成唯識論了義燈 4.85

4.85

The Treatise says: "Co-arising supports." Dharmapāla's qualifying differentiation takes that which definitively possesses an object, acts as master, and acts as the supported, to qualify and exclude other things that are not supports, causing the mind and mental factors to apprehend their own referent objects. This cites the result to illuminate the support of the cause. If a phenomenon, though arising in reliance on cause-conditions, cannot apprehend its own referent object, its result is called 'having a support' (youyi), not 'possessing a support' (yousuoyi). With respect to it, the cause-condition can only be a support (yi), not that which is relied upon (suoyi). Why is this so? Because the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra states that only the mind and mental factors are called 'possessing a support', while other phenomena are not called 'possessing a support'. If one does not make this qualifying distinction, phenomena would be conflated. However, the Commentary says: Yet inferring conceptually from a minor point of doctrine, it means the consciousness of one's own continuum serves as the support, not subsequent for prior, nor prior for subsequent, nor another's for one's own. The Yaoji says: "There is no conflation here. Since we are here discerning the faculties as co-arising supports, which are not before and after, and it is already fully established that one's own consciousness does not arise relying on another's faculties, these four criteria alone completely qualify the phenomena." I now say this is not so. Although we know these four criteria comprehensively qualify the phenomena, the text of the Treatise does not make it explicit; it merely discerns against the divergent doctrines of the earlier masters that those things are not supports, without explicitly excluding others or prior and posterior to clarify that it is one's own continuum. If, because it says 'co-arising', one does not need to qualify non-temporality, then for equal-and-immediate support, since it clarifies that the prior serves as equal-and-immediate with respect to the posterior, why must it again say 'the prior collection with respect to the posterior'? Below, in explaining opening-and-guiding, it says 'with respect to the subsequently arising mind and mental factors'. Furthermore, since it originally discerns mind and mental factors, why must it say 'namely, phenomena with cognitive objects'? In speaking of mind and mental factors, are they not cognitive agents? Moreover, just as in perfuming, perfuming one's own continuum is fully established; does one need to qualify another's continuum and prior and posterior? Therefore, the intention of the present Commentary is that when mind and mental factors rely on causes and conditions, they can all be called 'supported'. Since the Treatise says: "Through the reciprocal sovereign power, the two consciousnesses become determinate," this is also one's own consciousness arising due to another consciousness; why not qualify it? Although prior and posterior are distinct, they can both be termed 'existent' (you). Just as the school asserting different times for cause and effect, when explaining 'co-arising and co-ceasing' in perfuming in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, says 'co-arising and co-ceasing' because prior and posterior phenomena equally possess arising and ceasing; here, because prior and posterior minds differ from conceptual constructions, both can be termed 'existent'; why not qualify it? It is not that because they are equally existent, they must be non-temporal to be a co-arising support. Furthermore, it says: The Essential Summaries states that the first three each possess the four criteria. If so, they definitively qualify phenomena completely: having the same object manifests possessing an object, and being fundamental manifests being the master; from this it is proven that the remaining three are useless. I now say this opinion fails to understand the great import. Why? The Root Commentary bases itself on the Treatise's discussion of co-arising supports: first it clarifies the criteria, and then it states the distinctions of shared-object, uncommon, discriminating, defiled-pure, and fundamental supports. Do these five possess or lack the aforementioned criteria? If they lack them and yet can be supports, why were the previous criteria needed? They must possess them to be supports; this means the first three each possess the four criteria. Whichever possesses the four criteria possesses the previous meaning, only then becoming a support. Because of this, the body faculty, with respect to the eye and other four consciousnesses, is not those five kinds, and is therefore not their support. The Yaoji says: "We now explain that the body faculty is excluded by the criterion of 'acting as master'." I now say this is not so. The original intention of the Treatise's text was to use the single criterion of 'acting as master' to qualify sovereign from subordinate, not to qualify the body faculty. If one says that although there is a body faculty, if the four faculties are missing the four consciousnesses do not arise, and therefore we know they do not rely on it, this is not correct: similarly, although there is a sixth consciousness, without the body faculty the body consciousness does not arise; could one grant that the body consciousness does not rely on the sixth? Therefore, one does not use 'master' to exclude the body faculty. Moreover, when the Essential Summaries speaks of 'conformingly apprehending the referent object', it explains the shared-object faculty; if the shared-object faculty also possesses the previous criteria, it does not explain the meaning of possessing an object, and one must not recklessly object. Therefore, the seventh relies on the eighth without sharing the same object; thus we know that possessing an object is not stated in terms of conformingly apprehending an object. Whether conforming or not, they all possess objects; the wise should examine this. Question: In the present explanation of the co-arising support faculty, since possessing an object excludes seeds, can seeds not be a co-arising support? If they are not a support, seeds would not be faculties, contradicting the sacred teaching that the five faculties such as the eye extend to both seeds and actualities. Answer: The Treatise says faculties extend to seeds and actualities; now Dharmapāla discerns the distinction between support (yi) and that which is relied upon (suoyi): the actual faculty's function is superior, so it is called 'that which is relied upon'; the seed faculty is not superior, so it is not called 'that which is relied upon'. If one takes the seed faculty as a co-arising support, one's own seed should be it. Here, in discerning the co-arising support, it does not rely on explaining the meaning of faculties, and therefore does not take seeds.