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成唯識論了義燈 4.24

English (machine translation) 4.24

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English

4.24

The treatise says: "Because manas and the mental consciousness are subsumed under the evolving consciousnesses," and so forth. In this inference, since it was previously established that the sixth [consciousness] has a distinct co-existent support, there would seem to be the fallacy of inconclusiveness. Explanation: That is not so. Because one oneself admits that the seventh has a distinct supporting faculty, there is no fallacy of inconclusiveness; to eliminate the doubts of others, one establishes that the seventh has a distinct co-existent support, and the formulation of the inference can be known. This inference might seem to have the fallacy of an unestablished subject. Answer: Previously establishing that the sixth has a distinct supporting faculty means the manas faculty; the manas faculty is precisely the seventh, so it is free of this fault. The Yaoji says: "Establishing the sixth was addressed to the Hīnayāna, while establishing the seventh was addressed to the Mahāyāna; therefore the subject is established." Now I say that this is not so. If one does not establish for the Hīnayāna that the seventh has a support, how could one repel the fallacy of inconclusiveness raised by others? Therefore it is also addressed to the Hīnayāna. Some say: The inference has the fallacy of contradiction with the specific property of the subject (dharmi-svarūpa-viparīta-sādhana), saying: "The seventh does not take the eighth as its distinct co-existent support, because it is subsumed under the evolving consciousnesses, like the eye consciousness and so forth." This too is not so. The other party admits that the supports of the five consciousnesses are each distinct and not merely one. If it were not so, whenever one adduced an inference for any one of the well-established five consciousnesses, there would be the fallacy of contradiction with the specific property of the subject, because the other supports are not this support. Some formulate a contrary inference, saying: "It does not take the eighth as its distinct support, because it is not itself a maturation." If that were so, the five consciousnesses would also share this fault, because they are not solely maturations. The Yaoji formulates an inconclusive balance (viruddhāvyabhicārin), saying: "The seventh must take the eighth as its distinct co-existent support, because it is subsumed under constantly functioning mental factors and is not a consciousness, like the five mental factors of the eighth." This too is not so. An inconclusive balance is possible only when both the reason and the example are accepted by both parties. If addressed to the Hīnayāna, the eighth is non-existent for the other, so how could it constitute an inconclusive balance? Moreover, it is also named "mental consciousness" by karmadhāraya compound; furthermore, citta, manas, and vijñāna are also general names for all eight; now to say "it is not a consciousness" means that it is an unestablished reason, which should be differentiated as before.

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