成唯識論了義燈 4.71

4.71

Question: The original commentary refutes the Sautrāntikas, asking: 'If volitional action (saṃskāra) is in the present while its fruit is in the future, or after one kalpa, etc., how could it induce it?' Mahāyāna holds the same; why single them out for refutation? Answer: Because in the Mahāyāna the fundamental consciousness holds those seeds, so they persist even after many kalpas; whereas their consciousness has interruptions, so this is not a parallel case. Furthermore, it refutes the Sarvāstivādins, asking: 'Since rupa in the consciousness stage lacks the vipākavijñāna, how could it be called the fruit-vijñāna link? How could it be said that volitional action can induce the accompanying rūpa?' Now, this objection may be questioned: as in Mahāyāna vijñapti-mātra, can it be that all dharmas share the same nature as consciousness? Outsiders say that states (avasthā) are also like this: they need not be of the same nature as consciousness, and hence are induced by karma. The reply is: I say vijñapti-mātra means all are not apart from consciousness; just as volitional action conditions consciousness, all are induced by volitional action. You say that volitional action conditions consciousness, yet there are consciousnesses that are not conditioned by volitional action; hence it is not a parallel case. When refuting the Sautrāntikas, why is it said that because the future does not exist, one cannot say it 'induces', but can only say it 'perfumes'? To explain this: discussing their fundamental tenet, first, because of the vast distance of time; second, because consciousness is non-existent [in the future], it cannot induce, but only by the perfuming of volitional action does the immediately adjacent consciousness continue until it reaches the consciousness at the stage of taking rebirth (upapattibhava), which is called 'consciousness conditioned by volitional action'. According to Mahāyāna, it is not called the consciousness link in reference to manifest consciousness, but refers precisely to the seeds; therefore volitional action is capable of inducing it, because it is not separated by a vast distance of time.