成唯識論了義燈 6.72

6.72

Answer: The root commentary explains: 'If there is a vipāka abiding in past time, it is called mind; this is formulated in terms of a single mind differentiated in meaning across two times.' If so, it should be nominal, like the [nominal] view and discernment. The explanation says: What fault is there in admitting it is nominal? There would be the fault of contradicting what follows below, for the section below on nominal versus real states that name-and-form and the six sense-bases are all real. The explanation says: It is stated according to the majority, just as in the branch of formations form is also nominally spoken of, while in the section on nominal versus real it is also spoken of as real. Now I offer an alternative explanation: just as in the branch of name-and-form, form excludes the five sense faculties, what fault is there within 'name' in excluding consciousness? If there are only conception (saṃjñā) and formations (saṃskāra), they can still constitute 'name', being neither nominal nor mixed.