成唯識論演祕 5.15

5.15

Answer: One explanation says: "Identical cognized object" discusses this object in general; it does not say that the particular characteristics of this object are also identical. Furthermore, regarding the meaning of the primary mind and mental factors grasping the general and the particular, there are four explanations in total: The first says: The mind grasps only the general, and mental factors grasp only the particular. All treatises state that consciousness cognizes the general characteristic, and the Yogācārabhūmi merely says that mental factors cognize the characteristics of this not yet cognized, without stating that they cognize the general. Although this treatise states that this indicates mental factors also cognize the general characteristic, the intention of the commentator does not rely upon it. The second says: The primary mind grasps only the general characteristic, while mental factors grasp both the general and the particular. The Great Treatise (Yogācārabhūmi) and the Madhyāntavibhāga are as explained by the treatise master; since there is an explicit statement, it must not be contradicted in principle. The third says: Mental factors are as said by the previous second master; the primary mind also cognizes both the general and particular characteristics. Therefore, the treatise below says: "Sensation can experience agreeable, disagreeable, and neutral objects, causing the mind and so forth to give rise to aspects of joy, sorrow, and equanimity." If it also did not cognize agreeable, disagreeable, and neutral objects, how could it give rise to aspects of joy, sorrow, and equanimity? Explanations of the remaining mental factors all have the meaning of causing the mind to grasp particular characteristics. In the treatise, the passages above and below are numerous, so one knows that the primary mind also cognizes particular characteristics. Statements in the Great Treatise and so forth are all spoken regarding the primary mind's own power; assuming there were no mental factors, its own power could not grasp particular characteristics. Just as a king knows particular affairs due to his ministers, if he did not rely on them, he would be unable to know them. The fourth says: The primary mind is as said by the previous third master; mental factors cognize not only their own particular characteristics, but just as the mind can cognize all particular characteristics, all associated dharmas by their very nature cognize identically, being only a single object. Otherwise, how could it be said to cause the mind and so forth to give rise to joy, sorrow, and so forth? Since it says the word "and so forth", one therefore knows that mental factors grasp all particular characteristics. Although there are four explanations, one should rely on the latter: all associated dharmas are equal in power with respect to one another; that some cognize and some do not is unreasonable. The treatise's statement that the particulars grasped by sensation and so forth are distinct is spoken provisionally with respect to what is grasped by their own activity; speaking realistically, through the power of association they mutually grasp the cognized object, none of which contradicts principle.