成唯識論演祕 2.169

2.169

答：由諸聚色最初生時全分而生，最後滅時不至極微位中間盡滅，猶如水滴。復由五相應知，名不如理思議極微，謂於色聚中有極微自性而住，或有生滅；或謂極微與極微或合或散；或謂眾色極微積集；或謂極微能生別異眾多聚色。又《顯揚》十八云：謂諸極微但假想立，自體實無。若言有微，豈不違上諸聖教耶？若言前教據無散微成聚色等，名無極微。不障折麁所成微者，此非善救。折麁之微即最後滅，何非有滅？此所折微後合成麁，何不名生？豈所折微永不合耶？又聚色中即有二分，大聖所折極微自性又所折微，更互相望亦有合散，色聚亦有微量積集，亦得名為別生眾聚，何意《瑜伽》總判名為無生無滅，不如理思？又所折者體既不無，諸論云何判無實體但假想立？若言，諸論對敵申宗恐濫外義略不說者，亦非成救自許實微元總，不說何名申宗？既許假實兩種極微，何獨說假即申宗矣？又微自許恐濫不說，三科他有必應懼濫大乘不說，若云三科同故，故說，亦為不可。若據名同，極微亦爾；若約體說，小大三科體性假實種種亦異，云何名同？又本質微第八所變，非識外故，故名假者，即根、塵等第八親緣並名假，眼等五識親所緣者，類亦應然，非識外故。此等不然，彼云何爾？故知本無故教不說。

Answer: Because when aggregated forms first originate, they originate as wholes; and when they finally cease, they cease entirely mid-way without reaching the stage of an indivisible atom, just like a water droplet. Furthermore, based on five aspects, it should be known that this is called unmethodical contemplation (ayoniśo-manaskāra) regarding indivisible atoms: namely, asserting that within aggregated forms the intrinsic nature of indivisible atoms abides, or has origination and cessation; or asserting that indivisible atoms combine with or separate from other indivisible atoms; or asserting that various aggregated forms are accumulations of indivisible atoms; or asserting that indivisible atoms can produce distinct and numerous aggregated forms. Moreover, the eighteenth fascicle of the Prakaraṇāryavācā states: 'All indivisible atoms are merely established through conceptual imputation; their real substance does not exist.' If one claims that there are indivisible atoms, how would that not contradict the above sacred teachings? If one says that the earlier teaching is based on the non-existence of scattered atoms forming aggregated forms and so forth, calling it 'having no indivisible atoms,' but that it does not preclude the atoms produced by analyzing coarse matter—this is not a good defense. The atom produced by analyzing coarse matter would be the final cessation, so how could it not have cessation? If this analyzed atom later combines into coarse matter, how could it not be called origination? Could it be that the analyzed atom never combines again? Furthermore, within aggregated forms there would be two components: the intrinsic nature of the indivisible atom analyzed by the Great Sage, and the analyzed atoms themselves, which in relation to one another would also have combination and separation; aggregated forms would also have accumulations of atomic measures, and could also be said to distinctly produce numerous aggregations. Why then did the Yogācārabhūmi judge them universally as 'without origination and without cessation' and as 'unmethodical contemplation'? Furthermore, since the substance of what is analyzed would not be non-existent, why do the treatises determine that they lack real substance and are merely established through conceptual imputation? If one says that in confronting opponents to present their own doctrine, the treatises briefly refrained from mentioning it for fear of conflating it with non-Buddhist doctrines, this too is not a successful defense: having originally completely omitted to state the real atom accepted by oneself, how could that be called presenting the doctrine? Since both nominal and real indivisible atoms are accepted, why would stating only the nominal constitute presenting the doctrine? Moreover, if one did not speak of one's own accepted atoms for fear of conflation, then because other schools possess the three categories [of skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas], the Mahāyāna should also fear conflation and not speak of them. If one says that they are spoken of because the three categories are the same, that is also inadmissible. If based on identity of name, the same applies to indivisible atoms; if spoken with respect to substance, the substances of the three categories in the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna differ in manifold ways as nominal or real, so how could they be called the same? Furthermore, if the intrinsic atom (mūla-dharmin) transformed by the eighth consciousness is called nominal merely because it is not external to consciousness, then the sense faculties, objects, and so forth directly cognized by the eighth consciousness would all be called nominal; and those directly cognized by the five consciousnesses such as the visual consciousness would similarly have to be so by analogy, because they are not external to consciousness. These are not so; why should that [atom] be so? Therefore, we know that because they originally do not exist, the teaching does not speak of them.