成唯識論了義燈 6.2

6.2

Regarding the statement 'cognized by other consciousnesses': The original commentary is as in the subcommentary. Ximing states: 'The sixth manovijñāna and the subtle manovijñāna posited by the Mahāsāṃghika and others, as well as the seventh and eighth [consciousnesses] of our own tradition, are all the subject (dharmin) [of the syllogism], because they are cognized by other consciousnesses. However, since the seventh and eighth consciousnesses were already established earlier based on reason and teaching, the subject is successfully established.' Now I say this is not so: if what was established earlier makes the subject successfully established, it would not be a matter of taking external phenomena that were already established earlier, which would render it an already established thesis (siddhasādhana). If it is said that earlier they were established as existent, whereas now they are established as not separate [from consciousness], hence it is not an already established thesis—earlier, their being not separate from consciousness was also repeatedly established. Furthermore, the Mahāsāṃghika posits two sixth manovijñānas, coarse and subtle; if we now also posit them, would that not contradict our own school? If it is said that their subtle one is precisely our eighth [consciousness], why establish the subtle manovijñāna posited by the Mahāsāṃghika? For we establish our own eighth consciousness! Moreover, if one does not include the word 'mutually accepted' (prasiddha), then for the unwholesome manovijñāna of a bodhisattva in his final body and the sixth manovijñāna of Buddhas of other directions, there would also be the fault of a partially unestablished subject (ekadeśāsiddhadharmin) within the subject. But if one includes 'mutually accepted', then the seventh and eighth consciousnesses are not universally accepted by the others. The Yaoji states: 'If the seventh and eighth are included within "other consciousnesses", although the subject states "other consciousnesses", there is still inconclusiveness (anaikāntika); therefore, another explanation is logically superior.' Now I say this is not so: since the subject of 'other consciousnesses' already encompasses the seventh and eighth, what further consciousness remains to cause inconclusiveness? In order to avoid this fault, it merely states 'other consciousnesses' and does not say 'the sixth'. Furthermore, even if it did not include the seventh and eighth, the directly grasped object is not separate from the consciousness that can grasp it, so there is also no inconclusiveness.