成唯識論了義燈 5.19

5.19

Regarding the Śāstra's statement: "If this consciousness did not exist, how could that basis exist?": the Mahāyāna reveals to the Hīnayāna that if the seventh [consciousness] did not exist, the meaning of the sūtras would not be established. Therefore, challenging the outsider, it says: The eye and [the other senses] here subsume co-arising faculties, which are called the two conditions. The manas is also subsumed among the six, so it should rely on the present manas to be called the two conditions. The outsider challenges the Mahāyāna, saying: Manovijñāna is produced from two conditions; since it grasps the non-existent, the manas can arise, so why shouldn't it be admissible that the faculty produced from two conditions can arise even without the manas? The Sautrāntikas agree with the Mahāyāna in maintaining that past and future do not exist, and also allow that [consciousness] arises while grasping the non-existent; hence this challenge is made. The reply: Holding its own existence or non-existence, both are dharmas; grasping non-existence while manifesting forms, it arises from two conditions; the past, extinguished manas does not exist at present, so when the faculty of manovijñāna is absent, it should not arise. If the Sarvāstivādins make the previous objection from the standpoint of the Mahāyāna school, it is also admissible. The Sautrāntikas hold that what has ceased is non-existent and designate the name "manas" merely nominally; challenging from the Mahāyāna standpoint, they say: For the five consciousnesses, the six pairs of two conditions involve real cognitive objects and their faculties are also real; for the manovijñāna, the six pairs of two conditions involve nominal cognitive objects and its faculty is also nominal. However, below there is a separate refutation of the Sautrāntikas; here it is preliminarily set forth. The Sarvāstivādins also base their objection on the Mahāyāna. The reply: It is said that the faculty-dharma is the support, and concurrent with the manas it is not an acquisition of a nominal designation. Alternatively, it is explained that the immediate perceived aspect is produced through conditions, and even if the substantial referent is absent, it is still real; just like the five and six pairs of two conditions, the supporting faculty is not nominal. The outsider again challenges: The sūtras say that with the six pairs of two conditions, if the faculty is nominal, consciousness does not arise; since consciousness depends on the six pairs of two conditions, if the object is nominal, should it not also fail to arise? The reply: The force of the cognitive object is distant and indirect; even if it is nominal, consciousness can arise. The supporting basis is a superior predominant condition; its force is proximate, so if it is nominal, [consciousness] cannot arise. Nevertheless, it is preferable to equate the immediate perceived aspect with the faculty as currently real.