成唯識論演祕 1.542

1.542

詳曰：障、果相違礙即斷之，欲界煩惱既礙不還，見道斷之而有何失？若言惑細，豈勝無漏見道之智？若不勝者，勝斷不勝，何不許耶？又言伴者流類相助，非要相應；要相應者，云何五地說斷害伴？故疏不說相應之貪名伴已伏。又云相應行相同者，亦為不可。諸論皆言心王、心所同一所緣不同行相；若言《對法》隨轉理者，何處大乘不許超果？不許超果斷欲我見，此論明言而無生上退斷下失，豈不相違？亦不可以末那惑例，末那煩惱不能潤生，障不還故。又復論主已自簡訖。

We examine this: When the obstacle and the fruition are mutually contradictory and obstructive, it is abandoned; since defilements of the desire realm obstruct the non-returner, what fault is there in abandoning them in the path of vision? If one says the defilement is subtle, how could it surpass the anāsrava wisdom of the path of vision? If it does not surpass it, the superior abandons the inferior—why not accept this? Furthermore, what is called a 'companion' refers to mutual assistance among the same category; it is not necessarily associated. If it had to be associated, why does [the treatise] say in the fifth bhūmi that one abandons what harms companions? Therefore, the Commentary does not state that associated greed is called the companion that has already been suppressed. Moreover, to say that what is associated has the same ākāra is also unacceptable: all treatises state that the primary mind and mental factors have the same ālambana but different ākāras. If one says that the Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya adapts to the provisional doctrine, where does the Mahāyāna not accept transcending the fruitions? If one does not accept that transcending fruitions abandons the view of self in the desire realm, this treatise clearly states that there is no fault of being born in a higher realm, falling back, or abandoning what belongs to lower realms—does this not contradict that? Nor may one draw an analogy with the defilements of manas, because the defilements of manas cannot moisten rebirth and obstruct the non-returner. Furthermore, the author of the treatise has already set this aside himself.