成唯識論了義燈 5

English (machine translation) 5

Language: English

5.1

Composed by the bhikṣu Huizhao of Dayun Monastery in Zizhou.

The second master's explanation: Manas is associated with all four sensations. Question: Why in the desire realm is it not concurrent with suffering? And up to the second dhyāna, why is it not concurrent with the sensation of pleasure? Answer: The Commentary has already distinguished this. Why is it concurrent with grief and joy? Answer: Regarding its being concurrent with joy, there are three explanations: The first says joy is concurrent with the sixth consciousness, and because the seventh is concurrent with the sixth, it is said to be associated with joy. But this is not so. Why? Because it is said to take as its object the fruition induced by wholesome karma of the stages possessing joy, and does not take the sixth as its object; therefore this explanation is incorrect. The second says that the fruition follows the cause; or, because the eighth consciousness is brought about by the volition associated with the sensation of joy, the seventh, by taking this fruition of leading karma as its object, is said to take that which has joy and so on as its object, and is thus concurrent with the sensation of joy. The third says that they are concurrent because of conformity: just as it is said that the five consciousnesses take the previous image-part as their object, and this image is perfumed into existence by the preceding five consciousnesses, so when the subsequent five consciousnesses perceive it, it is said that they take the previous image as their object; this meaning is also like that. Because this fruition is summoned and brought about by joy and its associated volition, although it takes this fruition as its object, it conforms to that cause; hence it is said to be concurrent with joy. For association with the remaining sensations, the three explanations should be understood accordingly.

5.3

Question: The Commentary says: "If it were concurrent with four sensations, there would be the fault that the adamantine mind (vajrasaṃbhadhyāna) could not sever them all at once." But regarding its being concurrent with the sensation of equanimity, does it not sever them gradually, because equanimity changes with the stages? Answer: If it were concurrent with joy and so forth, it would inevitably vary according to the stages, and defiled dharmas would be severed together [with them], just as in the six consciousnesses. If it is concurrent with the sensation of equanimity, then it can indeed be severed all at once, just as the eighth consciousness, being concurrent with equanimity, is severed all at once. This principle is thoroughly established, so there is no fault.

5.4

Question: The treatise states that it takes the internal as its object and grasps it as a self. As for this view of self, is it solely the perceived-part that is called the view of self, or is the self-verifying part also subsumed under the view of self? Answer: If both are, what fault is there? Rejoinder: Both would have faults. If it is not called the view of self, then greed and anger would also be like this, and their self-verifying parts would not be greed and so forth. If it is called the view of self, one should admit that it perceives the external; how then could it be called perceiving the internal? It would also fail to be subsumed under valid cognition (pramāṇa). Answer: Only the perceived-part is called the view of self, not the self-verifying part; the self-verification of the view of self is merely called defiled discernment. Why is it not the same as greed and so forth? Answer: Greed and so forth correspond to the object, and greed can also be generated, just as when concurrent with the five consciousnesses, etc. Because the view of self does not correspond to the object, self-verification is not the view of self. Question: Why does not corresponding mean it is not the view of self, but merely called defiled discernment? Answer: Just as when taking the unconditioned or taking other realms as objects, when the perceived-part perceives them, it does not correspond to the unconditioned or the other realms. Only the perceived-part is named the perceiving of the unconditioned or perceiving of other realms; self-verification cannot be named the perceiving of the unconditioned and so forth; the view of self is also like this. Furthermore, if the intrinsic substance of the view is called the view of self, that is permissible. But if it is called the view of self because of perceiving a self, then self-verification is not, and greed and so forth are also like this. If greed arisen from perceiving form is called greed and so forth, then self-verification is not, because it does not perceive form. But because it is the self-verification of greed, it is called greed and so forth; its intrinsic substance is also that.

5.5

The treatise says: "Therefore, its association is solely with the sensation of equanimity." Question: The seventh perceives the eighth, and following its object it has solely the sensation of equanimity. Does the sixth perceive the seventh and eighth, and following them have solely the sensation of equanimity? Answer: The seventh constantly perceives the internal, and following its object it has solely the sensation of equanimity. The sixth perceives both internal and external, so it cannot have solely the sensation of equanimity. Question: The sixth is the inducer, and the seventh is what is induced. Following that which induces, it becomes untainted. If the seventh is what is induced and the sixth is the inducer, should it not follow the inducer in pervading the three sensations? Answer: When untaintedness arises, it is difficult to arise untainted in accordance with another. Because it perceives its object constantly and spontaneously, it does not pervade the three sensations. Question: The seventh untainted consciousness is induced by another, yet it does not follow the inducer in pervading the three sensations. The seventh untainted consciousness is induced by another; does it not follow the inducer in being of the same stage? Answer: When a pure dharma arises, it is difficult to follow the other inducer in being of the same stage. The sensation of equanimity arises spontaneously and does not follow the inducer in pervading the three sensations. Question: The seventh arises spontaneously and does not follow the inducer in pervading the three sensations. The five consciousnesses arise spontaneously; do they not follow the inducer in pervading the three sensations? Answer: The five consciousnesses arise alterably, and following others they pervade the three sensations. The seventh perceives a single uniform category, and does not follow others across the three sensations. Question: The five consciousnesses are induced spontaneously by another, and they follow the inducer in pervading the three sensations. The seventh is induced by another as a single uniform category; should it not follow the inducer in pervading the three sensations? Answer: Although the five consciousnesses are induced by another, they do not follow the inducer in being concurrent with investigation (vitarka) and analysis (vicāra). Although equality is induced by another, it does not follow the inducer in pervading the three sensations.

5.6

The treatise says: "If it were different from the storehouse consciousness..." The Yaoji states: Some say: "Some explain that because it is absent in the three states, it lacks the characteristic of flowing continuously; this also is illogical. As long as it has not been severed, it constantly arises in succession, identical to the eighth consciousness: before entering the four states, it is constantly called ālaya. Therefore, explaining nonexistence based on existence, it is not mentioned, or because their characteristics are identical it is not mentioned." Now, I maintain that this is not so. Even if the ālaya enters the four states, as long as it has not become untainted, it is said to flow continuously. It is not spoken of in terms of its name; its continuous flow is like a torrent. Manas transforms into the untainted in the three states; its transformation and alteration are not continuous, and therefore it is not like a torrent.

5.7

The treatise says: "To which nature do the mental factors of this manas belong?" The Commentary has two explanations: The first says: Both question and answer are dual, because the primary mind achieves the three natures through its mental factors. First, it mentions the mental factors to reveal the primary mind; thus the treatise states: "The four afflictions associated with this manas are defiled dharmas." Next, it reveals that which is made obstructed-neutral through the primary mind; the treatise states: "Because the basis of these concurrent defiled dharmas is subtle"; thus both question and answer are dual.

5.8

Question: The seventh perceives the eighth as a self, and following its object it is bound to one realm. The sixth perceives the three realms as a self; is it bound to the three realms? Answer: Those of one's own stage mutually reinforce each other, and following one's own they are bound to one's own stage. Those of another stage do not mutually reinforce each other, and do not follow another stage to be bound to it.

5.9

The treatise says: "At this state, defiled manas..." The Commentary says: "This is spoken of as pervading both graspings." The Yaoji and others say: "It speaks only of the grasping of self, not of the grasping of phenomena. Why? If it spoke of the grasping of phenomena, why would the treatise say that the sacred paths of the three vehicles have the function of subduing and eradicating it, since the non-learners of the two vehicles should not abandon it forever? Furthermore, Dharmapāla's explanation that it is absent in the three states is spoken with reference to defiled manas. Thus we know that the grasping of phenomena is not called defiled manas." Now I maintain that merely stating this does not contradict the treatise and is its primary intention. Although the two vehicles of determined nature cannot subdue or sever it, viewed from their perspective it is not defiled, and is not called defiled manas. But in contrast to those of indeterminate nature and the determined Mahāyāna, the grasping of phenomena is called defiled. Yet the sacred path of the emptiness of persons of the indeterminate nature also cannot subdue it; thus the treatise states: "The sacred paths of the three vehicles have the function of subduing and eradicating it." If it were solely the grasping of self, it should say that the sacred paths of the three vehicles can both subdue and eradicate it; why would it need to say "have"? That there is no defilement in the three states is also without fault: the grasping of phenomena, viewed from the perspective of the two vehicles of determined nature, is not called defiled, and is not absent in the three states. But viewed from the perspective of bodhisattvas, it is absent in the three states. The text is comprehensive and its meaning subtle; the rest do not know this thoroughly.

5.10

The Śāstra: "Also, like one who has not yet realized pudgala-[śūnyatā]." Ximing states the syllogism: "Before giving rise to [the realization of] dharma-śūnyatā, clinging to dharmas should operate constantly; because its antidote has not yet arisen; like the stage of clinging to self." In this syllogism, what is to be established is unproven in the example. The Shuyao says: "Clinging to dharmas, at the stage where dharma-śūnyatā is not yet realized (subject [pakṣa]), should operate constantly (predicate [sādhya]); because it is subsumed under one or the other of the two graspings; like grasping at a living being [i.e., at self]." Someone falsely pointed out an error, saying that the reason contradicts the essential nature of the subject, mistakenly citing the Shuyao's thesis and reason established in the explanation of the Śāstra text, so that both would have errors. Question: Regarding those abiding in the cessation concentration (nirodhasamāpatti), does the World-Honoured One enter the cessation concentration or not? Answer: There are three explanations. The first says he does not enter it. If so, how can he be fully endowed with all meritorious qualities? The answer is: He has accomplished the cessation concentration without manifesting it into actual activity. The second says: He does enter it. If so, why are bodhisattvas rebuked for entering it? The answer is: Those who indulge in its bliss are rebuked. Various sūtras also encourage bodhisattvas to enter it. Question: Since, upon entering the cessation concentration, the six consciousnesses do not operate, how could he benefit sentient beings? Answer: Through the power of his prior aspirational resolve. Without arising from the cessation concentration, he manifests deportment to transform sentient beings. The Buddha acts spontaneously without requiring preparatory effort. The third says: Although he appears to enter it, he does not actually enter it. A tradition says: The Śikṣāsamuccaya (or Siyi jing) states that when one enters the cessation concentration of principle (li), consciousness does not operate; when one enters the cessation concentration of phenomena (shi), consciousness still arises. What is called "appearing to enter" is precisely the cessation concentration of phenomena. However, upon examining the texts, among the three explanations, the second explanation is superior. Therefore, this Śāstra raises the objection: If the equality wisdom were based on the sixth [consciousness], it would have interruptions; since it is accepted that the Buddha operates constantly like the mirror wisdom, if he did not enter cessation, or even if he entered it [the consciousness] did not cease, then the sixth would operate constantly—how could the objection be valid?

5.11

As for the statement that both the thesis and the reason established would have errors: The Commentary says: "If there is a decisive contradiction with the essential nature of the predicate, one should modify that reason, saying: 'Excluding the manovijñāna of the noble path and so forth, it has no co-existent support; because it is manovijñāna; like the manovijñāna of the three states.' Since the reason is modified from before, the previous reason should also exclude what is subsumed under the six consciousnesses of the three states; thus there is no fallacy of inconclusiveness (anaikāntika)." The Shuyao says: "Furthermore, the reason has a contradiction with the essential nature of its own predicate, because it takes the indeterminate mental state of the aśaikṣa as a homologous example (sapakṣa)." The intention of this syllogism is: Because an aśaikṣa constantly lacks the seventh, regarding the statement that it is indeterminate: excluding when in the cessation concentration where the sixth consciousness is absent, one takes the sixth manovijñāna when not entering cessation as the homologous example. However, in terms of logical reasoning, there are two theses here: first, generally establishing the sixth manovijñāna; second, excluding the three states and taking the remaining sixth [consciousness]. The reason also has two: first, a general reason, 'because it is subsumed under the six consciousnesses'; second, a specific reason, also excluding the three states as non-three states, 'because it is subsumed under the remaining six consciousnesses'. As appropriate, each of the two reasons establishes the two theses; the fallacies can be known through reflection.

5.12

The Śāstra: "First, it is common to the mental continuum of all ordinary persons (pṛthagjana)." Ximing offers two explanations: first, it explains the continuum of grasping; second, it says that "continuum" refers to the body, and its intention favors this latter interpretation. The Yaoji also says: "This refers to the body of the five aggregates as a continuum, not to grasping and not to the mind." Now I say this is not so. The intention of this text is to reveal that the distinctions among the three states involve continuity and interruption. First it explains it generally, and later it re-examines the times of arising and non-arising. Therefore, the preceding 'continuum' explains that this accompanying intention has interruption and continuity; it does not explain its body. If one took the body of the five aggregates as the support and called it a continuum, then, just as grasping at a self also depends on the body of a noble one, why is it not called a continuum? The wisdom of equality also depends on a bodhisattva, so why is it also not called a continuum?

5.13

The Śāstra: "Although the functions of the two views of self and dharmas differ, they equally rely on a single insight (prajñā)." The Yaoji and others say: "There are definitely no separate seeds for the cognitive hindrances (jñeyāvaraṇa)." This has already been briefly explained before; now it is shown once more. If there are no separate seeds, when the arhats and others give rise to grasping at dharmas, can they perfuse seeds or not? If you say they do not perfuse, which of the four characteristics of a perfuser do they lack that they would not perfuse? If you say they are permitted to perfuse, how could these not be separate seeds? For what is perfumed is solely cognitive hindrances. Furthermore, they themselves say: 'The functional divisions of a single insight perfuse into two kinds of seeds'—this means they are indeed separate seeds. Why say they must be identical? That it is spoken of as an affliction is based on the root [afflictions] and the majority.

5.14

The Śāstra: "The intention accompanying grasping at dharmas, with respect to the two vehicles and so forth"—"and so forth" includes ordinary persons; that is, the two vehicles and ordinary persons. Ximing and others say: "'And so forth' includes the bodhisattva's wisdom of pudgala-śūnyatā, because since it does not obstruct that wisdom, it is also termed undefiled." The Yaoji says: "The latter explanation is superior. If it includes ordinary persons, bodhisattvas also have it; why not include them?" Now I say the former is superior. The Śāstra says: "With respect to bodhisattvas"—this includes both ordinary persons and nobles. If, with respect to a bodhisattva's [wisdom of] pudgala-śūnyatā, it is undefiled, then when giving rise to pudgala-śūnyatā, could one not be a bodhisattva? Furthermore, it should also say, 'With respect to bodhisattvas, excluding the wisdom of pudgala-śūnyatā, it is also termed defiled.' The preceding phrase is a general statement, and the text moreover makes no exclusion. Hence we know that looking at it generally, it does not include the time when a bodhisattva gives rise to pudgala-śūnyatā. However, regarding bodhisattvas it does not say 'and so forth', because the word 'all' subsumes them. Since the former shadows the latter, neither has any fault.

5.15

The Śāstra: "It is subsumed under that produced from maturation": as for a mind produced from maturation, down to transformation [minds]: there is a distinction between Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna. In Hīnayāna, the four minds are definitively only indeterminate (avyākṛta). However, the transformation mind is common to the desire and form realms; the mind of deportment is broad, and what the other three do not subsume all falls under deportment; it is only single, never double. Question: When one receives the precepts and so forth, which gives rise to deportment, is this not wholesome? Answer: That school's intention says: The wish to obtain the precepts—this mind is wholesome. Arising to prostrate and so forth is simply indeterminate. However, their establishment of the precept essence is not based on volition that initiates bodily and vocal karma, but is established on form and sound. In Mahāyāna, the transformation [mind] belongs only to the four dhyānas, common to wholesome and indeterminate, and to defiled and undefiled; the other three are common in nature to defiled and undefiled, as explained previously. However, they can arise combined, as when walking on a road while singing, dancing, and beating a drum; or minds occurring before and after can also arise concurrently, or a mind of karmic fruition cannot arise concurrently. If they are not karmic fruition and wholesome or unwholesome, they can be described by way of the four minds; it does not mean multiple minds exist side by side. The Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra states: "These exist conventionally; therefore they are called indeterminate"—this is based on a specific explanation.

5.16

The Śāstra: "Speaks of citta, manas, and vijñāna." The Sarvāstivādins say: "There are differences in meaning across five gates: first, the gate of names, which merely assigns names; second, the gate of meanings, where accumulating is called citta, discerning is called vijñāna, and cogitating is called manas; third, the gate of activities, where knowing from afar is called citta, initiating and guiding is called manas, and taking rebirth is called vijñāna; fourth, the gate of time periods, where the past is called manas, the present is called citta, and the future is called vijñāna; fifth, the gate of designation, where in the aggregates it is called vijñāna, in the bases (āyatana) it is called manas, and in the elements (dhātu) it is called citta. All of these are common to the six consciousnesses; there are no citta and manas separate from and outside of the six." When examining the texts and commentaries later, the Mahāyāna is different.

5.17

Regarding the Vimuktisūtra, some say: "Because one severs hindrances by means of the path and attains liberation, it is called the Vimuktisūtra." The Yaoji says: "Such as the Devaparipṛcchā and so forth, because they are not named Vimuktisūtra?" Now I say this is not so. What sūtra does not enjoin cultivating the path to sever hindrances? If not so, how could it be said: "Because it adduces an antidote, it is clearly the Buddha's preaching"? Therefore, the previous explanation is correct. However, Devaparipṛcchā is a specific name, whereas "vimukti" is a general name for those not entering into the āgamas. Regarding "the defiled intention constantly..." and so forth, various schools explain it differently. First, the Sarvāstivādins say: "'Defiled intention' refers to the sixth consciousness. 'Constantly' does not mean uninterrupted, hence it is called 'constantly', just as constantly giving food or constantly experiencing pleasure, and so forth. 'Co-arising and ceasing' does not mean simultaneous; because arising and ceasing are both present, it is called 'co-', which means all delusions have arising and ceasing. As for one who is liberated, when the antidotal path arises, it is 'neither past nor future' simply because one abandons its acquisition (prāpti) and is free from the bondage of objects; it is not that it lacks essential nature." The Sthaviravādins say: "'Defiled intention constantly' refers to the subtle manovijñāna, because it is uninterrupted. Since delusions co-arise, it says 'co-arising and ceasing'. Since past and future do not exist, it is 'neither past nor future'." Question: If the subtle manovijñāna, like taking rebirth and so forth, continues constantly and is accompanied by the four delusions, why does the second chapter of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha say: "Because it is based on defilement, there is no interruption in time," using this as an objection? Furthermore, in the cycle of nine mental states, the bhavaṅgacitta is the rebirth-linking mind, which is purely indeterminate. Moreover, later, reconciling the Yogācārabhūmi, it says that in Avīci hell there is maturation-produced [mind], which is the Sthavira doctrine; following this, it is not a subtle defiled intention that takes rebirth, so would this not fail to be their explanation? Answer: Within the Sthaviravādin school there are fundamental and derivative doctrines: taking rebirth unhindered (anivṛta) is the fundamental doctrine, while taking rebirth with a subtle defiled intention is the derivative doctrine. Among the Sautrāntikas there are also fundamental and derivative doctrines; the explanation of the sūtra should follow this.

5.18

Clarifying unshared ignorance (āveṇikī avidyā): The fifth fascicle of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha states: "This cannot be admitted to exist in the five consciousnesses. In that place there is no antidote. Where there is an antidote, there is something to be antidoted. There is no such antidote in the five consciousnesses, because in this [stage] the path of seeing does not arise." This means that the five consciousnesses in the stage of the path of seeing have not yet become undefiled. If there were unshared ignorance, then even in the noble stage it would be called "intoxication," which contradicts the teachings, for [the sūtra] speaks of ordinary persons and does not say that nobles also constantly give rise [to it]. Furthermore, this is spoken in reference to a bodhisattva giving rise to the path of seeing, at which time the seventh is also undefiled; it does not refer to the path of seeing generated by the two vehicles, nor does the sixth establish the seventh. Question: Since beings devoid of [Buddha-]nature lack an antidote, should it not be completely non-existent in them? Answer: Because they are ordinary persons. Moreover, the intention of this objection is formulated provisionally with respect to those with nature who give rise to the path of seeing. Otherwise, if one admits that the five [consciousnesses] have the wisdom that accomplishes activities, they ought to have unshared [ignorance]. Question: The Mahāyānasaṃgraha further says: "Nor is it present within the defiled manovijñāna, because when it is associated together with other afflictions, the name 'unshared ignorance' would not be established." Since this is so, how could it be accompanied by the four delusions, meaning the first master's position should be superior? Answer: That Śāstra, in formulating the objection, says: "Unshared ignorance would also not be established, because it is constantly associated with the view of self and so forth." It explains itself: "Your objection is inequitable; it is not that I say it is not associated with other afflictions and therefore is called unshared. Rather, it is said that because that delusion is absent in other places, it is therefore called unshared, just as the eighteen unshared Buddha dharmas [are unshared]. What was said earlier—that association with other afflictions makes the name unestablished—was said in observation of what the other established in order to expose their error." The meaning is: taking the position of others like the Sarvāstivādins who say that being accompanied by others is not called unshared, it exposes their self-contradiction, and therefore raises this objection. It is not that I myself say that when accompanied by other delusions it is not called unshared.

5.19

Regarding the Śāstra's statement: "If this consciousness did not exist, how could that basis exist?": the Mahāyāna reveals to the Hīnayāna that if the seventh [consciousness] did not exist, the meaning of the sūtras would not be established. Therefore, challenging the outsider, it says: The eye and [the other senses] here subsume co-arising faculties, which are called the two conditions. The manas is also subsumed among the six, so it should rely on the present manas to be called the two conditions. The outsider challenges the Mahāyāna, saying: Manovijñāna is produced from two conditions; since it grasps the non-existent, the manas can arise, so why shouldn't it be admissible that the faculty produced from two conditions can arise even without the manas? The Sautrāntikas agree with the Mahāyāna in maintaining that past and future do not exist, and also allow that [consciousness] arises while grasping the non-existent; hence this challenge is made. The reply: Holding its own existence or non-existence, both are dharmas; grasping non-existence while manifesting forms, it arises from two conditions; the past, extinguished manas does not exist at present, so when the faculty of manovijñāna is absent, it should not arise. If the Sarvāstivādins make the previous objection from the standpoint of the Mahāyāna school, it is also admissible. The Sautrāntikas hold that what has ceased is non-existent and designate the name "manas" merely nominally; challenging from the Mahāyāna standpoint, they say: For the five consciousnesses, the six pairs of two conditions involve real cognitive objects and their faculties are also real; for the manovijñāna, the six pairs of two conditions involve nominal cognitive objects and its faculty is also nominal. However, below there is a separate refutation of the Sautrāntikas; here it is preliminarily set forth. The Sarvāstivādins also base their objection on the Mahāyāna. The reply: It is said that the faculty-dharma is the support, and concurrent with the manas it is not an acquisition of a nominal designation. Alternatively, it is explained that the immediate perceived aspect is produced through conditions, and even if the substantial referent is absent, it is still real; just like the five and six pairs of two conditions, the supporting faculty is not nominal. The outsider again challenges: The sūtras say that with the six pairs of two conditions, if the faculty is nominal, consciousness does not arise; since consciousness depends on the six pairs of two conditions, if the object is nominal, should it not also fail to arise? The reply: The force of the cognitive object is distant and indirect; even if it is nominal, consciousness can arise. The supporting basis is a superior predominant condition; its force is proximate, so if it is nominal, [consciousness] cannot arise. Nevertheless, it is preferable to equate the immediate perceived aspect with the faculty as currently real.

5.20

One cannot say that physical matter serves as its support. In refuting the Sthaviravāda, it is said: The five consciousnesses rely on physical faculties, and the five consciousnesses lack conceptual discrimination; manovijñāna relies on physical faculties, [so] manovijñāna should lack conceptual discrimination. Challenging the Mahāyāna in return, they say: The eighth relies on the mental faculty, and the eighth lacks conceptual discrimination; what prevents the sixth from relying on a physical faculty while the manovijñāna possesses conceptual discrimination? The reply: The nature of physical matter is dull; relying on it, the five do not discriminate. The mental dharma is an eminent support; it must involve thought before it discriminates. The outsider challenges: The sixth relies on the mental faculty, and the sixth possesses conceptual discrimination; the eighth relies on the mental faculty, [so] should the eighth possess conceptual discrimination? The reply: The intrinsic nature of the eighth lacks clear discernment, so although it relies on the mental faculty, it does not discriminate. The intrinsic nature of the sixth has many capacities, and by additionally obtaining the mental support, it therefore discriminates. Question: What is present is called manas, and what has already ceased is designated with the name manas on this basis; what is present is also called vijñāna, so should what has already ceased also be called vijñāna on the basis of what is present? The reply: The name manas applies to two senses; having already ceased, it receives the name manas as a support. Consciousness only signifies discernment; having already ceased, it lacks capacity and is not called consciousness.

5.21

Regarding the Śāstra's statement: "Due to the self-grasping, it causes the six consciousnesses to..." and so forth: The Commentary provides two explanations and takes the latter explanation as correct. Ximing takes the former, and the Yaoji agrees. Now I consider the latter explanation superior: due to the self-grasping, one cannot eliminate signs. When one says, "I am able to practice giving," could the self of the seventh arise by objectifying giving and the like, saying "I am able to give"? Therefore, the intention of the original Commentary is that this sixth self, taking the seventh self as its supporting basis, has its cognitive mode augmented and clarified; it is not saying that "I give" is the seventh self. If grasping the signs of the three wheels were the seventh self, prior to the seventh bhūmi it would sometimes not yet be subdued, how much less prior to the bhūmis? Since it cannot be subdued, how could the three wheels of giving and the like eliminate signs? Therefore, regarding the bond of signs, there are two kinds: first, common to all signs, caused by the seventh self; second, grasping the signs of the three wheels, which, although also caused by the seventh, refers properly to the sixth. However, because the Mahāyānasaṃgraha relies on the supporting basis, it says: "To think oneself able to cultivate giving and the like does not occur apart from being accompanied by ignorance and self-grasping, nor does ignorance and the like exist apart from the supporting basis." If it were directly stated that the self-grasping of the seventh is incapable of eliminating signs, it should say: "It does not occur apart from the intrinsic nature of ignorance and self-grasping being able to grasp signs," and so forth. Why would it need to say: "not apart from being accompanied by ignorance and self-grasping, not apart from the supporting basis"? Thus, it speaks of that from which it originates, not that it is identical with it. Moreover, as for this Śāstra citing the Yogācārabhūmi as proof, it is because it serves as a general proof, not that it only proves the signs of those three wheels. If it were said that only non-conceptual wisdom can subdue these signs, then prior to the path of seeing there would be no pāramitā. Prior to the bhūmis, one cultivates sāsrava preparatory non-conceptual wisdom, which can subdue the sixth [consciousness], thus fulfilling the pāramitā. Question: Is the bond of signs the affliction obstacle or the knowledge obstacle? Answer: If either were assumed, what would be the fault? Both have flaws. If it were due to the affliction obstacle, the sāsrava mental states of an aśaikha of the two vehicles should be free from the bond of signs, because self-grasping is severed. If it were due to the knowledge obstacle, the post-attainment wisdom realizing the emptiness of self should possess the bond of signs. There are two explanations: First, one says it is due to the knowledge obstacle. If so, why should the post-attainment wisdom realizing the emptiness of self be bound? Answer: Because they are not mutually compliant; according to Sthiramati's explanation, this is correct. Second, one says that the affliction obstacle constitutes the entity of the bond of signs. If so, should the sāsrava wholesome and indeterminate minds of an aśaikha of the two vehicles lack the bond of signs? Answer: Because the entity of this perceived aspect is sāsrava, it is perfumed into seeds by what was induced by it. Now, although the entity of that self-grasping is completely severed, the bond of signs still persists due to this. However, the entity of dharma-grasping is not the primary bond of signs; since grasping existent signs serves as a basis to assist that self-grasping in arising, it is an auxiliary bond of signs. The scattered wholesome and indeterminate minds of an aśaikha also possess this assistance and have not separated from the bond of signs, whereas in the post-attainment wisdom of emptiness of self, although there is this assistance, there is no sign perfumed by the past sāsrava acting as the primary bond of signs, and thus it can be said to be absent. This explanation is correct. However, grasping the signs of the three wheels belongs solely to the sixth consciousness, because the five and eight are spontaneous and the seventh cognizes internally. If sāsrava signs are called the bond of signs, it pervades the eight consciousnesses. Question: The various treatises only say that "it causes the six consciousnesses to be unable to eliminate signs"; how can one now say it pervades the eight consciousnesses? Answer: That is stated with respect to the three wheels: it causes the sixth consciousness, through grasping a self, to cause all the first six consciousnesses to be bound by signs and fail to understand illusion. The seventh cognizing the eighth is also bound by signs, and because it is the root of the bond of signs, all are the bond of signs. If the seventh's grasping a self were not called the bond of signs, how could the six consciousnesses be called the bond of signs? Furthermore, this Śāstra says: "The bond of signs means being unable to comprehend objective signs as like an illusion, etc." Due to this, the perceiving aspect and perceived aspect are constrained and do not attain mastery; therefore, it is called the bond of signs. From this it is known that it pervades the eight consciousnesses. Question: If so, should the five and eight of an aśaikha of the two vehicles possess the bond of signs, because they do not comprehend illusion? Answer: There are two explanations: First, one says that because the defiled manas is extinguished, the five and eight are free from bond. Second, one says that since they objectify the perceived aspect produced from the sāsrava, which is a conceptualized sign, it remains a bond of signs. Just as with sāsrava, which previously became sāsrava together with the sāsrava of the seventh, when the defiled seventh is absent, the two consciousnesses—the five and the eight—are still subsumed under sāsrava; the bond of signs should be likewise.

5.22

Question: When signs bind the perceiving [aspect], the sign is called a bond. When the perceiving [aspect] binds the self-witnessing [aspect], is it called the bond of perception, etc.? Answer: As explained in the Xunyao, it is also permitted to be called a bond. Some say: being of the same seed is not a bond; being of distinct seeds constitutes a bond. The Yaoji states: "Now I consider that the perceiving [aspect] has the three wheels and is not like an illusion, etc.; hence it is called the bond of signs. The other aspects are not like this, so they are not called bonds." Some say this contradicts the text, because it is only regarding giving and so forth that signs are not eliminated. Others say it contradicts reason, because the aspects of cognitive agent and object that arise as fruits from the same seed—how could one not allow them to be spoken of as the binding and bound? Now I consider that the Yaoji is self-contradictory before and after. How so? When refuting the view that says "some say," it states that it contradicts the text, for the text only says that in giving, etc., signs are not eliminated, which means it does not allow the other aspects to be called bonds. When refuting the view that says "others say," it refers precisely to the cognitive agent and object. If one allows the cognitive agent and object to constitute a bond, the former objection regarding the three wheels is invalid. If only the three wheels are called bonds, then neither the cognitive agent nor the object is a bond. If one says: the refutation of "some say" is based on the bond of signs, and the refutation of "others say" is based on the bond of cognitive agent and object, if so, could the bond of cognitive agent and object not be a bond? Since it itself allows it to be a bond, how can it refute the view that says "some say"? The view of "some say" harmonizes the treatise's discussion of the three wheels, since the text speaks according to what is easy to understand. Furthermore, the Śāstra states: Bonds are of many kinds. Sometimes two bonds are spoken of: first, the associated bond; second, the object-boundary bond. Sometimes another two bonds are spoken of: first, the cognizing agent bond; second, the object-boundary bond. Sometimes another two bonds are spoken of: first, the bond of signs; second, the bond of dauṣṭhulya. When the cognizing mind and mental factors are accompanied by afflictions, they do not attain mastery, because they are bound by the associated dharmas; being associated is itself the bond, named as a karmadhāraya compound. When the cognizing mind and mental factors are constrained by the objective boundary, it is called the object-boundary bond, which pervades minds with dharma-grasping. The cognizing agent bond means that the bound object is bound by the cognizing mind, as in the designation of the ālaya. The bond of signs means that the mind is constrained by signs; hence it is named the bond of signs. The bond of signs is threefold: First, one says all perceived aspects are called bonds; this is Master Sthiramati, speaking according to dharma-grasping, because of the grāhya and grāhaka; although knowing they are like illusions, they cannot be without intrinsic nature. Or, agreeing with Dharmapāla, it only relies on self-grasping failing to comprehend [them] as like illusions, not on dharma-grasping. It also says: when this manas is not yet extinguished, the bond of consciousness is never cast off. Since manas is absent in the three states, there is no bond of signs. Second, one says that merely sāsrava signs are called the bond of signs, exclusively excluding anāsrava, pervading the eight consciousnesses. One says it is based on dharma-grasping failing to comprehend illusions, grasping them as existent; another says it is based on self-grasping merely failing to comprehend illusions, which constitutes the bond of signs, thus pervading dharma-grasping. If illusions are not comprehended as illusions, the bond in saṃsāra is called the bond of signs, existing solely in self-grasping. Third, one says it is based on the signs of the three wheels in practicing the six pāramitās, residing solely in the signs objectified by the consciousness associated with the sixth self-grasping, whereby one cannot reach the other shore. If so, since wholesome minds all lack self-grasping and practicing the pāramitās is wholesome, should they be free from the bond of signs? Answer: It speaks according to alternation, whereby one cannot eliminate signs. Question: If being free from the intermixture of self is called signlessness, what difference is there between supremacy of skillful means and supremacy of purity? Answer: Skillful means is based on absence of grasping; purity is based on absence of regret. The various explanations of the bond of signs do not go beyond these. As for the bond of dauṣṭhulya, summarizing the various texts, dauṣṭhulya has four kinds: first, active sāsrava minds and mental factors, namely the twenty-four kinds of dauṣṭhulya spoken of in the Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā; second, the active two obstacles; third, the seeds of the two obstacles; fourth, the vāsanā of the two obstacles. Or alternatively, for the active states, one generally speaks of the sāsrava mental dharmas of the three natures, and the same should hold for seeds; because the dauṣṭhulya meaning of wholesome and indeterminate seeds is slightly subtle, it is generally omitted in brief. Now, speaking of the bond of signs, it is based on self-grasping, being cited with reference to the six pāramitās; in accordance with what is common and uncommon, confronting the Hīnayāna it is explained based on self-grasping, whereas according to one's own doctrine it is explained with reference to the six pāramitās. As for dauṣṭhulya, this Śāstra does not clarify it, but cited sūtra verses contain it; according to what is appropriate, both śamatha and vipaśyanā must be cultivated to eradicate it, and speaking generally there is no error.

5.23

Because the phrase 'defiled' (sāsrava) expresses that which is together with outflows (āsrava). There are three kinds of 'sāsrava': First, its substance itself is an outflow and it is possessed by existence; hence it is called 'sāsrava'—namely, 'existence-outflow' (bhava-āsrava) among the three outflows. 'Existence' refers to the three realms of existence. Here, this refers to the inner body of the higher realms as 'existence', because in the upper two realms one gives rise to attachment with reference to the body, being detached from desire for external objects; thus the outflow of existence is called 'sāsrava'. That is, the afflictions of the two upper realms are called 'sāsrava', where the outflow is what is possessed. Second, because it possesses other outflows, it is called 'sāsrava'; that is, this refers to being that which is capable of possessing them. Third, because of conjunction with the nature of outflows, it is called 'sāsrava'; this is also the substance of the afflictions itself. Because this outflow is within saṃsāra, its substance has efficacy, and it is called 'sāsrava'. Now, here, in expressing that which is together with outflows, one takes that substance which is capable of possessing them to be called 'sāsrava', not taking the afflictions [themselves]. Therefore, the previous objection was raised specifically, saying: 'Furthermore, at the time of wholesome and unobstructed neutral minds, if there is no self-grasping, they would not be sāsrava.' The Yogācārabhūmi speaks only of possessing other outflows, whereas the Samuccaya speaks comprehensively. Objection: If only when together with outflows does it become sāsrava, then this contradicts both the third fascicle of the Samuccaya and the sixty-fifth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi. The treatises of both do not define sāsrava merely as being together with outflows. How do these two treatises explain it? First, the Abhidharma[-samuccaya] states: 'Because of the intrinsic nature of outflows, because of connection with outflows, because of being bound by outflows, because of being accompanied by outflows, because of according with outflows, and because of the category of outflows.' First, 'because of the intrinsic nature of outflows' refers to the substance of the afflictions. Being conjoined with the nature of outflows, it is called 'sāsrava'. Because this intrinsic nature is an outflow, residing in saṃsāra, it is called 'conjoined with the nature of outflows'. The remaining five kinds are called 'sāsrava' by virtue of this intrinsic nature. 'Connection with outflows' refers to association with outflows and serving as the support of outflows; that is, defiled minds and mental factors are called 'associated', while the omnipresent, the particular, and the first seven consciousnesses, along with the eye and other five sense faculties when accompanied by defilements, are called the 'support of outflows'. 'Being bound by them' refers to sāsrava wholesome dharmas, because through the power of outflows they invite future existence; here, the six external sense fields and neutral minds are also subsumed, though this is stated provisionally in terms of the wholesome. If according with the Yogācārabhūmi, past and future sāsrava dharmas, as well as wholesome and neutral minds, are all not 'bound', and present external sense fields when not cognized by direct perception are also not 'bound'. That treatise speaks in terms of external models (dharmas with substance), because past and future do not exist, and wholesome and neutral minds are not associated with outflows; when an outflow-mind cognizes them, they are in the past or future. When present form is not cognized by a mind of direct perception, it does not directly lean on a material model, and thus is said not to be an object-field. The Abhidharmasamuccaya, speaking in terms of both the immediate image-part and the distant objective support, states that they also constitute objective supports, which agrees with fascicle sixty-six on the explanation of abandoning the binding of object-support; each relies on a particular meaning, so they do not contradict one another. 'Being accompanied by outflows' refers to dharmas of other planes, which do not mutually augment one another. 'According with outflows' refers to the aids to penetration (nirvedha-bhāgīya); they are not augmented by different planes, but can be augmented by the same plane, because it is possible for them to be together with outflows; if they were anāsrava, they would not be 'according with'. Those that are sāsrava, although their increase turns away from existence, are nevertheless together with outflows; otherwise, being together with outflows would not designate an outflow. Or, although together with outflows, they do not augment them, because they can transform in accord with diminishing power and increasing efficacy; yet they are established as sāsrava, and the statement about 'augmenting' is made in terms of the remaining outflows. 'The category of outflows' refers to the aggregates of the arhat, because they were generated by the afflictions of a prior life. The sixty-fifth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi states: 'The distinctions of sāsrava are due to five characteristics: namely, by reason of basis, by reason of dormant tendency (anuśaya), by reason of association, by reason of objective support, and by reason of arising.' 'Basis' refers to pure forms and the minds and mental factors of the three moral natures; these are the substantive bases capable of possessing all outflows. According to what is appropriate, they are termed 'sāsrava' by virtue of the other four characteristics: namely, by reason of dormant tendency, by reason of association, by reason of objective support, and by reason of arising. That is, the seeds of unabandoned afflictions belonging to the aforementioned dharmas are called 'dormant tendencies'; by reason of these seeds, those [dharmas] are called 'sāsrava'. Defiled minds and mental factors are called 'sāsrava' by reason of association. If all existent entities are the scope of direct perception, or if they are prominently generated from the production of sāsrava, all such things are called 'sāsrava' because they are the objective supports of outflows. The present is called 'existent entity'; when it is the scope of consciousness relying on pure form, it is called 'the scope of direct perception'. This is stated in terms of greed and other [defilements] directly cognizing forms and other objects, which are called the objective supports of outflows; the rest are not objective supports. The treatise states: 'It is only through the appearance generated by one's own conceptual discrimination that afflictions arise; it is not that those dharmas are the distinctly cognized object-domain of this [consciousness]'; hence it is reconciled as before. As for becoming sāsrava 'by reason of arising': because dormant tendencies have not been abandoned, objects that accord with afflictions become manifest; this is stated in terms of being induced by defilements. It also states: 'Arising from all unwholesome afflictions, the various maturation fruits, and external things predominantly induced by maturation fruits; also because of arising, they are called sāsrava.' Produced relying on these sāsrava fruits, they are also called 'sāsrava'. In the sāsrava state, among the three moral natures, how many of the six meanings according to the Samuccaya and the five meanings according to the Yogācārabhūmi does each of the five categories of dharmas possess so as to be termed 'sāsrava'? This is analyzed in the lower fascicle of the Pivotal Essentials (Zongyao), in the explanation of the twelve links and the three kinds of abandonment. Based on these two passages, how could it be that only being together with outflows is called sāsrava? Answer: This [treatise] is based on the primary cause, while those are based on distinct meanings; hence there is no contradiction.

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