成唯識論了義燈 5.63

5.63

Question: If it is admitted that shame and remorse necessarily arise together, why does [fascicle] fifty-three state: 'If shame is presently manifest, remorse is also necessarily present; but one who has remorse does not necessarily have shame, and therefore the factor of shame is the most predominant'? Answer: That is stated based on a different meaning. When a recipient of precepts complies with protecting the minds of others, remorse arises with respect to others, and shame arises with respect to oneself. When one feels shame with respect to oneself, one also necessarily looks toward others and generates remorse, because when one's regard for oneself increases, one will certainly feel shame before others. If, with respect to others, one feels remorse, shame does not necessarily arise, because regard for oneself is weak. Alternatively, it is spoken in terms of what is predominant; all such conflicts should be understood by this principle. Question: It is said of faith that it causes others to be purified, and of equanimity that it causes others to be quieted; can these [factors of] shame and remorse cause others to revere, cause others to reject, and so forth? Answer: Since there is no text in the treatise, even if they cannot, what fault is there? Because the functions of the various mental factors are distinct. For instance, attention can alert other [mental factors], but it does not cause the alerted ones to also be able to alert. Even if they also cause others to revere and reject, what fault is there? Because the functions of mind and mental factors have universal and particular scopes, as is the nature of dharmas. However, they are not necessarily all analogous.