成唯識論了義燈 4

English (machine translation) 4

Language: English

4.1

Composed by the Bhikṣu Huizhao of Dayun Monastery in Zizhou

The treatise says: "Contact means the harmony of the three, discriminating transformation, and so forth," differentiating its essence and its activity. Question: Why is it that for the principal mind, only its nature and mode of activity (ākāra) are distinguished without stating its activity, whereas for the mental factors, their activity and nature are distinguished without stating their mode of activity? Answer: They mutually reflect each other, or it has already been briefly explained, hence it is not stated now. The earlier second fascicle says: "Consciousness, sensation, conceptualization, and so forth, because their modes of activity such as discerning and apprehending are each distinct." That which sensation and the rest rely upon is stated as the activity of contact, which also reflects that consciousness, as the basis for the rest, is precisely the activity of consciousness. Question: Mental dharmas and mental factors are subtle, hidden, and difficult to know; their own entity is revealed either through their function or through their mode of activity. What distinction is there between function and mode of activity? Answer: The mode of activity reveals its function of taking an object for itself; the function reveals its function of serving as a basis for others. However, the principal mind mostly reveals its own entity through its own mode of activity, whereas the mental factors are not uniform. Attention alerts the mind, and volition causes it to act—these are not functions of cognizing objects; sensation apprehends what is agreeable or disagreeable, and conceptualization grasps the image of the object—these are functions of cognizing. Explaining the mode of activity of consciousness: it is discernment, and discernment is subsumed under the seeing aspect (darśanabhāga). The first fascicle says: "Consciousness means discernment," which reveals its own entity through its mode of activity. The third fascicle cites "the realm from beginningless time," and so forth, which reveals its function as a causal condition for others, that is, revealing its own entity through function. The treatise says: "Therefore it is displayed through function." Question: If discernment reveals the self, why are contact and the rest also called discernment? Below, the fifth fascicle says: "Attention discerns marks of this that have not yet been discerned," and so forth. Answer: The single word "discernment" each reveals its own [aspect]; what contradiction is there in this? If not, it would contradict what was said earlier in the second fascicle. That says: "Because their modes of activity such as discerning and apprehending are each distinct." Answer: "Discernment" has two senses. First, cognizing an object is called discernment, which is common to both mind and mental factors. Second, the mode of activity of discernment belongs not to the mental factors, but only to the principal mind; and as for attention and the rest being called "discerning," this refers to cognizing an object as discernment, not discernment as the mode of activity. Or, there are simple and compound terms: the simple word "discern" is common to both the principal mind and mental factors, whereas the compound word "discernment" is not for the mental factors, but only for the principal mind. When consciousness was previously spoken of merely as "discern," it was because the verse was condensed and omitted the second character; only later when explaining it does it say that to discern means discernment. Or, speaking generally of cognizing, both mind and mental factors discern; when differentiating the mode of activity, discernment is not a mental factor. Question: Why do mind and mental factors take either the discernment of objects or other functions to reveal their own natures? Answer: The treatise author's intent simply takes up one kind, or does so to clarify it; it cannot be uniformly standardized. Question: Both take up function to reveal nature and activity; what is the difference between the two functions? Answer: Some say: Direct function reveals nature, indirect function reveals activity; near and far, internal and external, self and other are also like this. The Yaoji says: "Functions are of two kinds: first, exclusively for oneself; second, common to others. Exclusively for oneself reveals nature, and common to others reveals activity." We now hold that this is not fixed. Just as the function of contact favorably engenders mental factors to reveal one's own consciousness, it can also resemble sense faculties and objects in favorably engendering, which is common to others. Although this is entirely the nature of contact, it tentatively takes up harmony to make them contact objects together, as the nature of contact. It does not mean that the harmony of the three and discriminating transformation are not the nature of contact, for it is precisely through these that the nature is clarified. Attention directs the mind, causing it to proceed toward the object; this is exclusively for oneself, taking up one to illustrate the rest. If it is said to be spoken based on mental factors, how could there be no qualification? Furthermore, as for revealing activity through what is common to others, the fault has not yet been avoided; following the majority, it may be permissible. Ximing says: "Discernment extends across the mode of activity and is present in both mind and mental factors, as stated in the fifth fascicle." We now hold that this is not so. If it were identical with discernment, why would it subsequently refute the third master by saying: "Lest the five such as contact should also be able to discern"? Therefore, we know that discernment is not a common mode of activity, and it should be interpreted as explained before. Question: Contact resembles the three in favorably engendering, and resembling them is the nature of contact; then also, any fruit resembling its cause should all be the nature of contact. If not, how could one refute the other by saying: The fruit resembling its cause should all be the nature of sensation? Answer: It is not merely apprehending resemblance that is called the nature of contact; it has other functions besides. That [other master] claims that merely resembling the cause is the nature of sensation, which is why this refutation was made. Question: "Contact means the harmony of the three"—this takes its name from cause and fruit. "Discriminating transformation" is the designation for being able to apprehend resemblance. This differentiates the name. "Contacting the object as its nature" should be the beginning of revealing its entity. Is it now solely revealing the entity, or is it distinguishing both name and entity? Answer: Although it seems like an explanation of the name, it properly only reveals the nature. Or it concurrently distinguishes the name, taking the entity by investigating the name, which is why both are distinguished. However, according to the treatise's intent, it properly distinguishes the entity; taking both through reasoning also does not conflict. Question: For the sixth and eighth consciousnesses, the object and faculty are distinct, so they can be said to arise from the harmony of the three. For the seventh, faculty and object are identical, so it should arise from the harmony of two. One says: It may be so. A second says: The meanings of faculty and object are different, so it also arises from the harmony of three. Furthermore, speaking in terms of what is universally established, it arises from the harmony of three; based on its great non-shared nature, it also arises from the harmony of two. Question: Contact arises dependent on the harmony of three, and from that is named "the harmony of three." Consciousness and sensation arise from two and four; should they be named "the harmony of two" and "the harmony of four"? Answer: There are two explanations. One says: Contact also harmonizes them, whereas the others do not harmonize them, hence they do not receive the name. A second says: They could also receive it. Question: Consciousness arises from the harmony of two and can be named the harmony of two. Consciousness arises from attention; should it be named alerting? Answer: Consciousness arises from them and its entity is also harmonized, so from that it can be named the harmony of two. Arising from attention, it is not alerting, so it is not named alerting from that. Question: Attention alerts the mind, and it is capable of alerting in the state of seeds. The harmony of three gives rise to contact; does the harmony of three occur in the state of seeds? Answer: The seeds of faculties and consciousness are inferior and without function; they are not yet the harmony of the three. The nature of attention is capable of alerting, hence its function arises in the state of seeds.

4.3

The treatise says: "Attention means having the nature of being able to alert the mind." Does it alert in the state of seeds or in the state of manifest activity? Answer: In accordance with what various masters say, alerting extends across both states. The primary commentary holds that it is in the state of seeds, not in manifest activity. Both Ximing and the Yaoji disagree with the primary commentary, saying that the two explanations of the treatise apply across both seeds and manifest activity. As the Treatise on the Five Aggregates says: "It means having the nature of causing the mind to awaken." The first fascicle of the Xianyang says: "Arising reliant on the mind, operating together with and associated with the mind. Having the movement of mind as its substance, and directing the mind as its activity." According to the Sarvāstivāda, they themselves have two explanations: the Za xin relies on the manifest, hence that treatise says: "One who recalls awakens to the condition, one being in the characteristic of arising." The eleventh fascicle of the Nyāyānusāra says: "That attention is directly present means that it directly arises in proximity and makes its own object present." That is, at the very time of arising, about to enter the present, it grasps the meaning of its own object. The Mahāyāna also has two explanations. One relies on the Xianyang: present attention alerts the simultaneously associated mind, the text being as cited earlier. The second relies on this treatise: striking and stimulating the seed of the mind that is to arise into manifest activity, it directs the manifest mind to proceed toward the object of cognition. However, in explaining this treatise, there are themselves two interpretations: one holds that this future seed of attention alerts the future seed of the mind that ought to arise, thereby causing the mind to proceed toward its own present object; the second says that present attention alerts the present seed of the mind that ought to arise, directing that manifest mind to proceed toward its own object. This latter interpretation is superior. We now hold that this is not so. If one follows the Sarvāstivāda, the Nyāyānusāra is correct, that is, the Za xin lun has awakening toward what will be cognized as its nature; it agrees with the Nyāyānusāra. If it were like that, it would not be the correct view. If one follows the Mahāyāna, there is also only a single explanation. The Treatise on the Five Aggregates says: "It means being able to cause the mind..."—the seed of the mind can also be called mind, because it does not say "having the nature of causing the manifest mind to awaken." If one relies on the Xianyang, which says: "Born from the seeds of the ālayavijñāna, arising reliant on the mind, operating together with and associated with the mind, having the movement of the mind as its substance." The first two lines exclude the doctrines of other traditions; "arising reliant on the mind" shows the meaning of a mental factor; "operating together with the mind" excludes arising before or after; "associated with" excludes simultaneous material faculties, thereby explaining the meaning of association for mental factors. Only with "having the movement of mind as its substance" does it reveal its own entity. Moving the mind that ought to arise as its substance—this is precisely the seed-mind. If it were directly present, it would already have directly arisen; why call it "ought to arise"? Since it has already arisen into manifest activity, why would it need to be alerted further? If alerting means causing it to understand, this is the capability of discernment; if alerting means causing it to proceed toward an object, it is not different from activity. If alerting means causing it to arise, once it has arisen, why alert it? If it is said: Since a present cause is allowed to give rise to a present fruit, what is there to prevent alerting the mind in the present?—this is not so. Because when a seed in the present gives rise to a present mind, although both are in the present, it requires that which is able to give rise to that which has not yet arisen. If when the seed exists, that manifest activity already exists, why would the seed need to arise? If present faculties and so forth do not cause arising, they merely serve as a support. If they were able to cause arising, then whenever the faculties exist, consciousness should constantly arise, just as with attention: when there is a manifest factor capable of alerting, there must be a mind. If it is said: If it is capable of alerting in the state of seeds, then it belongs to the future, and since the future has no entity, how could it alert?—this is not so. Mahāyāna causality is profound, marvelous, and beyond words; viewing the manifest activity that is about to arise, the future is provisionally posited. Although it is in the state of seeds, together with the manifest activity it produces, it is also directly present. This is the tenet of Dharmapāla; there is no need for differing views. A coarse examination makes it seem like present alerting, but subtle investigation reveals the principle of alerting to be hard to see. However, the Yogācārabhūmi says: "What is attention? It means having the nature of turning around"—this is identical with the Xianyang. "Turning around" and "movement" are similar in meaning and intent, so they are reconciled as before. One should not posit a different master's view here. What is refuted by the treatise as turning toward merely refutes the Hīnayāna.

4.4

Regarding the treatise's "holding the mind and causing it to abide" among the refutations of attachments: Various explanations hold that this only refutes deviant views within the Mahāyāna. Ximing's initial interpretation also refutes the Hīnayāna. The Yaoji also disagrees with what the primary commentary stated: "The Abhidharmasamuccaya only says: 'Holding the mind is its activity.' The Miśrakābhidharma-samuccaya explains: 'Repeatedly directing the mind—it is directing that is called holding, not abiding that is called holding.' Since it says 'repeatedly directing the mind,' it agrees with this treatise, so it should not be refuted." We now hold that this is not so. The Miśrakābhidharma-samuccaya says: "Precisely toward this object, repeatedly directing the mind; therefore, one whose mind attains concentration is called one who has attained attention." The intent of the primary commentary is simply that because the treatise says, "precely toward this object, repeatedly directing the mind"—since it says "this object," that is a single object, repeatedly directing the mind toward a single object clearly means abiding. If not, why would it further say: "Therefore, one whose mind attains concentration is called one who has attained attention"? Thus the intent of the Miśrakābhidharma-samuccaya clarifies that this attention holds the mind and causes it to abide, and only then is concentration attained. The Abhidharmasamuccaya is based on predominance, while the Miśrakābhidharma-samuccaya considers it an exhaustive principle, which is why the present treatise refutes it. If it merely refutes the Hīnayāna, which school's view it determines to be superior?

4.5

Question: Since conceptualization has the formulation of conventional designations as its activity, why is it not the cause of speech? Answer: According to what the Miśrakābhidharma-samuccaya says, it is the cause of subsequent expression, not the preparation for speech. It is because of conceptualizing the image of an object that conventional designations are established; its functional capacity is remote. Investigation and examination (vitarka and vicāra) have a direct function, as they directly initiate speech, and are therefore said to be the formations of speech.

4.6

The treatise says: "Obscuring refers to defiled dharmas obstructing the noble path." Question: If defiled dharmas obstruct the noble path and are called obscured, then since unwholesome dharmas also obstruct the noble path, are they equally called obscured? Answer: In terms of their ability to obstruct the noble path, unwholesome dharmas should be called obscured; but because their functional power to bring about karmic fruition is strong, they are not called obscured. Question: Unwholesome dharmas strongly bring about retribution, and following their predominance they are not called obscured; non-conceptualization does not produce karmic fruit, yet it obstructs the noble path, so is it called obscured? Answer: The obscuration of defiled dharmas by their own nature is predominant in obstructing the noble path, so it is called obscured; the retribution of non-conceptualization and the like obscure the principle only subtly, so they are not called obscured.

4.7

Regarding the section on consciousnesses compared by analogy, the four masters differ.

4.8

As for the third master, Nanda: if it were solely Sthiramati, it would not be so; but if understood generally, it is admissible, citing 'resembling the sense-faculties and so forth' to rescue and refute as appropriate. The various masters each explain that it can apply generally to seeds and actual states, because the textual phrasing is general.

4.9

Question: Do the six active perfumers jointly produce the seed of a single objective substratum, or do they each perfume separately? Answer: There are two explanations. One says they jointly produce the seed of a single objective substratum, while the seeds of the image aspect and the vision aspect are distinct; another says the objective substrata are also distinct, and this latter explanation is correct. Question: Since all are multiple causes jointly generating a single result, why is the latter correct? Answer: Seeds situated in the same locus can jointly produce a result, but since the active perfumers differ in aspect, they each perfume their respective objective substrata separately. Question: Although receiving perfuming does not pertain to the mental associates, the objects cognized are the same for both the primary mind and mental associates. When transforming into sense-faculties and objects, do they both have practical function? Answer: Ximing says that the Tripiṭaka Master offered two explanations. One says that what is transformed by touch and so forth lacks real practical function; the object may serve as an empowering condition, but it is not an intentional object. Another says they are not analogous: the sense-faculty has the meaning of being empowering, so it is transformed solely by the primary mind; the object has the meaning of being a distant condition, so it also extends to mental associates. The latter interpretation is regarded as correct. Now I say this is not so: that what is transformed by mental associates serves as an intentional object of the sixth [consciousness] is indeed unproblematic in principle, but for it to serve as the object of the five consciousnesses contradicts the correct doctrine. This is because Dharmapāla does not accept that the five consciousnesses cognize what is unreal. If one says that this is spoken in reference to the sixth [consciousness], that is also not so: comparing the sense-faculty and object, since the sense-faculty is discussed in reference to the five [consciousnesses], and the objects are the five objects, how could this be spoken in reference to the sixth? Although attributed to the Tripiṭaka Master, such a shared hearing is not attested, not to mention that the teaching requires relying on the Dharma, not on persons.

4.10

The Treatise says: 'Since the substance is originally existent,' and so forth; the root commentary raises an objection. The Yaoji says: there is a rescue. The *Vibhāṣā* rescues this, saying: the function of seeing form and so forth does not extend into the past, so the three time periods are distinct. The masters of the *Nyāyānusāra* rescue it by saying: the three time periods are distinguished by the function of grasping results in terms of the homogeneous cause; all others are mere capacities. These are the rescues proposed by them. The commentary does not cite them, and when stating that the refutation is incomplete, upon what grounds does it rely? Now I say: if the *Vibhāṣā* rescues it by saying that the function of seeing form and so forth does not extend into the past, and thus the three time periods are distinct, then although the five objects such as form are in the present, they also lack the function of seeing and so forth, and should be called the past. The *Nyāyānusāra* exclusively takes the function of grasping and giving results in terms of the cause of the same kind to be 'function' (kāritra). If it is distinguished because the homogeneous is superior, then the forbearance with the doctrine of suffering would not be able to arise, since it would lack a homogeneous cause and thus lack function. Furthermore, the five causes all have the nature of being a causal condition and can all grasp results; why would they not be functions? If they were not functions, they should not be causal conditions. Furthermore, the twelfth fascicle of the *Vibhāṣā* says: as for the equal-and-immediate condition, with the exception of the final mind and mental associates of an arhat, it consists of the remaining past and present minds and mental associates. Other masters say that it is also an equal-and-immediate condition, but the subsequent result does not arise. The judgment is that it should not be so; why is that? The equal-and-immediate condition is established on the basis of function. If a phenomenon serves as the equal-and-immediate condition for that phenomenon, no phenomenon and no sentient being can obstruct it from arising. The supreme worldly phenomena are not the final mind, and the subsequent [mind] is not of the same kind, so it may not be immediate; from this we know that the final mind of the one beyond training lacks function. Since it lacks function, why is it not the past? Thus our auxiliary objection holds. However, according to the *Vibhāṣā*, in the past there is also the function of grasping and giving results for the equal-and-immediate condition. Its tenth fascicle says: What is the equal-and-immediate condition? It states: having the meaning of sequence and having the meaning of giving function—this is giving the result. It further states: having the meaning of being able to produce the mind and having the meaning of leading forth—this is the meaning of grasping the result. It also states: being able to lead forth an equal-and-immediate phenomenon is called the equal-and-immediate condition; therefore we know that the equal-and-immediate condition has the meaning of grasping and giving.

4.11

The Treatise says: 'At the stage when the previous cause perishes,' and so forth; there are three explanations. First, in terms of the equal-and-immediate: the previous cause-and-effect perishes, and the subsequent moment's consciousness cause-and-effect arises. Second, in terms of seeds: at the stage when the previous seed cause perishes, the subsequent seed result is just arising. Third, in terms of the previous moment: at the stage when the active and seed cause-and-effect perishes, the subsequent moment's active and seed cause-and-effect arises, because all seeds arise and perish together with the eighth consciousness, like the two ends of a scale, being stated by way of mutual implication. The previous text only mentions the perishing of the cause, while the subsequent text only mentions the arising of the result; this explanation is correct.

4.12

The Treatise says: 'contemplating present phenomena' and so forth. Ximing says: contemplating that the present seed phenomena have the function of leading to what follows, one nominally designates a future result on the cause, and in contrast speaks of the present cause. Now I say this is not so. Why? When one says: 'on the present seed-cause, one nominally designates a future result,' is one contemplating the present cause and calling it the future result, or is one contemplating that the present cause is able to lead to something and calling that the future result? If one contemplates the present cause and calls it the future result, then result and cause would have no distinction. Furthermore, the Treatise says: 'Nominal means that the present consciousness appears resembling that form.' If one contemplates the function of leading to what follows and speaks of that which is led forth, calling it the future result, then one is not nominally designating the future result on the present cause. That which is led forth is not the cause; it is simply that, relying on consciousness, it transforms into the future, and is nominally called the future result; being established as future on the basis of the present, it is therefore a nominal designation. Another explanation says: 'present consciousness' refers to the seed-consciousness. Since it has an aspect resembling the repayment of the previous and the leading forth of the subsequent, it is spoken of as 'resembling'; thus, relying on this aspect, one nominally speaks of past and future, and it is not a transformation upon the contemplating mind. This is also not so. Why? The previous text speaks of 'contemplating present phenomena' and so forth, and the subsequent text says 'nominal means that the present consciousness appears resembling that form.' If it were not relying on this contemplating mind, so that on the present consciousness an aspect resembling past and future appears, how could there resemble being such on seeds? However, the two tiers of cause and effect are clear in the text and can be known.

4.13

Question: The Commentary says: 'Relying on consciousness transforming into past and future, one nominally designates the three time periods.' Is this the rational three time periods, or the vijñapti-mātra three time periods? If it is the rational three time periods, what difference is there with the vijñapti-mātra three time periods? Answer: When one does not investigate the aspect of cause and effect repaying and leading forth, but merely speaks of past events and remembers future terrifying things, the mind transforms into the forms of the past and future, and relative to those two forms speaks of the present—this is vijñapti-mātra; hence it is distinct from this. There is further another explanation: however, the establishment of the three time periods differs among the various traditions. For instance, according to the Ekavyāvahārika school, the three time periods are mere words and completely lack real substance. According to the Lokottaravāda school, time periods are established on the basis of phenomena: the mundane is nominal, so its time periods are also nominal; the supramundane is real, so its time periods are also real. According to the Mahāsāṃghika, Sautrāntika, and others, past and future are nominal, and the present is real. According to the Sarvāstivāda, the three time periods are all real; the twentieth fascicle of the *Kośa* cites scripture and reason to establish that the three time periods are real. Yet within that tradition there are distinctions among four masters. Thus their verse says: 'Herein there are four types: / differences in kind, character, state, and relativity. / The third, based on function, / is the best in establishing the time periods.' First, Dharmatrāta says: due to the differences of the three kinds, the three time periods have differences, but not differences in substance. Just as when breaking a gold vessel to make other items, although the shape-color differs, the顯-color is without difference; when traversing the three time periods, there is only relinquishing a kind and acquiring a kind, not relinquishing substance and acquiring substance. Second, Ghoṣaka says: due to the differences in characters, the three time periods have differences. 'Differences in characters' means: one says that within the non-concurrent formations there is a distinct kind, and because the characters of the time periods differ, the three time periods differ; when conforming to the character of one time period, the characters of the other two time periods are concealed, not that their substance does not exist. A second says: when the character of a time period has function, it is called conforming; although the character is without function, following the phenomenon its substance is not non-existent. Third, Vasumitra says: due to differences in state, the three time periods have differences, not that there are differences in substance. Just as moving a single counting-rod: placed in the single unit position it is called 'one', in the thousand position it is called 'a thousand'; although the positions differ, the substance does not differ. Fourth, Buddhadeva says: due to differences in relativity, the three time periods differ. Relative to the subsequent, it is called past; relative to the prior, it is called future; relative to both, it is called present. The *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* refutes what Dharmatrāta taught as holding to the transformation of phenomena, placing him in the camp of the Sāṃkhya; what Ghoṣaka established confuses the characters of the time periods, because the three time periods would all have the characters of the three time periods; what Buddhadeva taught regarding reciprocal relativity would mean that within the phenomena of a single time period there should be the three time periods, meaning the preceding and succeeding moments of the past time period should be called past and future, and the middle called present. It accepts only the third, established on the basis of function, as keeping the time periods unconfused. The *Vibhāṣā* agrees with the *Kośa*, while the *Nyāyānusāra* allows difference in kind, both refuting the assertions of Ghoṣaka and Buddhadeva. What the Mahāyāna establishes is either two or three, as distinguished in the root commentary; fearing prolixity, I cite the referenced texts in brief. *Yogācārabhūmi*, fascicle three: 'How is it established? It is established like phenomena because all seeds are not separate from phenomena. As for all result phenomena: if they have the character of having already perished, they are past; if they have a cause but have the character of being as yet unborn, they are future; if they are already born and have the character of not yet perishing, they are present.' *Yogācārabhūmi*, fascicle fifty-one, says: 'What are past saṃskāras? That is, their characters have already perished and their self-nature has already been relinquished. What are present saṃskāras? That is, their characters have not yet perished and their self-nature has not been relinquished. What are future saṃskāras? That is, their cause is present, their specific character is as yet unborn, and they have not attained self-nature.' *Yogācārabhūmi*, fascicle fifty-two, says: 'Past saṃskāras exist because they have given results; future saṃskāras exist because they encompass causes. Why is this? Present saṃskāras are manifested by three characteristics: first, because of being of the nature of past results; second, because of being of the nature of future causes; third, because their specific character continues unbroken.' It also says: 'The continuum of seeds that have already given results is called the past realm. The continuum of future seeds that have not yet given results is called the future realm. The continuum of present seeds that have not yet given results is called the present realm.' The second fascicle of the *Madhyāntavibhāga* says: 'The already and not-yet functioned of causes and effects / is what should be understood as the meaning of time periods.' The explanation says: 'Having already functioned in both causes and effects is the meaning of the past; having not yet functioned in both is the meaning of the future; having already functioned in causes but not yet having functioned in effects is the meaning of the present.' These only explain the distinction of the time periods in terms of cause and effect and seeds, all being subsumed under the rational three time periods. Those which speak of supernormal powers, the three knowledges, and so forth are all the supernormal three time periods. Now this treatise text refers to the vijñapti-mātra three time periods. The Treatise says: 'Nominal means that the present consciousness appears resembling that form.' Furthermore, the fundamental tenet clarifies vijñapti-mātra. However, according to Ximing, it seems to interpret this cause and effect in terms of principle. The Yaoji agrees with this; let the wise discern. Question: Phenomena have three natures; upon which nature are the three time periods nominally established? Answer: In terms of real principle, they are established solely on the dependent nature. In terms of nominal designation according with conditions, they extend to all three natures. The Yaoji states: the consummate is permanent and abiding, and the imagined nature is non-existent, so neither is relied upon to establish the distinction of the three time periods. Now I say that while this is so in terms of distinct natures, the various sūtras and treatises also nominally establish them based on [these natures]. First, the consummate can be spoken of in terms of the three time periods through being revealed on the basis of verbal expression. How so? As in the twelvefold mental practices of the eye, knowledge, clarity, and awakening, which each contemplate past, future, and present with respect to the four noble truths. With respect to the consummate, if one did not nominally establish the three time periods relying on verbal expression, the fourfold mental practice would not be accomplished; therefore, relying on the consummate, they can also be nominally established. Thus it extends to both types, vijñapti-mātra and principle. Relying on the imagined nature, they can also be nominally established. How so? As the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra* says: there is no self, person, and so forth. Vasubandhu's commentary explains: in terms of erroneously grasping the self in the three time periods generally and specifically, these four kinds are established. That is establishing the three time periods relying on the imagined nature. This is solely vijñapti-mātra, the three time periods and nothing else. The three time periods established relying on the dependent nature are as cited above. The cited passages are entirely based on contemplating the correct principle of dependent origination. The consummate is not dependent origination, and the imagined lacks intrinsic nature, so they were omitted and not spoken of.

4.14

The Śāstra states: "Because they definitely do not retrogress to arise afflictive hindrances." As for the stages before and after retrogression to arise afflictions, the various schools explain it differently: according to the Mahāsāṃghika and others, there are those who retrogress from the afflictions of the path of seeing, because it is a single path, but on the path of cultivation there is definitely no retrogression, because it is a dual path; according to the Sarvāstivāda, there is definitely no retrogression from the afflictions of the path of seeing because it is a swift path, whereas there is retrogression on the path of cultivation because it is leisurely. However, regarding the delusions of the path of cultivation, those who first abandon them through the six mental practices and later become noble ones of the eight [stages] definitely do not retrogress: first, because they have sharp faculties; second, because they abandon them by both the worldly and world-transcending paths. Moreover, if they pass through another life, they likewise do not retrogress. According to the Mahāyāna school, there is no retrogression in either case, because their seeds have been eternally severed, and past and future do not [truly] exist. However, when the Mahāyāna speaks of retrogression, it is retrogressing from and losing worldly dwelling in happiness in the present life. When the Hīnayāna speaks of retrogression, it is retrogressing from and losing the noble fruition, but they are certain to regain that fruition in this very life and definitely do not pass through another life. Now, concerning the nature of retrogression, it extends to noble ones of the three realms; but if one actually retrogresses, it occurs only in the human realm, because the conditions for retrogression are found there. There are five conditions for retrogression: first, affairs of the Saṅgha; second, resolving disputes; third, long-distance travel; fourth, frequent sickness; fifth, delighting in reciting scriptures.

4.15

The Śāstra states: "Because moment by moment they increasingly advance." Ximing says: when one enters the cessation concentration based on the contemplation of the emptiness of persons above the third stage, does one advance or not advance? The explanation is that one does not advance, because one does not sever the attachment to phenomena. Based on this meaning, there is the phenomenon of leaping over kalpas. I say this is not so: although one enters the cessation concentration based on the emptiness of persons, one nonetheless advances, because without arising from the cessation concentration, one displays the various deportments and is able, moment by moment, to perform acts of benefiting and gladdening [beings]. It is not that their advancement is spoken of solely in terms of the emptiness of phenomena and severing attachment to phenomena. If not so, it would contradict this statement of advancing "moment by moment"; except when the great compassion fulfilling the vow [to liberate] the realm of sentient beings is completed at the end of the ten stages, then there might be no advancement. Otherwise, practicing for immeasurable asaṃkhyeya [kalpas] without fulfillment could not be fulfilled by practice over three great kalpas, whereas apart from that, all are advancements. Furthermore, when entering concentration, the concentration definitely benefits oneself and its merits also advance, while the matter of leaping over kalpas can still be established without contradiction. If one enters the emptiness of phenomena, one directly severs attachment to phenomena. Having the intention to benefit beings, one advances even further. Even though both are advancing, why should this preclude superior and inferior—how much more so when one in whom wisdom predominates surpasses one in whom compassion predominates! Another explanation says that from the eighth stage onwards, there is in truth no one who leaps over [kalpas], because the power of each stage is equal, advancing in a uniform manner without superior or inferior. The talk of leaping over kalpas is stated with reference to the transformation body that appears for the sake of transforming beings, not the true fruition body (saṃbhogakāya). The fruition body is inconceivable, and bodhisattvas of the ten stages are not even able to see it, how much less beings prior to the stages! Furthermore, it is not by relying on the fruition body that one then manifests the eight aspects [of a Buddha's life]. Based on the Avataṃsaka Sūtra, bodhisattvas of the ten faiths also manifest the eight aspects. Could noble ones of the ten stages be incapable of manifesting these aspects, such that they must await the attainment of Buddhahood? The original commentary says: from the eighth stage onwards, the first moment doubles the preceding two kalpas. The second moment doubles the previous thought-moment even further. The Yaoji states: The Daśabhūmika Sūtra says that the intellectual activity arisen in a single thought-moment, compared with that from the initial generation of the aspiration [for awakening] up to the end of the seventh stage, is not equaled by a hundredth part, nor even by any calculation or metaphor. According to this sūtra passage, it is not merely double. I say now: this passage may be based on a particular intention and does not necessarily apply to everything, just as the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra states that the merit of upholding the sūtra, compared with previously sacrificing one's body to make offerings to the Buddhas, etc., does not equal one part in a hundred, and so forth, nor can it be reached. According to Asaṅga's treatise, this is determined to be prior to the stages; how could it be that at this stage, all practices would be capable of multiplying manifold all preceding practices?

4.16

There are eighteen names in all for the eighth consciousness. The verse says:

4.17

Unsubmerged, root, abode, store, seed, stainless, holder, object,
manifestation, appearing, turning, mind, support, maturation, consciousness, root, life, existence.

4.18

Exposition: First, the "unsubmerged consciousness" (wumo shi): The Wuxiang lun says that all seeds are not hidden or submerged, hence it is called "unsubmerged." Second, named "root consciousness" (ben shi): it is the root of all phenomena. Third, "abode" (zhai): also from the Wuxiang lun, meaning it is the dwelling place of the seeds. Fourth, "storehouse consciousness" (zang shi): that is, the consciousness that is grasped and stored, namely the ālaya[vijñāna]. Fifth, named "seed" (zhong): namely the seed-consciousness. Sixth, "stainless consciousness" (wugou shi): as the sūtra cited below states. Seventh, named "grasping and holding consciousness" (zhichi shi): namely the ādānavijñāna. Eighth, named "object-condition" (yuan): The Madhyāntavibhāga-śāstra says it is the consciousness that takes things as its object. Ninth, named "manifestation" (xian): The Wuxiang lun says it manifests the five sense faculties, four great elements, and so forth, all being manifested here. Tenth, named "appearing consciousness" (xianshi): The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra says that all phenomena appear upon the root consciousness. Eleventh, "turning" (zhuan): The Wuxiang lun says it arises as the support for all phenomena. Twelfth, named "mind" (citta): meaning accumulating and generating. Thirteenth, named "support" (yi): namely the support of the knowable (jñeyāśraya). Fourteenth, named "maturation" (yi): namely the vipākavijñāna. Fifteenth, named "consciousness" (shi): The Wuxiang lun says it is the consciousness that discerns things. Sixteenth, named "root consciousness" (gen shi): the Mahāsāṃghika school establishes it as the mūlavijñāna. Seventeenth, named "life" (sheng): the Mahīśāsaka school establishes it under the name "the aggregate that lasts to the end of saṃsāra" (saṃsārakotika-skandha). Eighteenth, named "existence" (you): the Sthaviravāda and Vibhajyavāda schools establish it as the bhavaṅgavijñāna. The passages of the cited sūtras and treatises should be further checked against the texts. Question: The Ekottarika-āgama establishes four ālayas; why are they not mentioned? Explanation: Those four names do not refer exclusively to consciousness, so they are not mentioned here. Or, making it nineteen is likewise not precluded. According to the explanations of ancient masters, there are seventeen names: 1. ālayavijñāna, here translated as "primeval submergence"; 2. ādāna; 3. the consciousness that is the aggregate lasting to the end of saṃsāra; 4. named discerning consciousness; 5. named citta, translated here as mind-consciousness; 6. manovijñāna, whose essence is the mental faculty, and thus is named consciousness; 7. the first consciousness, counted from root to branch as the first; 8. the eighth consciousness, counted from branch to root as the eighth; 9. seed-consciousness; 10. named objective consciousness; 11. mūlavijñāna; 12. bhavaṅgavijñāna; 13. retribution consciousness; 14. consciousness of the mark of wisdom, because it possesses the nature of understanding from the perfuming of hearing [the Dharma]; the Laṅkāvatāra says: 1. consciousness of the mark of turning, 2. consciousness of the mark of karma, 3. consciousness of the mark of wisdom; 15. true-mark consciousness: the four-fascicle Laṅkāvatāra says that the true-mark consciousness is the aforementioned mark of wisdom, which, unlike defiled phenomena, is called "true" [in contrast to] the false; 16. storehouse consciousness: the Laṅkāvatāra says, "The ocean of the storehouse consciousness is eternal and abiding"; 17. appearing consciousness, which is constantly manifest without interruption; the Laṅkāvatāra says that briefly stated there are three: the true consciousness, the appearing consciousness, and the discerning consciousness.

4.19

The Śāstra states: "Or it is named ālayavijñāna," etc. The root [text/commentary] states: It only has the function of storing defilements and being grasped by the view of self; it is not said to be stored by the perfuming of defilements, nor does it extend to the stage of fruition, because there is no perfuming [in fruition]. Although grasping as an object and storing does not have self-grasping, equality wisdom's taking it as an object also extends to the stage of fruition, so it merely eliminates being grasped and stored by self-grasping. Therefore the Śāstra states: "It is not that at the stage of non-learning and for non-retrogressing bodhisattvas there is the meaning of being grasped and stored by defiled phenomena." Grasping includes both cognitive grasping and erroneous grasping; both are called "grasping." Just as in the expression "grasped and received," the word "grasp" is broad, not referring solely to erroneous grasping; therefore it merely excludes defilement. Were it not so, it should simply say, "It is not that at the stage of non-learning and for non-retrogressing bodhisattvas there is the meaning of grasping and storing." Why would it need to say: "there is the meaning of being grasped and stored by defiled phenomena"? Therefore it states only two, as explained below in the verse. First, in terms of one meaning, it is named ālaya; later, by further semantic explanation, it possesses all three meanings. It does not say that "store" is explained solely by two meanings, thus not contradicting the treatises. If, following the various explanations, one does not rely on another text, this very treatise passage can possess the three stores: the aspect where self-view, self-love, and so forth cognitively grasp it as self is the meaning of being grasped and stored by self-love; that which can perfume it is the meaning of being that which is stored; and the impermissible storing of phenomena of the defiled category is the meaning of being that which stores defiled phenomena. Because the Mahāyānasaṃgraha explains defilements as the various transforming consciousnesses and not the ālaya. However, the relinquishment of this name is designated solely in terms of the stage where the bonds of cognitive objects are severed and subdued completely; it does not mean relinquishing the meanings of "storing" and "being stored." Because the term "defilement" encompasses all sāsrava natures of the three moral qualities, extending across both hindrances. There is no text stating that it is solely the hindrance to the knowable. From the eighth stage onwards, the sāsrava states of the five and seventh [consciousnesses] can still arise as samudācāra and perfume the object and subject aspects of the eighth consciousness, possessing both storing and being stored; but simply having no self-grasping, it is designated as relinquished. Therefore the preceding text states: "Although the affliction seeds within the vipāka consciousness are not yet completely severed, the self-view, love, and so forth that take this consciousness as an object no longer grasp and store it as an internal self; hence it eternally relinquishes the name ālayavijñāna." It does not say that only when storing and being stored are both absent is it called relinquished. Question: Why is it not like the ādāna, where when one [aspect] is lost, the name is not relinquished? Answer: This is in terms of the meaning of the bond of cognitive objects, whereas that is in terms of its essential nature. If self-grasping is absent, one is freed from the bond of cognitive objects and relinquishes the name ālaya. Although there is no connecting to rebirth, it still holds the sense faculties and seeds, so the ādāna is not lost.

4.20

The Śāstra states: "Vipāka is relinquished when one is about to attain bodhi." According to this, there are two masters. First, speaking of "attainment": according to the Sarvāstivāda, there are two explanations of their own: First, they say their essences are distinct, taking the initial acquisition as "attainment" (prāpti) and the subsequent state as "possession" (samanvāgama). If so, why do they not establish "possession" [as a separate non-associated factor]? Answer: Because it belongs to the same category as attainment, they do not establish "possession" as an [independent] non-associated [factor]. Second, they say attainment and possession are identical in essence: initial acquisition is named attainment, and after being acquired, its continuation is named possession; or, the future is named attainment, and the present and past are named possession. As for Mahāyāna masters, although there is no separate text, according to the Yogācārabhūmi, attainment, acquisition, and possession are one in essence and distinct only in name. Explaining "about to attain," there are two masters: First, they say cause and effect occur at different times; this is the view of the master cited later in the treatise who asserts that it arises when the seed is no more. Because the fruition arises simultaneously with the ānantaryamārga, while the cause is in the phase of cessation, they explain "about to attain" as in the commentary. Second, they say cause and effect occur at the same time: both arise and cease simultaneously with the ānantaryamārga. In accordance with these two masters, each divides into two: one [asserts] relinquishment on the ānantaryamārga, and one [asserts] relinquishment on the vimuktimārga, making four explanations in total.

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成唯識論了義燈 — Classical Chinese