成唯識論演祕 1.813

1.813

詳曰：此難意云：論說緣言在於法中，如何以法遮有法過？由斯即應於有法中，言除覺等便無相符。今以理觀，簡亦何失？連類言之可當悟矣，且如佛法對聲論師立聲無常。無常宗法，便簡聲上所有常義。若不簡者，他許聲常豈不相符？相符不有，故知能簡。今者，實等有法之中含能、所緣，法中言緣，意遣有法能緣覺等，與立聲宗而有何別？獨不見許，故「一緣」言兼簡相符。想應無失，請審詳之。

I examine this and say: The idea of this objection is: The treatise states that the word "cognizing" lies in the predicate property (sādhya-dharma); how could a property eliminate a fault in the subject? Therefore, within the subject, if one says "excluding intellect and the like," there will be no establishing what is already accepted. Now, examining this with reason, what fault is there in [such] an exclusion? Stating it by analogy should make this clear. For instance, in Buddhism, against the Grammarians (Śabdika), one establishes that "sound is impermanent." The thesis property "impermanent" then excludes all senses of permanence on sound. If it did not exclude them, would there not be establishing what is already accepted, since the opponent accepts sound as permanent? Since establishing what is already accepted does not occur, we know that it can exclude it. Now, within the subject of substance and the like, both the cognizer and the cognized object are contained; by stating "cognizing" in the predicate property, the intent is to dispel the cognizer—intellect and the like—from the subject. What difference is there between this and establishing the thesis of sound? Why is this alone not accepted? Therefore, the single word "cognizing" simultaneously excludes establishing what is already accepted. I think this should be without fault; please examine it carefully.