they be called nominal designations? Furthermore, how could it say that it indicates the subsequent non-existence of this? It should say that it indicates that the preceding dharma is already non-existent. Moreover, this contradicts the third fascicle of the Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā, where relying on the present, the three time-periods are nominally established; that is formulated with respect to the causes and effects of dharmas, past and future, pervading everything. Furthermore, the first fascicle of the Prakaraṇāryavācā says: Mind-non-associated dharmas cannot be designated as either identical to or different from dharmas such as mind. Since the characteristic of cessation is established based on past non-existence, differing in both time and substance from present dharmas, how could it not be designated as different? Furthermore, if it were solely non-existent, why does fascicle 52 ask: As the World-Honored One said, past formations exist... up to: what is the esoteric intention of this? Answer: Past formations exist because they bestow fruition; future formations exist because they assimilate causes. If it were not so, since the substances of past and future are non-existent, how could one say they bestow fruition and assimilate causes? Therefore, relying on present dharmas, which bestow fruition and assimilate causes, the past and future are nominally designated. Moreover, how could it be said: among the aggregates, one observes arising and cessation as they occur? Cessation relies on the past, the past is non-existent, and non-existence is not an aggregate-dharma.

3.12

Question: Since the past is nominally established relying on present dharmas, how can it be said that the time of non-existence is called cessation? Furthermore, fascicle 46 says: Past formations have already arisen and already ceased; because for those formations no cause can be obtained, nor is there any intrinsic nature. It also says: It is precisely the intrinsic nature of these moments of already-arisen formations disintegrating that is correctly contemplated as cessation.

3.13

Answer: It is precisely contemplating that the present dharma has the mark of recompensing what precedes it. Nominally speaking of the past cause, it is called the past; it is called already arisen, with its intrinsic nature disintegrated. It is not that in the absence of present dharmas one speaks of the past in isolation. Therefore fascicle 52 says: If seeds that have already bestowed fruition continue in succession, that is called the past realm. Since it calls the succession of seeds the past realm, this clarifies that the substance of the seeds is not what has already ceased.

3.14

Question: When a present dharma has not yet ceased, how can cessation be established? Furthermore, can all active dharmas lack the characteristic of cessation?

3.15

Answer: For now, it is based on seeds to reveal the past dhātu, which implicitly illuminates the present, just as seeds that have not yet given their fruit and continue in series are called the present dhātu; it is not that seeds alone are uniquely called the present. This is because, as with the eighteen dhātus, they pertain to all three times. Or it may be that only seeds are mentioned because they continuously proceed in series, and being causes, their realm is prominent. Or again, actual dharmas (samudācāra) may also be termed 'seeds' because they can produce fruit. This is just as in the eighth assembly [of the treatise], where there is mention of seeds in terms of the ten causes and the two causes; therefore, in reality, both seeds and actual dharmas possess the characteristic of cessation. Because by observing a present dharma there is a function that repays what came before, one metaphorically speaks of a past cessation; hence it is said that the characteristic of cessation resides in the past time. For only after a dharma has passed away does the characteristic of cessation become manifest. In reality, with respect to the present, because there is an impending cessation, it is also designated as cessation. This is just as the text of the treatise states: it is metaphorically established to indicate that this [dharma] will not exist afterward. The characteristic of cessation is just like the suffering of change (vipariṇāma-duḥkhatā), which exists only when pleasure ceases; yet pleasurable sensation is also called the suffering of change, meaning it is suffering when it changes—the present dharma is also like this. Because it must inevitably cease, the reason it is said to belong to the past is that at that time it is manifest, to differentiate it from other schools, and because it is distinguished according to time. Therefore, fascicle fifty-two states: 'Why did the World-Honoured One teach only three kinds: first, arising; second, cessation; and third, duration-and-alteration?' Answer: 'Because all conditioned phenomena are manifested by the three times: from the future time, being originally nonexistent, they arise. Therefore, based on the future time, the World-Honoured One taught the conditioned characteristic of arising with respect to conditioned dharmas; and so on, up to: based on the past time, he taught the conditioned characteristic of cessation with respect to conditioned dharmas. Dharmas of the present time are manifested by two characteristics, namely duration and alteration.' Since duration and alteration are established in the present, it is clear that arising is in the future and cessation is in the past, distinguishing them according to the meaning of the times. In reality, according to metaphorical sense, they can pertain to all three times. Otherwise, the four characteristics would not pervade conditioned phenomena, and being nonexistent in the present and future, cessation would not be impermanence. Fascicle fifty-two states: 'Furthermore, the distinctions of impermanence are also manifold, namely: impermanence of destruction and cessation, impermanence of origination, impermanence of transformation, impermanence of dispersion and destruction, impermanence of future existence, and impermanence of present occurrence. If all conditioned phenomena, having arisen, immediately cease, this is called the impermanence of destruction and cessation. What was originally nonexistent and now exists is called the impermanence of origination. The arising of conditioned phenomena with differentiated characteristics is called the impermanence of transformation. Dispersion and falling away is called the impermanence of dispersion and destruction. These are the four impermanences. When in the future, it is called the impermanence of future existence. When directly present, it is called the impermanence of present occurrence.' Following this, we know that they can pertain to all three times, because it re-explains the distinctions among the preceding four characteristics. Furthermore, it is explained as only present because there are no separate past and future, and the three are established based on the present. Although in reality based on the present, in meaning they pertain to all three times, so there is no fault of lack of pervasion.

3.16

However, 'due to the power of causes and conditions, conditioned dharmas...' below sets forth the correct view. Following the text, there are five gates of analysis: 1. the intention in explaining the characteristics; 2. the nature and features of the characteristics, which also analyzes their names; 3. distinguishing them according to the times; 4. resolving difficulties; 5. revealing distinctions. The sectional division is as in the Commentary; now I add the identification of their essence. The identification of their essence has two parts. First, analyzing the other schools: The Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle thirty-eight, states: 'As the Dārṣṭāntikas say, conditioned characteristics are subsumed under the aggregate of formations not associated with mind (citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra-skandha), and the aggregate of formations not associated with mind has no real entity; therefore, conditioned characteristics are not really existent entities.' However, the later Sautrāntikas do not separately state that they are within the unassociated formations. The Vibhajyavādins say: 'Conditioned characteristics are all unconditioned; if they were conditioned, their nature would be weak and inferior, and they would not be able to produce dharmas, sustain dharmas, alter dharmas, or cease dharmas. Because the conditioned characteristics are in their essence unconditioned and their nature is powerful, they can produce dharmas, and so on up to cease dharmas.'

3.17

The Dharmaguptaka school says: 'Three characteristics are conditioned, and the characteristic of cessation is unconditioned. If the characteristic of impermanence were conditioned in essence, its nature would be weak and inferior, and it could not cease dharmas; because it is unconditioned and its nature is powerful, it can cease dharmas.' What the Śramaṇas of the similar continuity say: 'The arising, duration, aging, and impermanence of material dharmas are in essence still matter; and so on up to consciousness dharmas as well.' This meaning is that the four characteristics are not different from matter and so forth; following the essence of the five aggregates, the characteristics are subsumed under them, and are not unassociated formations.

3.18

The Sautrāntika masters say: 'When the five aggregates emerge from the womb, it is called arising; when they continue in series, it is called duration; when they decline and change, it is called alteration; when life ends, it is called cessation.' However, the Mahāvibhāṣā says that what they describe is merely the characteristic of generic similarity (nikāya-sabhāga) and not conditioned characteristics. This meaning says that these four characteristics are established solely upon the generic similarity of sentient beings and do not pervade all conditioned phenomena. Because the Sautrāntika masters do not accept the establishment of duration in a single-instant dharma; the utmost limit of time is called an instant (kṣaṇa). Because dharmas are momentary, according to the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya, fascicle five, the Sautrāntikas also establish the four characteristics within a single instant. That treatise states: 'Furthermore, with respect to all conditioned dharmas of a single instant, apart from grasping them as real entities, the four characteristics are also accomplished. That is, in every single moment, what was originally nonexistent and now exists is called arising; having existed and then becoming nonexistent again is called cessation; subsequent instants arising in succession to the preceding ones is called duration; and because there is a difference between the preceding and the subsequent, it is called duration-alteration.' This meaning is that the arising of an essence that was originally nonexistent and now exists is called arising; the state of nonexistence when what existed has returned to nonexistence is called cessation; the ability to induce subsequent instants to arise in succession to the preceding ones is called duration; and that very characteristic of duration, because it has a difference either with the preceding moment or with the subsequent moment, is called duration-alteration. Because alteration is analyzed with respect to duration, it is called duration-alteration. Although metaphorically established, they are not separate from what is characterized. Fascicle five of the Abhidharmakośa says: 'Here, what need is there for separate entities such as arising?' Also, just as the marks of a Great Man are not different from the Great Man, and just as the characteristics of hardness and so on belonging to the earth element and so on are not different from earth and so on, therefore, although metaphorically established, they are not separate from what is characterized. The Sarvāstivādins say: 'Separate from the dharmas characterized, they have distinct, real entities, and are subsumed under the aggregate of formations not associated with mind.' This concludes the analysis of the Hīnayāna. What is explained in the Mahāyāna is that the four characteristics are metaphorically existent, are neither identical to nor different from the dharmas characterized, and are subsumed under the aggregate of formations not associated with mind. This principle is thoroughly established, so no citations are adduced.

3.19

Second, concerning the intention in explaining them: First, analyzing the Hīnayāna. The Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle thirty-nine, states: 'Question: Why was this treatise composed? Answer: In order to analyze the meaning of the sūtras. Furthermore, in order to refute other schools and reveal the correct doctrine. Furthermore, in order to mark and distinguish conditioned phenomena, they are called conditioned characteristics.' Although this explains the reason for teaching three in the sūtras, it also explains the intention behind the characteristics. In reality there are four characteristics, but the sūtras mention three. To explain the meaning of this sūtra there are many alternatives, which also explain the intention behind the characteristics, as briefly analyzed in the Commentary. Next, revealing the Mahāyāna: According to the Prakaraṇāryavācā, fascicle eighteen, characteristics and so forth are taught in order to give rise to discourse subordinated to a principal referent. Thus that treatise states: 'Discourse subordinated to a principal referent means that discourse must be subordinated to a principal referent before its characteristic can be understood, and cannot be without subordination to a principal referent. As when speaking of the characteristic of arising: whose arising is this? Looking to the subordinate principal, one gives rise to this discourse, namely, the arising of matter, the arising of sensation, perception, formations, and consciousness; this is not like when speaking of matter: whose matter is this? Looking to the subordinate principal, one gives rise to this discourse. As it is with arising, so it is with duration, alteration, impermanence, and other formations not associated with mind; their categories should all be understood according to their proper application; this is called discourse subordinated to a principal referent.' In the Yogācārabhūmi, fascicle forty-six, there are many alternatives: 1. to cause the contemplation of impermanence; 2. to contemplate conditioned phenomena as suffering; 3. to know the selflessness of dharmas; 4. to cause the realization of nirvāṇa. These are explained extensively there. The Abhidharmasamuccaya speaks of contemplating arising, aging, and duration, and its intention is also the same as this. If this treatise metaphorically establishes the four characteristics to distinguish them from the unconditioned, its intention is also the same as that: contemplating impermanence, realizing nirvāṇa, and so on; the features are as in the text.

3.20

Regarding their distribution among the times: the Hīnayāna is as usual; the Mahāyāna has many explanations. One explanation is that three characteristics are present and one characteristic is past. As in this text: because the latter one is nonexistent, it is in the past; this is according to two times, agreeing with the explanation in fascicle fifty-two of the Yogācārabhūmi. Or according to a single time: the treatise says, 'Arising indicates that an existent dharma was previously nonexistent; cessation indicates that an existent dharma is nonexistent afterward.' Since it indicates nonexistence afterward, it is in the present. Otherwise, it should say that cessation indicates that an existent dharma is nonexistent after having arisen. If following the first explanation, it should say that it indicates that after arising, its essence immediately returns to nonexistence, not that cessation is established in the present to indicate that it is nonexistent afterward. Either of the two explanations may be accepted; their intended meaning is as before. Furthermore, fascicle fifty-two reveals them in terms of the three times: the treatise says, 'Because all conditioned phenomena are manifested by the three times: from the future time, being originally nonexistent, they arise. Therefore, based on the future time, the World-Honoured One taught the conditioned characteristic of arising with respect to conditioned dharmas. Having arisen, they pass away into the past. Therefore, based on the past time, the World-Honoured One taught the conditioned characteristic of cessation with respect to conditioned dharmas. Dharmas of the present time are manifested by two characteristics, namely duration and alteration. Why is this? Only in the present time can duration be apprehended; and alteration between earlier and later is also only in the present.' According to the intent of this treatise, since only duration and alteration exist in the present, it is clear that arising is in the future and cessation resides in the past; this is also a provisional explanation, and in principle there is no contradiction. Or again, all four characteristics can pertain to the three times: although there is no complete text stating that they pertain to all three times, by drawing mutual analogies based on before and after, in principle they can pertain to them. Distinguished by the three times, arising is in the future; distinguished by the instant, arising is in the present; distinguished by differentiated categories, it also pertains to the future. Fascicle fifty-two states: 'If spoken of in terms of arising belonging to the realm of existence, from the desire realm up to the base of nothingness, arising is called unsurpassable arising.' Although this intention speaks of present dharmas of arising having superior ones above them—just as conditioned dharmas are called surpassable—the implicit meaning also reveals that in the future there are further superior dharmas that will arise, which is called unsurpassable arising. Among impermanences, fascicle fifty-two states: 'Impermanence of destruction and cessation; impermanence of origination; impermanence of transformation; impermanence of dispersion and destruction; impermanence of future existence; impermanence of present occurrence. If all conditioned phenomena, having arisen, immediately cease, this is called the impermanence of destruction and cessation. If all conditioned phenomena, originally nonexistent, now exist, this is called the impermanence of origination. Impermanence of future existence refers to when the four impermanences are in the future time; it is called the impermanence of future existence.' In this text, in order, the three times of past, present, and future are the three impermanences. In the text on duration and alteration, because of implicit abbreviation, the treatise text does not mention them. This treatise comprehensively clarifies the four characteristics of arising and so on, metaphorically establishing the four characteristics as pervading the sentient and non-sentient, the momentary and the continuous.

3.21

Resolving difficulties is as in the treatise. External objection: 'The essence of the past is nonexistent, yet you establish the characteristic of cessation in the past time; the essence of the future is also nonexistent, so should you also establish a characteristic in the future time?' Answer: 'The essence of the past was once existent; on the basis of having once existed, the characteristic of cessation is established. The essence of the future was originally nonexistent; in the future no characteristic is established.' Further objection: 'The past once existed, and on the basis of having once existed a characteristic is established; the future will exist, so on the basis of what will exist should a characteristic be established?' Answer: 'The essence of the characteristic of cessation is nonexistent; based on the nonexistence of what has already ceased, a characteristic of nonexistence is established. The essence of arising and so forth is existent; since the essence of the future is nonexistent, no characteristic is established.' Further objection: 'It indicates that a dharma is nonexistent afterward, so based on nonexistence the characteristic of cessation is established; it indicates that a dharma will exist afterward, so should the characteristic of arising be established in the future?' Answer: 'Indicating that a dharma is nonexistent afterward, one may establish a characteristic of nonexistence based on nonexistence; indicating that a dharma is existent afterward, one cannot establish a characteristic of existence based on nonexistence.' There are further difficulties, which are omitted and cannot all be raised.

3.22

Revealing distinctions: The Sautrāntikas establish two kinds, namely momentary and lifetime. The Sarvāstivādins do likewise. The Sthavira, Mahīśāsaka, and Saṃmatīya schools are as explained in the Essentials (Shuyao).

3.23

Explaining according to the Mahāyāna, there are many distinctions.

3.24

First, the distinction between permanence and impermanence: regarding intrinsic nature, they are impermanent, but in conforming to their underlying nature, they are permanent; when phenomena are subsumed into the nature, they are permanent, while when examining characteristics and functions separately, they are impermanent. Therefore, the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, fascicle twenty-two, states: "Good son, conditioned dharmas: arising is also permanent, yet because abiding is impermanent, arising is also impermanent. Abiding is also permanent, yet because arising arises, abiding is also impermanent. Change is also permanent, yet because abiding is impermanent, change is also impermanent. Destruction is also permanent, yet because there is existing now what was previously non-existent, destruction is also impermanent."

3.25

Second, the distinction between the imagined and dependent natures: if it is the imagined nature, its substance is like an illusory sky-flower and cannot be said to serve as the characteristics of the conditioned; the same applies to permanence and impermanence. If it is the dependent nature, because it exists depending on conditions, it is an impermanent characteristic. Therefore, the Madhyamakaśāstra, Chapter One on the Three Characteristics, states: "Are these three characteristics conditioned, being able to serve as the characteristics of the conditioned; or are they unconditioned, being able to serve as the characteristics of the conditioned? Neither is admissible. Why? If arising were conditioned, it would possess the three characteristics; if arising were unconditioned, how could it be called a characteristic of the conditioned, and so forth?"

3.26

Third, the distinction of substance and type, as stated in [Yogācārabhūmi] fascicle fifty-two: "Furthermore, the distinctions of arising are: momentary arising, continuous arising, augmented arising, distinct mental arising, undesirable arising, desirable arising, inferior arising, middling arising, superior arising, surpassable arising, and unsurpassable arising."

3.27

The distinctions of aging are: bodily aging, mental aging, aging of lifespan, deteriorating aging, and intrinsic transforming aging. The distinctions of abiding are: momentary abiding, continuous abiding, condition-continuous abiding, non-distracted abiding, and established norm abiding. The distinctions of impermanence are as listed immediately before; furthermore, there are momentary, single-period, kalpa-enduring, and saṃsāra-exhausting [impermanence]. As explained under "clarifying distinctions," it can be understood by consulting the text; these are the four distinctions in terms of time periods.

3.28

Fifth, identical names with distinct substances: for instance, the links of birth, aging, and death in conditioned origination, and the touches of birth, aging, and death among the touches, and so forth. How are they distinguished? Answer: birth as a link of conditioned origination refers to the real substance of the five aggregates from the intermediate existence until the basic existence prior to decline and transformation, which is termed the link of birth. Aging refers to grey hair or decrepitude prior to death. Death refers to approaching the end—both the time of impending death and actual death. Both encompass the five aggregates, having real dharmas as their substance, and the links of conditioned origination are manifested by their characteristic names. Conceptual and real states have different distinctions: although the states of the four characteristics of a single period may be identical, the conceptual and real are distinct. Furthermore, destruction in a single period refers to what has already ceased being called death; while death as a link of conditioned origination refers to impending death and actual death, because what has already ceased is not a link. Regarding aging and death among touches, fascicle fifty-four states: "Aging is established based on the disharmony of temporal transformation; death is established based on the disharmony of the vital faculty's transformation." The meaning here is that aging and death are effects; because aging and death exist based on the states of touch, the name of the effect is established on the cause. For example, the substance of the touch of hunger and thirst is nominally established on states of the four great elements and exists only in the form aggregate. The aging and death of the four characteristics generally rely on the five aggregates. Taking the distinctive meaning above, in the four udānas, the substance of the five aggregates and the four characteristics are both generally called impermanent, because they lack that permanence. Fascicle forty-six states: "Because permanence is unobtainable in these conditioned formations, they are called impermanent," which accords with the Abhidharmasamuccaya. Sūtras also state: conditioned formations are impermanent, for they are of the nature of arising and ceasing. The impermanence established in treatises on pramāṇa refers solely to cessation, yet it encompasses both substance and characteristic. The Sāṃkhya holds characteristic cessation; against the Śabdavādin and others, they establish substantial cessation. If impermanence encompassed both arising and ceasing, then thesis and reason would not be distinct, which would fall under the fallacy of analogy.

3.29

Sixth, identical substance with distinct names: they are either called arising, abiding, changing, and ceasing; or called arising, aging, abiding, and impermanence; or called arising, abiding, abiding-changing, and impermanence; or called origination and dissolution, and so forth.

3.30

Seventh, the distinction between pervasive and non-pervasive: the four characteristics of a single period are explained in terms of sentient beings; the momentary four characteristics pervade all conditioned dharmas. Fascicle eighty-eight states: "These three characteristics are established in their transmigration based on two kinds of conditioned processes: first, based on the physical body; second, based on the moment. Regarding what is based on the first transmigration: in the respective nikāya-sabhāga of sentient beings, the initial birth is called arising, the final demise is called ceasing, and so forth."

3.31

In refuting name, phrase, and phoneme, it says: if name, phrase, and phoneme were substantially existent apart from sound, this refutes the non-Buddhist position. The Yaoji hypothetically sets forth the opponent's counter-objection: "Should the nominal, non-concurrent name and so forth not be expressors, because they are nominal?" Or: "Do you accept that, apart from the sound āyatana, they are subsumed under the dharma āyatana of non-concurrent nominal dharmas, like other nominal dharmas?" Ximing explained: "Your name, phrase, and so forth cannot be established as real substances, as refuted previously. If one does not accept that sound is an expressor, there would be the fault of lacking the pramāṇa of authoritative testimony among the pramāṇas." This explanation is inadmissible, because it was not refuted previously. Furthermore, the opinions of Mahāyāna masters differ: Dignāga did not establish the pramāṇa of authoritative testimony, because others accept it as real. The Yaoji states: "The opponent constructed an inference with contradiction, yet that inference incurs the fault of establishing what is already accepted by the thesis." We now say this is not so. If the inference stated "not real expressors," there could be the fault of establishing what is already accepted; but it merely states "not expressors." How could that be called establishing what is already accepted? We now say: that inference has the fault of contradictory decisiveness in the reason, because nominal and real as reasons, as well as being subsumed under the dharma āyatana apart from the sound āyatana, are mutually accepted by each side, so there is no fault for the Mahāyāna. If the opponent says that nominal name, phrase, and phoneme are not nominal expressors and regards this as a contradiction, this is also not a fault. Why? The Mahāyāna inference refutes them, saying: "Your name, phrase, and phoneme are definitively incapable of expressing; because they are distinct from sound; like form and so forth." Now, if one constructs an inference against the Mahāyāna stating: "Nominal name, phrase, and phoneme are not nominal expressors," among the contradictions in pramāṇa, what kind of contradiction is it? With respect to the Mahāyāna inference, it is entirely without fault. Moreover, because Mahāyāna names and so forth are not distinct from sound, subsuming the nominal under the real, sound is indeed the expressor. If the opponent objects that it cannot express, that contradicts worldly convention. Therefore, the text below states: "Speech is not distinct from expressors, as is commonly understood by gods and humans."

First 31 of 91 passages. Read on

Linked texts (1)

成唯識論了義燈 — Classical Chinese