成唯識論了義燈 6

English (machine translation) 6

Language: English

6.1

Composed by the monk (bhikṣu) Huizhao of Dayun Monastery in Zizhou.

Regarding the statement 'cognized by other consciousnesses': The original commentary is as in the subcommentary. Ximing states: 'The sixth manovijñāna and the subtle manovijñāna posited by the Mahāsāṃghika and others, as well as the seventh and eighth [consciousnesses] of our own tradition, are all the subject (dharmin) [of the syllogism], because they are cognized by other consciousnesses. However, since the seventh and eighth consciousnesses were already established earlier based on reason and teaching, the subject is successfully established.' Now I say this is not so: if what was established earlier makes the subject successfully established, it would not be a matter of taking external phenomena that were already established earlier, which would render it an already established thesis (siddhasādhana). If it is said that earlier they were established as existent, whereas now they are established as not separate [from consciousness], hence it is not an already established thesis—earlier, their being not separate from consciousness was also repeatedly established. Furthermore, the Mahāsāṃghika posits two sixth manovijñānas, coarse and subtle; if we now also posit them, would that not contradict our own school? If it is said that their subtle one is precisely our eighth [consciousness], why establish the subtle manovijñāna posited by the Mahāsāṃghika? For we establish our own eighth consciousness! Moreover, if one does not include the word 'mutually accepted' (prasiddha), then for the unwholesome manovijñāna of a bodhisattva in his final body and the sixth manovijñāna of Buddhas of other directions, there would also be the fault of a partially unestablished subject (ekadeśāsiddhadharmin) within the subject. But if one includes 'mutually accepted', then the seventh and eighth consciousnesses are not universally accepted by the others. The Yaoji states: 'If the seventh and eighth are included within "other consciousnesses", although the subject states "other consciousnesses", there is still inconclusiveness (anaikāntika); therefore, another explanation is logically superior.' Now I say this is not so: since the subject of 'other consciousnesses' already encompasses the seventh and eighth, what further consciousness remains to cause inconclusiveness? In order to avoid this fault, it merely states 'other consciousnesses' and does not say 'the sixth'. Furthermore, even if it did not include the seventh and eighth, the directly grasped object is not separate from the consciousness that can grasp it, so there is also no inconclusiveness.

6.3

The treatise: "This means that when consciousness and the like arise, they have no real function," and so forth. In the Mahāyāna, there is truly no physical form arising in a mirror. The Sarvāstivādins maintain that a distinct form is generated. Therefore, this treatise states: "It merely appears like an external object, just as with a mirror and the like." The original explanation: 'just as with you' means just as with those Sarvāstivādins and the like. As for the Sautrāntika school, although there is no distinct form, there is still a simulated appearance. It is not that the Mahāyāna school accepts that there is a distinct form. Therefore, the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa and other texts say: "like a scorched grain sprout, like an echo in a valley, like an image in a mirror," and so on, all as metaphors for nonexistence. If so, why do the Mahāyānasaṃgraha and other texts use the mirror image and the like as metaphors for the other-dependent nature (paratantra-svabhāva)? One cannot conform to the other, for the other takes it as real. Since one's own system has no distinct form, how can it serve as a metaphor for the other-dependent? Answer: There are two meanings: first, taking the meaning of not being separate; second, taking the meaning of resemblance. For instance, regarding an image in a mirror, the Sarvāstivādins hold: first, it is not separate from the mirror; second, it resembles the face or other image, yet is not the real face. It does not take whether the image-form is real or unreal. Facing the Sarvāstivādins, one takes those two meanings; facing the Sautrāntikas, one takes the meaning of seeming existence, which in reality is not separate from mind. Question: Since in the Mahāyāna there is truly no image in a mirror, why does the Saṃdhinirmocana's chapter on 'Mind, Mentation, and Consciousness' say: "Just as when a single condition for generating a reflection appears before it, only a single reflection arises," and so forth? And the Buddhabhūmi-sūtra says: "Like images of forms appearing in reliance on a round mirror"? Answer: Conforming to other schools and what is accepted in the world, one adopts it as a metaphor, so there is again no contradiction. Although the Sautrāntika has no real reflection, taking it as a simulated appearance is also without fault. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha states: "Due to confusion, one claims to see a reflected image," and so forth, relying on one's own real doctrine to refute other schools. Therefore, the Saṃdhinirmocana says: "With the mirror as a condition, one turns back to see one's own archetype (bimba); it is not that the mirror has a reflection." When the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, fascicle 36, says: "like seeing an image in oil," and so forth, this is also conforming to others; it is not that Nāgārjuna and others grasped it as real.

6.4

Question: In refuting the knowledge of others' minds, it should be that it conditions an external object. Now you say: it conditions one's own mind and does not directly condition another's mind; it should also be that, like taking a mirror as a condition, one turns back to see one's own archetype. Does the mirror serve as a metaphor for the mind, or should one take the archetype? Answer: Supposing it is so, what fault is there? Both have faults. If the mirror is taken as a metaphor for the mind, one should say that taking the mirror as a condition, one turns back to see one's own mirror; thus, taking the mind as a condition, one turns back to see one's own mind—how could one say 'one turns back to see one's own archetype'? Taking the archetype as a metaphor for the mind is to be questioned in the same way. Answer: There are two explanations. One says: provisionally speaking in terms of the dispersed state, one should say that, like the archetype, taking the mirror as a condition, one turns back to see one's own archetype. Now, the knowledge of others' minds, with another's mind as a condition, turns back to see one's own mind. The second says: speaking in terms of meditative concentration, just as concentration serves as a condition, one's own mind transforms into various reflected images that are not separate from one's own mind, like a dispersed mind which, taking a mirror as a condition, turns back to see the original archetype. It is not that, separate from the archetype, a distinct [entity] is generated in the mirror. Question: One's own mind, taking another as a condition, can still see one's own mind; but one's own archetype, taking a mirror as a condition, cannot see—how can the archetype serve as a metaphor? Answer: The metaphor takes a partial aspect: just as the archetype of the eye, taking the mirror as a condition, turns back to see the archetype of the eye. Hence it is said: 'turns back to see one's own archetype.' Although what is seen is not the eye, it is the basis of the eye, conforming to conventional truth. Question: Among what is seen, according to the Mahāyāna school the archetype and the image-aspect (pratibimba) are distinct; how can one say 'turns back to see one's own archetype'? Answer: Subsuming the image-aspect under the archetype, because it resembles the archetype; in terms of what is truly seen, one directly sees one's own image-aspect. Taking a partial metaphor to illustrate the objects grasped by the knowledge of others' minds and the like is completely without fault. Therefore, Asvabhāva's Commentary (Mahāyānasaṃgrahopanibandhana), fascicle 5, states: 'Wholesome and unwholesome volitional karma of the uncollected levels, taking the archetype as a condition, gives rise to the reflected fruit; it is just like this.' Question: For all deluded views, what is the substantial entity of the reflected images seen, and under what category are they subsumed? Answer: Solitary, dispersed conceptual thought falsely grasps that the mirror contains an image and so forth; as for where these reflected images seen by deluded [views] are subsumed, the Yaoji states: 'Some say it is still the base of forms (rūpāyatana), because it resembles the preceding characteristic.' In the original subcommentary there is no such text. The original explanation in the 'Chapter on the Base of Phenomena' in the Fayuan states: 'The reflected form is the base of forms,' referring to the solitary manovijñāna in a dispersed state conditioning the five dusts, called conceptual mind. Subsuming the aspect under the archetype, it is subsumed under the base of forms; this does not address the case of grasping a real form in a mirror as a reflected image. The master's original explanation is that without relying on an archetype, falsely grasping a mirror image as truly existent is an imagined [form] within the base of phenomena (dharmāyatana). Question: In the Prakaraṇāryavācā-śāstra, the form-objects of the five dusts also have reflected form; within the forms of the base of phenomena, the sphere of meditative concentration also has reflected form; and among imagined forms, there is also reflected form. What is the difference? Answer: Reflected forms belonging to the base of forms have two explanations: One says that the conceptual manovijñāna conditions the characteristics of the five dusts; matching the object against the sense faculty, it should be subsumed under the base of phenomena. Now, in accordance with the archetype and the fruit produced, it is included in the base of forms. The second says: what is transformed by the five consciousnesses is called reflected form, while what is transformed by the fundamental consciousness is the remaining form; matching the sense faculty against the object, what is transformed by the eighth [consciousness] should be included in the base of phenomena. Subsuming the dark under the luminous, it is subsumed under the base of forms. Both explanations are admissible, but the second is superior. Imagined reflections have already been briefly discriminated earlier; those belonging to meditative concentration, such as transformed gold and the like which lack real utility, are called reflections of meditative concentration. Question: Taking the mirror as a condition, why does it not say 'turns back to see one's own reflection', since it conditions a reflected image? Answer: Conditioning a reflection is not mutually accepted; subsuming the aspect [under the archetype], it says 'seeing the archetype'.

6.5

In explaining why the knowledge of others' minds is called vijñapti-mātra: Ximing states that Sthiramati gives three explanations and Dharmapāla gives two explanations. Sthiramati has no contradiction. In Dharmapāla's explanations, the second says: 'All grasped objects are not separate from that which grasps them; hence it is called vijñapti-mātra.' In applying this generally to all states, there is an overextension in his statement. In saying 'all grasped objects', he does not distinguish between direct and indirect [objects]. The indirect objective condition (dūra-ālambanapratyaya) overextends to the direct grasped object, universally saying that it is not separate from that which grasps it. If the indirect objective condition were also not separate from the grasping mind, why would one need to say of the knowledge of others' minds: 'It does not directly condition another's mind; therefore it is not a grasping separate from consciousness'? For even if it directly conditioned another's mind, it would still not be separate from one's own mind! Moreover, why was it stated earlier: 'It should not directly condition form and the like that are separate from oneself, because that grasped object is not separate from oneself'? The correct explanation should state: 'All direct grasped objects are not separate from that which grasps them; hence it is called vijñapti-mātra.'

6.6

The treatise: "The all-seed consciousness (sarvabījakavijñāna)." Ximing states: 'Being able to induce its own category and induce simultaneous actual occurrences of its own category is the nature of direct cause (hetupratyaya).' He then asks himself: 'If so, how can the seeds that are drawn forth be of the nature of direct cause?' He explains: 'In reality they are not direct causes, but the Bodhisattvabhūmi nominally designates them as direct causes because they belong to the same category as direct causes.' Now I say this is not so: looking distantly toward future actual occurrences, they are called 'drawing forth' (saṃskāra/ākṣipta); seeds that have not yet been moistened, generating their own category, are also causes of this type, hence they are called direct causes.

6.7

The treatise: "Because it is extremely subtle and perfect." Ximing offers three explanations. The third says: 'The preceding passage generally explains the eighth [consciousness] in both cause and fruit, which means having nothing to be perfumed. The subsequent passage generally explains the eighth in both cause and fruit, where the cause is subtle and the fruit is perfect.' The Yaoji states: 'Among the various explanations, there is one that takes the third as logically concordant.' Now I say this is not so: 'the seven evolving consciousnesses' separately explains the first seven; below 'the eighth mental factor complex', it separately explains the eighth. 'Because it is extremely subtle and perfect' generally explains the eight consciousnesses, being the karmic maturation in the causal stage and anāsrava in the fruit stage, the reason why they are not perfumed: because the karmic maturation is extremely subtle and inferior, it is not perfumed; because the anāsrava state of the fruit stage is extremely perfect, it is not perfumed. Otherwise, what reason would there be for stating earlier that, except for the wholesome of the Buddha-fruit and the extremely inferior neutral, they cannot be perfumed? Therefore, the original explanation is logically superior. For the subcommentary explains: 'Another explanation is that the eighth in the causal stage and the ripening mind among the six consciousnesses are both not perfumed because they are extremely subtle; the eighth on the fruit stage, because it is extremely perfect, specifically excludes the eighth as being anāsrava only on the fruit stage. There are divergent explanations of the five consciousnesses, some allowing them to extend to the causal stage. Since the wholesome phenomena of the Buddha body neither increase nor decrease, in reality all eight consciousnesses of the fruit should be excluded, generally explaining the eight consciousnesses.' Hence, the earlier treatise merely stated that there are seven that can perfume the fundamental consciousness to produce seeds of their own category.

6.8

[The Śāstra states:] "Because an ordinary person (pṛthagjana) seeking to proceed to the form realm brings forth an anāsrava [mind] after [a form-realm] mind, etc." The original commentary explained: One who awakens abruptly (sāhasika) reaches the eighth ground, is born in the fourth dhyāna, first obtains a superior body, and only then undergoes transformation [body] (pariṇāma-deha). Ximing states: An ordinary person seeking Buddhahood is a person of sudden awakening; by force of the anuśaya of the afflictions (kleśa) that have not yet been severed, he brings forth an anāsrava [mind] after a form-realm mind. Now, I say: if it were because the anuśaya have not yet been severed, then he would immediately be born in that heaven. Those of the first two fruits with their anuśaya, and those of the third fruit who have not yet severed [the anuśaya of] the form realm, turning their minds to seek Buddhahood, should likewise definitely be born in the fourth dhyāna, because they possess anuśaya. Thus we know: the superior capacity of sudden awakening does not weary of saṃsāra, and only upon taking the most superior body does one undergo transformation; therefore, he must be born there. The two vehicles are not so; hence their rebirth is not fixed. The Yaoji states: From the eighth ground upward, because one also does not sever anuśaya, taking rebirth is useful. Therefore, only upon the tenth ground is one born in the Maheśvara [Heaven]. Bodhisattvas of the other grounds cannot be born there, because they have not fully cultivated the perfuming. For this reason, the fourth fascicle of the Yogācāra[-bhūmi] states: "Through the tenth ground of extreme perfuming and cultivation, one is able to be born within it." The second fascicle of the Prakaraṇārya-śāsana states: "If one well cultivates the fourth dhyāna dwelling within the tenth ground induced by inconceivable samādhi, one obtains the fruit of birth as the Great Maheśvara Deva, which surpasses the Śuddhāvāsa." The sūtra and śāstra passages clearly show: when [practitioners of] the two vehicles turn their minds [to the Mahāyāna], if they are aśaikṣa, all their future births attain apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha. For those of the first two fruits who undergo birth in the desire realm, birth in the higher two realms also attains apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha; they immediately undergo transformed birth right in the desire realm. An anāgāmin who turns his mind in the desire realm immediately receives the transformed retribution right in the desire realm; if he turns his mind in the form realm, he receives it in the form realm. Once these śaikṣa and aśaikṣa receive the transformation, they definitely have no death and rebirth. Merely proceeding to the Maheśvara [abode] is not called "birth". As for suddenly awakening bodhisattvas, with the sole exception of the three evil destinies, all other births have not yet attained apratisaṃkhyā[-nirodha]; although they undergo transformation while afflictions remain unsevered, they still have death and rebirth. Now, I say this is not so: all who undergo transformation definitely do not abandon their lifespan to separately undergo death and rebirth. If they were to separately undergo retribution, would it be by the karma of the Bṛhatphala heaven, or by the karma of the Great Maheśvara Heaven? If it were Bṛhatphala karma, it would not differ from what was previously received, so why would it need to be received again? If it were Maheśvara Heaven karma, when did they create that karma? If it were newly created, it would not be called a subsequent retribution (aparaparyāyavedanīya); if it were previously created, it should follow that the five kinds of anāgāmins previously created the karma for the Śuddhāvāsa [heavens]. Since that is not so, how could this be so? Furthermore, if śaikṣas of the two vehicles turn their minds and reach the tenth ground, they would have a separate birth and death. But the text speaks of the tenth-ground bodhisattvas being born there; it does not say that it is direct passage and not gradual awakening. Moreover, the eighth fascicle of this treatise states: "This means that indeterminate pratyekabuddhas, śrāvakas, and bodhisattvas who have attained sovereignty through great vows, because they have permanently severed or subdued the affliction-hindrance, can no longer undergo a future [rebirth with] a sectioned body (pariccheda-kāya). Fearing that they would neglect the long-term cultivation of the bodhisattva practices, they then, by the power of superior anāsrava samādhi and vows, support the causes of their present body just as in the method of extending lifespan, causing them to yield fruit uninterruptedly for a long time. Supported time and again like this by samādhi and vows, they proceed even unto realizing unsurpassed bodhi." If there were death and rebirth on the tenth ground, they should again be capable of receiving a future sectioned body, and it would not be the case that the affliction-hindrance is permanently subdued. Furthermore, one could not say that they support the cause of their present body so that it yields fruit uninterruptedly. Question: When [practitioners of] the two vehicles, prior to the path of seeing (darśanamārga), turn their minds to aspire to the Mahāyāna, are they gradual or sudden? Answer: As this is extensively distinguished in the original Commentary on the Lotus Sūtra and the Definitive Meaning of the Lotus Sūtra, I shall not recount it here, fearing it would be cumbersome.

6.9

Regarding the Śāstra's [mention of] the "Palace of the Great Maheśvara": the sixth fascicle of the Abhidharma[-samuccaya-bhāṣya], the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra, and fascicles seventy-eight and seventy-nine of the Yogācāra[-bhūmi] all speak of it in general terms. As fascicle seventy-nine of the Yogācāra states: with regard to the pure land, bodhisattvas of the third ground or above are reborn there, and the tenth ground is also included among them. The Abhidharma[-samuccaya-bhāṣya] only explains the Buddha's pure land, stating that it is realized only by the Buddha, not an object of dhyāna for those who have attained dhyāna. Speaking generally of the land without distinguishing which Buddha, it also applies to bodhisattvas who are able to be reborn there; the text also includes the place of birth for bodhisattvas in the Palace of the Great Maheśvara. Otherwise, tenth-ground bodhisattvas would not be born there; because the text is obscure, the master of the Yaoji said it was not found in other editions. However, the Palace of the Maheśvara, being the place where the Buddha's rank is received, is located in the land of enjoyment for others (parasaṃbhogakṣetra), and its location is not fixed. How is this known? According to the Daśabhūmika-sūtra: "At that time, when the samādhi of the bodhisattva manifests before him, there is a great jewel lotus king, whose circumference is like ten asaṃkhyeya hundred thousand trisāhasramahāsāhasra Buddha-worlds. At that time, the bodhisattva's body is exceptionally wondrous and fits this lotus seat." Since worlds exist in the ten directions, not aligned horizontally as the Sarvāstivādins say, the location of the Palace of the Maheśvara is not fixed. However, regarding the Daśabhūmivyākhyāna's statement that "the subsequent retribution and benefit is being born in the cognitive abode of Maheśvara," this is spoken in terms of first entering the tenth ground. When the tenth ground is fulfilled and one is about to receive the Buddha's rank, the land where one resides does not necessarily remain in the location of the Palace of the Maheśvara. Question: Since a bodhisattva of the first ground sees the other-enjoyment land as a hundred times three-thousand [worlds], and it gradually multiplies on the grounds above, so that the pure land beheld by the tenth ground is calculated to be immeasurable and boundless, how could he still be born in the Great Maheśvara above the Śuddhāvāsa? Furthermore, from the first ground onward, there is no fear of the evil destinies, because they are constantly born in Buddha lands; that Buddha land is not only above the Śuddhāvāsa. Answer: Although Buddha lands differ in size, the bodhisattva's currently arising sāsrava consciousnesses are still sāsrava and belong to realms and grounds. There are no distinct sentient beings apart from the three realms; no matter which land one is born in, with respect to the eighth consciousness, it always belongs to a realm. Speaking in terms of this, through extreme perfuming and cultivation, the tenth-ground bodhisattva transcends the five Śuddhāvāsa and is born in the Palace of the Maheśvara, so there is no fault. However, the Palace of the Maheśvara is not subsumed within the Śuddhāvāsa. Fascicle four of the Yogācāra states: "Within the form realm, there are eighteen abodes; the Asaññisatta Heaven is subsumed within the Bṛhatphala Heaven and is not a distinct abode." Since it states that there are eighteen abodes, and also states that the Asaññisatta is subsumed within the Bṛhatphala, the Palace of the Maheśvara is not [one of] the five Śuddhāvāsa. If it were subsumed within the Śuddhāvāsa, the abodes would be seventeen, not eighteen.

6.10

Regarding the Śāstra's statement: "because the sixth consciousnesses of the three realms and nine grounds mutually induce one another": Question: Altogether how many minds are there? From which desire-realm mind does which desire-realm mind arise? The questions regarding the minds arising in the upper two realms and unconditioned (unbound) minds are also like this. Answer: According to the eighteenth fascicle of the Prakaraṇārya-śāsana, there are eight minds bound to the desire realm: 1. innately acquired wholesome (upapattilābhika-kuśala); 2. expedient wholesome (prayogika-kuśala); 3. unwholesome (akuśala); 4. defiled neutral (nivṛtāvyākṛta); and undefiled neutral (anivṛtāvyākṛta), divided into four types: maturation (vipāka), deportment (īryāpatha), craftsmanship (śilpasthāna), and transformation (nirmāṇa) minds. There are six minds bound to the form realm, excluding unwholesome and craftsmanship. There are four bound to the formless realm, excluding unwholesome, deportment, craftsmanship, and transformation minds. There are two unbound minds, namely śaikṣa and aśaikṣa. In total there are twenty minds. However, speaking generally: the desire [realm] gives rise to [minds of] all three realms; the form [realm] gives rise to two realms; the formless [realm] gives rise to the formless; and each gives rise to unbound [minds]. Furthermore, the desire realm of itself lacks a transformation mind; it is spoken of by similarity, but in reality it belongs to the upper realm. Hence fascicle sixty-nine states: "Like the desire-realm transformation mind which is a fruit of the form realm, immediately after the wholesome mind of the form realm, this neutral mind of the desire realm [arises]." Moreover, as for calling this mind "desire realm", one should know that it is of the category of an image thereof, not its intrinsic nature. According to this, in reality the desire realm has seven minds, excluding the transformation mind, because it is not bound to the desire realm. As for their arising mutually in immediate succession, stating it briefly in terms of the desire realm, the verse says:

6.11

"Desire-realm innate gives rise to seven;
having attained absorption, perhaps nine or ten.
It arises from ten itself;
expedient also definitely [gives rise to] seven.
First attaining absorption, it gives rise to nine;
with mastery, it brings forth thirteen;
arising from others is also like this.
Unwholesome [gives rise to] seven of its own ground;
for the other realms there are two explanations.
It arises from seven each of its own and higher [grounds];
defiled is similarly twelve;
from others, sixteen arise.
Regarding birth-and-death and such distinctions:
maturation only gives rise to nine—
its own seven, and two defiled;
it also arises from its own seven.
Deportment and craftsmanship definitely [give rise to] nine,
or fifteen, which is not fixed.
Both arise from others and their own seven;
the upper two realms are indeterminate."

6.12

As for the line, "Desire-realm innate gives rise to seven; having attained absorption, perhaps nine or ten": to begin with, the desire-realm innate [wholesome mind] of one who has not attained absorption immediately gives rise to seven—namely, the seven of the desire realm. If one has newly attained absorption, it immediately gives rise to nine, adding the defiled neutral of the form and formless realms, which is the position of moistening rebirth. If one has practiced for a long time, it immediately gives rise to ten, adding the form-realm deportment [mind]. Hence the sixty-ninth fascicle of the Yogācāra states: "If one who has already aroused dhyāna or formless [attainments] does not regress, then immediately after a wholesome mind of the desire realm, according to whatever is desired, the various minds of higher grounds and the śaikṣa and aśaikṣa minds can manifest and arise, because he has previously well grasped their aspects; thus, he is able to arouse those various minds as he pleases." According to the intent of this text, it speaks generally of the two wholesome [minds]. Here we take the innately acquired, hence it gives rise to deportment. As for "It arises from ten itself": it also arises from the seven of the desire realm and the upper three—the two minds of the form realm, deportment and defiled, and the defiled of the formless. This is spoken in terms of being in the desire realm. Alternatively, twelve [minds] can also arise from the expedient wholesome minds of the upper two realms.

6.13

The former explanation is preferable. Being adjacent to that superior mind, innate [goodness] does not arise. As for "the expedient [good mind] also definitely [gives rise to] seven; upon first attaining concentration it gives rise to nine; when sovereign it gives rise to thirteen": when expedient goodness gives rise to the seven minds of the desire realm, if one has first attained concentration, it can give rise to nine, adding the concentrated good [mind] of the form realm. Thus, fascicle sixty-nine states: "If one has not previously generated the dhyānas or the formless [attainments], when first wishing to generate them, one must proceed immediately from a desire-realm good mind to give rise to the good mind of the first dhyāna stage; during the state of taking rebirth, the defiled [unobscured minds] of the higher [realms] arise." If one has practiced for a long time, it immediately gives rise to thirteen: six minds of the desire realm (excluding the unwholesome), three minds of the form realm (expedient, defiled, and deportment), and two of the formless realm (the expedient good mind and the defiled), as well as the minds of learners (śaikṣa) and non-learners (aśaikṣa)—this is spoken generally with respect to the good [mind]. As for "arising from another is likewise": it also arises from the preceding thirteen minds into this expedient good mind. "Unwholesome [arises from] the seven of its own stage, while for the other realms there are two explanations": it definitely gives rise immediately to the seven of its own stage. Regarding the higher stages, there are two explanations: First, if pṛthagjanas are detached from the desire of the desire realm, although they cannot subdue the afflictions of the desire-realm path of vision, by the power of concentration, shame (hrī), and the like, they are restrained and do not give rise to the unwholesome; that is, the unwholesome of desire does not immediately give rise to the minds of higher stages. Because the delusion regarding principles is not subdued at all, it can arise; [delusions] regarding objects [such as] lack of shame and their kind are already subdued, so although [delusion] regarding principles arises, it is not unwholesome. Second, since they cannot subdue the afflictions arising from [wrong] views—discriminative views and the like—it is admitted that the unwholesome immediately gives rise to the form [realm's] mind born of fruition, deportment, and defiled [minds], and gives rise to the formless [realm's] two minds of fruition and defilement, making twelve minds in total. As for "from itself and above, seven arise each": it arises from the seven of its own stage and also the seven of the stages above. From the form realm's defiled [mind], innate [goodness], deportment, and fruition arise. This is stated regarding the cognitive obscurations of those with determined gotra: the lower unwholesome arises, but not expedient goodness because its power is superior, and not karmic fruition because it does not arise in an unmixed manner. The three minds of the formless realm—innate, defiled, and fruition-born—arise from fourteen. According to the first explanation, it only arises from the seven of desire. As for "the defiled is likewise twelve": it is as explained by the second master regarding the unwholesome mind. As for "from others, sixteen arise": it arises from the seven of its own stage, five minds of the form realm (two good, fruition, defiled, and deportment), and four minds of the formless realm, excluding the deportment of the form realm. As for "distinctions such as life and death": fascicle sixty-nine states: "When retrogressing from the previously attained concentrations of the two realms, one retrogresses because a defiled mind becomes manifest; this lower defiled mind arises immediately from the higher good or defiled [mind]." This refers to retrogressing from concentration to generate a lower mind. Furthermore: "When dying from above, immediately after the good, defiled, or indeterminate [minds] of the higher stages, only the defiled of the lower stages arises." This refers to moistening rebirth arising from those kinds. Furthermore, the afflictions of the path of vision are also admitted to arise alternately from the three natures of the higher realms, except for expedient [goodness], the meaning of which is as stated previously. As for "fruition gives rise only to nine, its own seven and the two defiled": it gives rise to the seven of its own stage and the two defiled of the higher realms, which is the state of moistening rebirth. As for "also arising from its own seven": fascicle sixty-nine states: "Immediately following what belongs to the desire realm, whether good, defiled, or non-defiled indeterminate, it universally gives rise to all that belongs to the desire realm." Therefore, we know that fruition also arises from its own seven. As for "deportment and technical skill definitely [give rise to] nine, or fifteen variably": they give rise to the seven of their own stage and the two defiled of the higher realms, also in the state of moistening rebirth. As for "or fifteen variably": one who has attained mastery in concentration can, from these two minds, also give rise to the two [of the higher realms]; if without technical skill, only deportment arises, along with the two expedient [minds] and the minds of learners and non-learners. Or they cannot [arise] at all, because their power is weak; this is spoken in terms of transformative indeterminate [minds] resembling desire minds giving rise to the good mind of the form realm, as cited above from fascicle sixty-nine. As for "the two from other and own seven, in the upper two realms are variable": deportment and technical skill arise from the seven of desire; in the upper realms they are variable. When arising alternately between higher and lower, they arise from the two defiled minds, and from the form realm's deportment, innate, and fruition. Or they cannot [arise] at all, because their power is separated and distant. This is tentatively explained in terms of desire-realm minds giving rise to others and themselves; the rest should be understood by analogy, and are omitted lest it become cumbersome. The explanation in fascicle seven of the Kośa differs from this, as can be known by comparison. Fascicle five of the Samuccaya merely deals with generative causes, presenting ten kinds of sequential mind generation in a brief outline, without detailing them all.

6.14

Regarding the equal and immediate [condition] (samanantarapratyaya) of the five consciousnesses, there are two masters. Question: Why does the second explanation hold that at the causal stage, they do not give rise to the anāsrava? Answer: Because at the causal stage, the five sense faculties are the objective aspect (nimittabhāga) of the eighth [consciousness]; it is impossible for sāsrava, unshared, necessarily simultaneous [faculties] sharing the same object to emit an anāsrava consciousness, because brightness and obscurity are distinct. Question: Take the case of the five sense faculties: they also possess sāsrava and anāsrava seeds, yet the fruition consciousness is admitted to take sāsrava as object and not take anāsrava as object, merely sustaining them without loss. What prevents the five sense faculties from also generating an anāsrava [consciousness], being sustained without being cognized as object, and emitting an anāsrava consciousness? The anāsrava marks and characteristics (lakṣaṇānuvyañjana) are also like this. Answer: Anāsrava seeds are hidden, so the eighth does not take them as object; the anāsrava faculties are manifest, so how could it not take them as object? Anāsrava marks and characteristics do not transform [as its support] and are not appropriated (upātta), so it likewise does not take them as object, unlike the five sense faculties. Moreover, it is said: The five sense faculties necessarily involve sensory appropriation; there are no five faculties that the eighth does not take as object. Seeds do not involve sensory appropriation; there are naturally seeds that the eighth does not take as object.

6.15

Question: When persons of the first two fruits attain the anāsrava noble path of the first sāmantaka and, after turning their minds [to Mahāyāna], undergo transformation-body rebirth, which anāsrava [attainment] do they give rise to? Answer: That of the fourth dhyāna stage. Why? Because through this turn of mind and superior cultivation, they attain the fourth dhyāna. Therefore, the Yogācārabhūmi Śāstra, fascicle eighty, states: "If one skillfully cultivates the four bases of psychic power (ṛddhipāda), one may remain for an eon, or more than an eon." Although that text, following the preceding passage, speaks definitively regarding non-learners, now as for the first three fruits: if they did not skillfully cultivate, they should not be able to sustain their lifespan; since they are admitted to attain supernormal powers and only then can sustain their lifespan, they supremely cultivate dhyānas and the formless [attainments]. Yogācāra fascicle sixty-nine states: "What is the knowledge of resolution (praṇidhijñāna)? It is based on the sharp-rooted arhat liberated in both parts cultivating the limit of the fourth dhyāna as support." Although this speaks of non-learners, one should know by analogy that learners who have turned their minds are also like this. If they lacked the knowledge of resolution, how could they know that their lifespan is about to end and undergo transformation-body rebirth? Question: Since they only undergo transformation-body rebirth depending on the superior anāsrava concentration of the fourth [dhyāna], why do they not sever the afflictions of the lower stages? If they were admitted to sever them, they should attain the non-returner (anāgāmin) before undergoing transformation-body rebirth. Why does the Nirvāṇa Sūtra state: "A srotāpanna passes through eighty thousand eons; a sakṛdāgāmin passes through sixty thousand eons"? Answer: Although they generate the anāsrava, they rely on the viśeṣamārga and not the ānantaryamārga; therefore, they do not attain the fruit. Thus, the Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā, fascicle nine, explaining entering the quiescent liberation of the formless realm without having detached from desire of the form realm, states: "Noble ones who have already attained the fourth dhyāna do not seek rebirth in the formless realm; abandoning the path that severs bonds, they rely on the viśeṣamārga and can gradually enter the quiescent liberation concentration of the formless realm." Saying that they have not detached from the desire of the form [realm] refers to not severing the seeds; the quiescent liberation concentration is the concentration of cessation (nirodhasamāpatti). If lesser fruits are even able to do this, how much more so those who have already turned their minds? Question: By analogy, when those non-learners proceed toward the Great [Vehicle], it is rapid; why do learners who have turned their minds not take the fruit? Answer: Although they know it is rapid, because they are weary of the lesser fruit, they do not take it.

6.16

Regarding the objective condition (ālambanapratyaya), the second master says: "The objective aspect of the eighth [consciousness] is in all cases generated by leaning upon an external archetype (bāhyārtha)." The third master says: "Because the seeds of all sentient beings are not identical." Dharma Master Jun of Xihe says: "At the causal stage, the eighth does not take the anāsrava as object; although the five gotras differ, this cannot serve as an objection. Furthermore, just as with nutriment-nurtured form (aupacayikarūpa), sentient beings have superior and inferior [forms] variably, yet the higher [consciousness] can take them as an objective condition; although the five gotras differ, what prevents them from being cognized? This is tentatively one explanation." Nutriment-nurtured form and the like, though superior or inferior, are possessed by all sentient beings, and thus can serve as an objective condition. Anāsrava seeds are either present or absent and have no real entity [in some], so they cannot be cognized as an object. Moreover, the quantity of seeds is not restricted to the anāsrava; among sentient beings, there is tentatively the distinction between severed and unsevered sāsrava, so this can serve as an objection. The correct explanation is as in the root [text]. Ximing explains: "The third master objects to the second master, saying: 'There would be no distinction between ordinary beings and noble ones.' This objection is not reasonable, because the causal eighth does not take anāsrava seeds as object. Furthermore, the previous master only said that one's own eighth's reflection must lean upon an archetype, not that what one lacks in seed must be manifested. If one took what others possess as an analogy for the archetype, then whenever the eye [consciousness] and so forth arise, whatever color and so forth [is present] should always be fully equipped with that reflection and necessarily lean upon an archetype. Since when the eye [consciousness] and so forth arise, they sometimes only cognize blue and the like, therefore regarding one's own specific characteristic, it must lean upon another, but not everything possessed by others must serve as an archetype. Now this objection concerns what is transformed by oneself: there are multiple seeds, and the corresponding sentient beings are not necessarily similar. Now, examining the intention of the objection, it applies to both causal and resultant stages: if the resultant eighth cognizes anāsrava seeds, some sentient beings do not have anāsrava seeds; if spoken with respect to this, one's own specific characteristic lacks an archetype. If one says that it relies on what exists to serve as an archetype and does not lean upon what is absent, why not admit that regarding what is useful to oneself, it transforms leaning upon that archetype, while regarding what is of no use to oneself, it merely directly cognizes it oneself without leaning upon an archetype?" However, Ximing's statement that Dharmapāla relies on the transformation of one's own eighth having utility to object to the other master is also unreasonable, because that master also admits transformation having utility. Earlier in the second fascicle, regarding transforming one's own and others' faculties, both are admitted to have utility, not transformation without utility; furthermore, the objection regarding transforming the container world also takes utility, not that transforming without utility is also admitted.

6.17

On the Śāstra's statement: "Excepting the final moment," etc., the original commentary's explanation proceeds by deduction. Within the bodhisattva's three-mind image-based path of vision (pratibimbakadarśanamārga), the first two minds belong to the first faculty, and from the third mind onward they belong to the second faculty. The text of the śāstra does not qualify which path of vision is meant; it states [the rule] in general terms with respect to the final moment. Alternatively, it follows the Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā in speaking conformingly to others regarding the total of sixteen minds; Fascicle Nine of the Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā states: "The [faculty of] coming to know what is not yet known subsumes [the path of] vision; the [faculty of] having known subsumes [the path of] cultivation; the [faculty of] one who fully possesses knowledge subsumes [the path of] no-further-training." Because the Sarvāstivādins classify the sixteenth mind as belonging to the path of cultivation, this is speaking conformingly to others. Or else, because one single moment is brief, it is concealed to conform to the majority and designated as cultivation. Furthermore, according to the Hīnayāna, the sixteen minds observe the four noble truths, and upon reaching the sixteenth there is nothing left unknown, so it is subsumed under [the faculty of] having known. If according to Mahāyāna the total of sixteen minds universally observes both principle and wisdom, the cognitive forbearance of the subsequent cognition of the path (mārgānvayajñānakṣānti) has already exhaustively observed wisdom—which differs from the Sarvāstivāda—and therefore the sixteenth is subsumed under the faculty of having known either by relying on the two vehicles or by accommodating others. Now, according to the Yogācārabhūmi and Fascicle Nine of the Cheng weishi lun, the bodhisattva's image-based path of vision also has three minds: they are established generally and specifically by modeling upon the preceding real uninterrupted [path] and [path of] liberation. The first two are specific contemplations, and the third synthesizes them, which is re-contemplation. The twenty-six minds are all said to model upon the real path of vision's uninterrupted [path] and [path of] liberation, and thus they are also re-contemplations, because they are not [cases of] knowing what has not yet been known and ought to be known. Moreover, Fascicle Ten of the Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā states: "These ten faculties, having previously not known reality, are cultivated and set into motion in order to come to know it, and are therefore called the faculty of coming to know what is not yet known." The two minds know it correctly, so the third mind belongs to the second [faculty]; although it is in the path of vision, it belongs to the second faculty. However, the Yaoji states: "If the bodhisattva did not contemplate the twenty-six [minds], it could be as stated, with the third mind being named the faculty of having known; yet no text qualifies the twenty-six minds. Furthermore, if one only contemplated the sixteen of real wisdom, it could be as stated; but what about the sixteen of the higher and lower four truths? Moreover, the Yogācārabhūmi and other texts state: 'The initial signless [path of vision] arises uninterruptedly from the supreme mundane dharmas (laukikāgradharma); the three minds and the sixteen are only said to arise subsequent to this'; thus one cannot say that the real and the image-based are simultaneous. By this principle, both the three minds and the twenty-six [minds] subsequent to the real are called image-based vision; according to this intended meaning, the original commentary's explanation that the third of the three minds belongs to the second faculty is rejected. Furthermore, regarding the statement that the signless arises uninterruptedly from the supreme mundane dharmas, our fundamental master holds that the real and the image-based are simultaneous, and spoken of as before and after only in terms of meaning." Now I say this is not so: concerning the three-mind path of vision, Fascicle Fifty-Five of the Yogācārabhūmi also states: "It arises uninterruptedly from the culminating wholesome roots of the [stages] conducive to penetration (nirvedhabhāgīya)." This śāstra also reconciles the various image-based paths of vision by explaining that their arising uninterruptedly from the supreme mundane dharmas is spoken of metaphorically based on the real [path of vision], and is not [restricted] solely to the signless. Moreover, all twenty-six are re-observations; which of the twenty-six minds do not model upon real vision? That is, after the three minds, they re-contemplate and model upon it; why would they not be [the faculty of] having known? If speaking in terms of observing conventional [truth], in the higher and lower sixteen [minds], the sixteenth mind would not yet have wisdom knowing it, so it should be called [the faculty of] coming to know. If it is said: "The śāstra says 'excepting the final moment,'" the śāstra also says "there is nothing left unknown," which immediately belongs to the second [faculty]. Thus we know that the Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā's statement that the first fifteen are [the faculty of] coming to know is spoken conformingly to others, just as saying that [the faculty of] having known subsumes the path of cultivation is based on Mahāyāna itself: although the sixteenth mind is the faculty of having known, it belongs to the path of vision. Thus we know that each of the various explanations has a distinct doctrinal intent. The original commentary itself divides Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna in establishing the distinction among the three faculties.

6.18

On the Śāstra's statement: "The preceding three formless [absorptions]," etc., the original commentary explains: they lack preparatory practice (prayoga), and furthermore active anāsrava has never arisen there before; therefore, those previously cultivated and attained by a pṛthagjana are called "adjuncts of realization" (abhisamayāntika). Although they do not become active, they are also subsumed under this faculty and can arise in the path of cultivation. Now, based on the text of Fascicle Sixty-Nine, they also increase in the [stages of] provisions (saṃbhāra), preparatory practice, and the path of vision, and arise within the path of cultivation. In explaining the order of arising in the beginning, middle, and end of conventional cognition (saṃvṛtijñāna), it says: "The five views, greed, and so forth are defiled, etc.; all such conventional cognitions should be abandoned. One should know that in order to produce their antidotes, non-erroneous view is produced, which is subsumed under wholesome sāsrava conventional cognition..." up to: "Furthermore, relying precisely on that conventional cognition subsumed under the supreme mundane dharmas, one is able to enter the path of vision. When ascending to the path of vision, all the seeds of the wholesome conventional cognition previously cultivated become completely purified through that perfuming, which is also called cultivation. These are called the conventional cognitions at the adjunct of the realization of the truths (satyābhisamayāntika). Having emerged from the path of vision, one gives rise to this cognition and realizes the liberation of the phenomena abandoned by seeing." This passage speaks universally of their arising in all three vehicles; hence the text immediately below says: "Furthermore, one is able to know: 'I have already attained the fruit of a srotāpanna,' and so forth." Thus we know that in Mahāyāna, before the path of vision, in the state conducive to liberation (mokṣabhāgīya), wholesome states of the formless are produced and rebirth is also taken in the formless; thus we know that in the stage of provisions, one extensively cultivates the formless. As for incidental cultivation (anuśikṣā) upon entering vision, the śāstra does not say that incidental cultivation occurs only in the fundamental state and is solely anāsrava; according to the later explanation of the śāstra, the formless also possesses the three anāsrava faculties. Fascicle Fifty-Seven states that the lower three formless [attainments] have eleven faculties; therefore they encompass both sāsrava and anāsrava. In accordance with this, Mahāyāna differs from the Sarvāstivāda: after entering the path of vision, they never again become active. Question: If the four wholesome roots and so forth can all arise again in the path of cultivation, why is there no confusion [of stages]? Answer: That is also not the case, because the stages are distinct. If in the stage of the path of cultivation they are not called wholesome roots, just as seeds of the path of vision later also produce cultivation—otherwise, from what seeds would the path of cultivation arise? Although produced from seeds of vision, it is not called vision; so too, although produced from those seeds in the subsequent path of cultivation, it is not called wholesome roots. Furthermore, original anāsrava seeds in the stages of provisions and preparatory practice are also called those paths. The Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā says they are subsumed under the truth of the path; because in all cases they are admitted not to be confused, this is also the case here. Question: In the fundamental state, when one incidentally cultivates conventional [cognition], does it also get called "fundamental"? Answer: What fault is there in calling it fundamental? If it is objected that it is a fault because it is not anāsrava, the answer is: speaking of anāsrava is based on active manifestation, and based on the faculty of coming to know what is not yet known, not with respect to seeds. The Yaoji states: "Conventional [cognition] is not anāsrava and cannot be named fundamental"; then likewise, the formless has no path of vision and should not be named fundamental, yet although it lacks the path of vision it is spoken of as fundamental. Although it is subsumed under sāsrava, it is called fundamental by association; thus there is no fault. Question: The śāstra says that those who turn towards the Great [Vehicle], in order to realize the emptiness of phenomena (dharmanairātmya), give rise to [realization of] the emptiness of persons (pudgalanairātmya), which favorably assists [the realization of] the emptiness of phenomena and can be subsumed under this faculty; why should sāsrava, which does not favorably assist it, also be subsumed here? Answer: Among the two vehicles' [attainments of] the emptiness of persons, some do not favorably assist it; but merely speaking of those turning towards the Mahāyāna, all the sāsrava they cultivate favorably assists the path of vision, so what fault is there in incidental cultivation serving as a faculty? Therefore the Yaoji states: "Those of incidental cultivation only take anāsrava; conventional cognition and the like do not assist the path of vision"—its merits and faults should be scrutinized. The Yaoji and others state: "Before the bodhisattva grounds, anāsrava does not arise; the anāsrava cognition of the emptiness of persons in the two vehicles belongs to their lineage and is not that of a bodhisattva; this is established by syllogism: anāsrava [cognition] of the emptiness of persons does not arise prior to the grounds." Now I say this is not so: this śāstra explicitly states that when those in the stages of the two vehicles turn towards the Great [Vehicle], what is produced prior to the grounds to realize the emptiness of phenomena—the anāsrava [cognition] of the emptiness of persons subsumed under the nine grounds—is entirely subsumed under this faculty of the bodhisattva. To deny it now, would that not contradict [the śāstra]? How could holy persons of the two vehicles who direct their minds toward the Mahāyāna fail to give rise to anāsrava cognition? Since they are already called bodhisattvas prior to directing their minds, why would the anāsrava they produce not belong to this faculty? The Lotus Sūtra says: "What you are practicing is the bodhisattva path." Based on those of indeterminate [lineage], all belong to this faculty.

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成唯識論了義燈 — Classical Chinese