成唯識論演祕 4.639

4.639

詳曰：已滅雖無，然開其路，彼識依此而可得生，似現依止假立意名。已滅之意與現思量殊不相似，如何依七假立思量？雖思量意是本所諍，為外難云滅非思量，何得名意？故論答云：滅似現意，依止一邊，依之假立。若言依止自望說者，如何自望？若望現在，現在名識，似何稱意？若望以前，以前體無，似似於誰？論破於他，假依真立，義應不成。又按世親《攝論》第一云：「過去已滅，無所思量，云何當有能思量性？」准此文意，不以思量為過去意，可審詳之。

In detailed consideration: Although what has already ceased is nonexistent, it opens the path, and that consciousness can arise based on this, resembling the present support, so it is metaphorically given the name manas. The manas that has already ceased is entirely dissimilar to present cogitation; how could it be metaphorically established as cogitation based on the seventh? Although the cogitating manas is what is fundamentally disputed, when the external opponent objects: 'What has ceased is not cogitation, so how can it be named manas?' the treatise answers: 'What has ceased resembles the present manas in terms of being a support, and is metaphorically established based on it.' If you say that being a support is said from its own perspective, how is it from its own perspective? If looking toward the present, the present is named consciousness; what does it resemble to be called manas? If looking toward the past, the past has no entity; what would it resemble? When the treatise refutes others, that the metaphorical is established based on the real would be meaningless. Furthermore, according to the first fascicle of Vasubandhu's Mahāyānasaṃgraha: 'The past has already ceased and has no cogitation; how could it have the nature of being able to cogitate?' In accordance with the meaning of this text, one does not take cogitation as the past manas; this may be carefully considered.