成唯識論演祕 2.169

2.169

Answer: Because when aggregated forms first originate, they originate as wholes; and when they finally cease, they cease entirely mid-way without reaching the stage of an indivisible atom, just like a water droplet. Furthermore, based on five aspects, it should be known that this is called unmethodical contemplation (ayoniśo-manaskāra) regarding indivisible atoms: namely, asserting that within aggregated forms the intrinsic nature of indivisible atoms abides, or has origination and cessation; or asserting that indivisible atoms combine with or separate from other indivisible atoms; or asserting that various aggregated forms are accumulations of indivisible atoms; or asserting that indivisible atoms can produce distinct and numerous aggregated forms. Moreover, the eighteenth fascicle of the Prakaraṇāryavācā states: 'All indivisible atoms are merely established through conceptual imputation; their real substance does not exist.' If one claims that there are indivisible atoms, how would that not contradict the above sacred teachings? If one says that the earlier teaching is based on the non-existence of scattered atoms forming aggregated forms and so forth, calling it 'having no indivisible atoms,' but that it does not preclude the atoms produced by analyzing coarse matter—this is not a good defense. The atom produced by analyzing coarse matter would be the final cessation, so how could it not have cessation? If this analyzed atom later combines into coarse matter, how could it not be called origination? Could it be that the analyzed atom never combines again? Furthermore, within aggregated forms there would be two components: the intrinsic nature of the indivisible atom analyzed by the Great Sage, and the analyzed atoms themselves, which in relation to one another would also have combination and separation; aggregated forms would also have accumulations of atomic measures, and could also be said to distinctly produce numerous aggregations. Why then did the Yogācārabhūmi judge them universally as 'without origination and without cessation' and as 'unmethodical contemplation'? Furthermore, since the substance of what is analyzed would not be non-existent, why do the treatises determine that they lack real substance and are merely established through conceptual imputation? If one says that in confronting opponents to present their own doctrine, the treatises briefly refrained from mentioning it for fear of conflating it with non-Buddhist doctrines, this too is not a successful defense: having originally completely omitted to state the real atom accepted by oneself, how could that be called presenting the doctrine? Since both nominal and real indivisible atoms are accepted, why would stating only the nominal constitute presenting the doctrine? Moreover, if one did not speak of one's own accepted atoms for fear of conflation, then because other schools possess the three categories [of skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas], the Mahāyāna should also fear conflation and not speak of them. If one says that they are spoken of because the three categories are the same, that is also inadmissible. If based on identity of name, the same applies to indivisible atoms; if spoken with respect to substance, the substances of the three categories in the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna differ in manifold ways as nominal or real, so how could they be called the same? Furthermore, if the intrinsic atom (mūla-dharmin) transformed by the eighth consciousness is called nominal merely because it is not external to consciousness, then the sense faculties, objects, and so forth directly cognized by the eighth consciousness would all be called nominal; and those directly cognized by the five consciousnesses such as the visual consciousness would similarly have to be so by analogy, because they are not external to consciousness. These are not so; why should that [atom] be so? Therefore, we know that because they originally do not exist, the teaching does not speak of them.