成唯識論演祕 5.15

5.15

答：有義說：同所緣總論此境，不言此境別相亦同。又，心王、所取總、別義，總而為四釋：一云：心唯取總，心所唯別，諸論皆說識了總相，《瑜伽》但說心所了此所未了相，不言了總，此論雖云此表心所亦緣總相，釋論者意即不依之。二云：心王唯取總相，所取總、別。《大論》、《中邊》如論主釋，既有誠說，理不可違。三云：心所同前第二師說，心王亦緣總、別二相，故下論云：受能領納順、違、中境，令心等起歡、戚、捨相，若也不了違、順、中境，如何能起歡、戚、捨相？解餘心所皆有令心取別相義。論中上下文有眾多，故知心王亦緣別相。《大論》等說，皆約心王自力而說，設無心所，自力不能取別相故。如王因臣能知別事，若不因者，即不能知。四云：心王同前第三師說，心所非但緣自別相，如心能緣一切別相，諸相應法，法爾同緣，唯境一事，不爾，如何說令心等起歡、戚等。既說「等」言，故知心所別相皆取。雖有四解令依後說，諸相應法相望力齊，有緣、不緣不應理故。論說受等所取別者，且約自行所取者說，以實而言，由相應力互取所緣，皆不違理。

Answer: One explanation says: "Identical cognized object" discusses this object in general; it does not say that the particular characteristics of this object are also identical. Furthermore, regarding the meaning of the primary mind and mental factors grasping the general and the particular, there are four explanations in total: The first says: The mind grasps only the general, and mental factors grasp only the particular. All treatises state that consciousness cognizes the general characteristic, and the Yogācārabhūmi merely says that mental factors cognize the characteristics of this not yet cognized, without stating that they cognize the general. Although this treatise states that this indicates mental factors also cognize the general characteristic, the intention of the commentator does not rely upon it. The second says: The primary mind grasps only the general characteristic, while mental factors grasp both the general and the particular. The Great Treatise (Yogācārabhūmi) and the Madhyāntavibhāga are as explained by the treatise master; since there is an explicit statement, it must not be contradicted in principle. The third says: Mental factors are as said by the previous second master; the primary mind also cognizes both the general and particular characteristics. Therefore, the treatise below says: "Sensation can experience agreeable, disagreeable, and neutral objects, causing the mind and so forth to give rise to aspects of joy, sorrow, and equanimity." If it also did not cognize agreeable, disagreeable, and neutral objects, how could it give rise to aspects of joy, sorrow, and equanimity? Explanations of the remaining mental factors all have the meaning of causing the mind to grasp particular characteristics. In the treatise, the passages above and below are numerous, so one knows that the primary mind also cognizes particular characteristics. Statements in the Great Treatise and so forth are all spoken regarding the primary mind's own power; assuming there were no mental factors, its own power could not grasp particular characteristics. Just as a king knows particular affairs due to his ministers, if he did not rely on them, he would be unable to know them. The fourth says: The primary mind is as said by the previous third master; mental factors cognize not only their own particular characteristics, but just as the mind can cognize all particular characteristics, all associated dharmas by their very nature cognize identically, being only a single object. Otherwise, how could it be said to cause the mind and so forth to give rise to joy, sorrow, and so forth? Since it says the word "and so forth", one therefore knows that mental factors grasp all particular characteristics. Although there are four explanations, one should rely on the latter: all associated dharmas are equal in power with respect to one another; that some cognize and some do not is unreasonable. The treatise's statement that the particulars grasped by sensation and so forth are distinct is spoken provisionally with respect to what is grasped by their own activity; speaking realistically, through the power of association they mutually grasp the cognized object, none of which contradicts principle.