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成唯識論演祕 4.378

成唯識論演祕 4.378

Language
Classical Chinese

4.378

問:若實有,何故《瑜伽》五十二云:「復次種子云何?非折諸行別有實物名為種子,亦非餘處。然即諸行如是種性,如是等生,如是安布名為種子……如穀麥等物所有芽、莖、葉等種子,於彼物中磨擣分折,求異種子了不可得,亦非餘處。然諸大種如是種性,如是等生,如是安布,穀麥等物能為彼緣,令彼得生,說名種子。」又云:「是世俗有」。又《攝論》第二云:「非彼種子有別實物於此中住,亦非不異。」二論皆云無別實物,復云世俗,云何定斷論說實有?

Question: If they are real entities, why does the Yogācārabhūmi, fascicle fifty-two, state: "Furthermore, what are seeds? Seeds are not some other real entity apart from the analysis of the conditioned factors, nor are they elsewhere. Rather, it is just those conditioned factors having such a disposition, such equivalent arising, and such arrangement that are called seeds… Just as with the seeds of sprouts, stalks, leaves, and so forth in items such as grain and barley, if one grinds, pounds, divides, and breaks down those items seeking a distinct seed, it can never be found, nor is it elsewhere. Yet the great primary elements having such a disposition, such equivalent arising, and such arrangement, where items such as grain and barley can serve as their conditions to cause them to be produced, are spoken of as seeds"? And it also states: "They are conventional existents." Furthermore, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, fascicle two, states: "It is not that those seeds exist as a distinct real entity abiding within this, nor are they not non-distinct." Since both treatises state that there is no distinct real entity, and further state that they are conventional, how can one definitively conclude that the treatises say they are real entities?

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